

WINTER 1958

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Quarterly

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IN THIS ISSUE . . .

The Canadian Election is examined by two authorities in our public affairs review. J. R. MALLORY, Department of Political Science and Economics at McGill University, analyses the constitutional questions raised; JOHN MEISEL, Department of Political and Economic Sciences, Queen's University, introduces a new field of social science research with his suggestive study of voting patterns in the June Election.

D. J. GOODSPEED, a previous contributor to the Quarterly, is an officer at Army Headquarters. He argues in his article that a silent social revolution has taken place in Canada which is the New World's answer to the Marxian dialectic.

With universities across Canada constructing residences in frantic anticipation of the estimated doubling of university population within the next few years, the article by Watts and Symons is timely and informative. R. L. WATTS is the Warden of the new men's residence at Queen's and teaches in the Philosophy Department. T. H. B. SYMONS, formerly acting dean of men, Trinity College, Toronto, is now Dean of Devonshire House, the new University of Toronto Residence for Men; he also teaches in the History Department.

GREGORY VLASTOS, who at one time was head of the Philosophy Department at Queen's University, is now teaching at Princeton. His brilliant, thoughtful paper on Socrates was originally presented to a meeting of The Humanities Association in June 1957.

The fascinating developments in the field of neurological research are examined by DR. DENIS WHITE, a distinguished member of the medical faculty of Queen's University. He was co-author of a report to the University of London on the status and need for psychiatric treatment within British prisons and is now especially concerned with micro-surgery.

Has Canada produced a major satirist to replace the late Stephen Leacock? This is the question considered in a con-

QUEEN'S QUARTERLY

tribution from D. J. DOOLEY who teaches in the Department of English, Royal Military College, Kingston. Pursuing a somewhat related theme, H. R. PERCY explores the current role and task of the critic in Canada. Mr. Percy joined the Royal Navy at the age of 16 and is now living in Canada as a member of the Canadian Navy. He has published various essays and short stories.

Canadian writers have tended to shy away from nature lore — perhaps they are surfeited by its abundance. KERRY WOOD is one of the few who deal in this commodity, and his account of a morning's detective work forms the substance of his pleasant, brief essay.

COLLEEN THIBAUDEAU contributes the short story to this issue. Although she has spent a year teaching in a French Lycée she assures us that the material used in her story was drawn from imagination, not from memory. She is married to the poet James Reaney.

A group of three short poems in this issue are by JAY MACPHERSON, whose recent collection of poems *THE BOATMEN* has attracted much favourable notice. She teaches English at Victoria College, Toronto. Other contributions to this department are by DOUGLAS G. JONES who is in the Department of English at the Ontario Agricultural College; GEORGE WALTON of the Civic Health Centre, Regina, whose long-time interest in explorers is brought out in his poem; and J. MUNRO MacLENNAN who was educated in Scotland and more informally educated in Canada as farm and bush worker, hobo and (the juxtaposition is accidental) civil servant; he has published plays, poetry and short stories.

QUEEN'S *Quarterly*

Volume LXIV

WINTER

Number 4

Public Affairs Review—

Canadian Election in Retrospect

I	<i>The Election and the Constitution</i>	465	J. R. MALLORY
II	<i>Analysing the Vote</i>	484	JOHN MEISEL
	<i>The Paradox of Socrates</i>	496	GREGORY VLASTOS
	<i>The Last Promenade—A Short Story</i>	517	COLLEEN THIBAUDEAU
	<i>The Canadian Revolution</i>	521	D. J. GOODSPEED
	<i>Psychiatry and Its Neurological Future</i>	531	DENIS NALDRETT WHITE
	<i>The Residence Hall and the University</i>	552	T. H. B. SYMONS and R. L. WATTS
	<i>Rocket to the Moon—A Poem</i>	568	J. MUNRO MACLENNAN
	<i>Three Poems</i>	569	JAY MACPHERSON
	<i>Stars over Evil Houses—A Poem</i>	570	D. G. JONES
	<i>Explorer's Tale—A Poem</i>	571	GEORGE WALTON
	<i>Trail at Dawn</i>	573	KERRY WOOD
	<i>The Satiric Novel in Canada Today</i>	576	D. J. DOOLEY
	<i>Criticism—Its Place in Canada's Future</i>	591	H. R. PERCY
	<i>The New Books</i>	599	

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Public Affairs Review

Canadian Election In Retrospect

I

The Election and the Constitution

by

J. R. MALLORY

History does not repeat itself. But the past becomes a part of the present. Thus it was in 1957 that behind the Twenty-third Parliament lay the shadow of the Fifteenth. For the first time since 1925 a general election had failed to return a political party with a majority in the House of Commons. Since we generally think of elections as settling the issue of who governs, little thought has been given to the questions of constitutional propriety and procedure which now arise.

The General Election which was held on June 10th seemed to be just another of those plebiscitary exercises by which Canadians have been re-electing Liberal majorities for almost a generation. At least so most observers thought, and their observations were confirmed by the Gallup Poll. But the electorate evidently thought otherwise, for they toppled the Liberals from their position as a majority party but unfortunately failed to give the necessary support for any other party to gain a clear majority.¹

It is not necessary here to attempt an explanation of what happened, though a few obvious points should be noted. In general, it

¹ The actual results were:

Conservative	111
Liberal	104
CCF	25
Social Credit	19
Others	6

may be said that for a long time the Liberals had succeeded in identifying themselves with the consensus of the country. Evidently within the last two years the Government had changed its relationship for a good many voters from "we" to "they". There was some cause for this. In the 1955 and 1956 sessions the Liberals had shown an arrogant insensitivity to the parliamentary opposition in the debates on the Defence Production and Pipeline bills. Both of these, however, were somewhat complex and abstract issues which probably did not have a profound effect on the average voter.² More important were a variety of discontents of various primary producers, particularly farmers bedevilled by accumulating surpluses and dwindling markets. Of decisive importance was the role of strong opposition political machines in several provinces. The formidable Conservative provincial organization in Ontario, which had played a negligible role in 1953 was in 1957 fully committed to the fray and resurgent conservative organizations in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Manitoba lent new weight to the Conservative campaign. Added to this the great efforts of the Social Credit parties in Alberta and British Columbia, and the well-established C.C.F. organization based in Saskatchewan, and the Liberals were sure to encounter heavy weather.

The result was a rebuff much greater than the party standings suggest, for no less than nine cabinet ministers, including C. D. Howe, Walter Harris, J. J. McCann, and Stuart Garson were lost. Only in Quebec did the Liberals hold their own, and even there there were casualties. Although the Liberals polled more votes than the Conservatives, nearly half their voting strength was in Quebec. The three-quarters of a million votes which they polled in Ontario were almost entirely dissipated by the hazards of three and four-cornered contests in single-member constituencies.

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² It is significant that after the conclusion of the Pipeline debate in 1956, the Opposition parties did not hold up Supply. The interim Supply Vote would have been exhausted by the end of June, and a serious delay in Supply would have forced a dissolution of Parliament. A quick appraisal of their chances in a General Election led the Conservatives to believe that the Pipeline issue was not sufficiently popular, and it is said that there would have been difficulty in raising campaign funds on that issue.

The press and public reaction to the results of the election revealed a mixture of bewilderment and confusion which gradually gave way to a kind of irritated comprehension. Before all the returns were in, the Canadian Press news agency had concluded that the Conservatives had won, and on the morrow a jubilant *Gazette* carried the headline VICTORIOUS PC PARTY TO FORM CANADA'S NEXT GOVERNMENT. The Canadian Press story on the election had no hesitation in saying that "Normal procedure will be for Governor-General Vincent Massey to call on . . . Mr. Diefenbaker . . . to form a government to succeed Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent's group, since he would have the largest Commons block."

Within a few hours other possibilities were being canvassed. *The Montreal Star's* Ottawa correspondent thought that the Liberals had three choices—to negotiate for third party support and remain in office; to seek an immediate dissolution (presumably without meeting Parliament at all); or to resign in favour of the Conservatives. There was widespread discussion of the possibility that in the last case Mr. Diefenbaker also would form a government only with a view to an immediate dissolution of Parliament.

Some of these suggestions reveal a remarkable lack of comprehension of the working of the Canadian constitution. It has been a generation since Canadians have been faced with the question of what happens when there is a change of government. Many people seem to have thought that Mr. Diefenbaker had become on that fateful night a "Prime Minister-elect." Canadians have been following far too many American election returns and in the process have lost sight of the fact that our constitution is not precisely the same as that which operates on the other side of the border.

The public memory is remarkably short, for a close parallel to the present situation arose as recently as 1952 in British Columbia. It was the lack of public understanding of what had happened there that led H. F. Angus to say that the election "has shown how little the public knows or cares about constitutional principles."³ His

³ Dean Angus also remarked that "the Lieutenant-Governor does differ in significant respects from the Governor-General and from the Queen." *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XVIII, no. 4, Nov., 1952, p. 518. While this is true it is worth noting that the public, in considering the role of the Governor-General in 1957, did not seem to think so.

further comments could be applied with equal force at least to the earlier reactions, as revealed in the Montreal and Ottawa newspapers, to the situation in 1957:

"There has been some popular discussion of the possibility of dissolving the new Legislative Assembly without allowing it to meet. Some say that if the Premier were to advise a dissolution the Lieutenant-Governor would be bound by constitutional usage to act on his advice; others that the Lieutenant-Governor would be constitutionally bound to reject the advice and allow the leader of the C.C.F. party, Mr. Winch, to attempt to form a government. The significant point in this discussion is the unanimity of opinion that the Lieutenant-Governor has no constitutional discretion in the matter. The rubber-stamp theory is universal and is, no doubt, the result of colonial tradition."⁴

One of the oddest reactions to the election in 1957 (and one which was expressed in places as far apart in every way as Quebec and British Columbia) was that the result had somehow made Canadians look foolish. We, with our long tradition of stable government, had produced an intolerable stalemate and we must hold another election at once to clear up the uncertainty. Someone, as the *Vancouver Province* reported on July 5th, had remarked, "Well, Diefenbaker sure restored the parliamentary system—but which parliamentary system, the British or the French?"

What everyone seems to have forgotten is that there was nothing new or abnormal in the situation at all. In fact it bore a marked resemblance to the General Election of 1925 when the party standings were Conservative 116, Liberal 101, Progressives 24, Others 4. Then as in 1957, a Liberal Government had gone to the country and had emerged from the election with a smaller number of seats than the Conservatives. That time also there had been a heavy toll of cabinet ministers, including the Prime Minister himself. The main difference is that in 1925 the balance of power was held by the Progressives, who were an undisciplined group essentially made up of former Liberals to whom a Conservative government was anathema.⁵ This time the

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 524.

⁵ The lack of coherence of the Progressives in parliament was not the result of poor leadership but of doctrine. The Progressives believed in "constituency autonomy" and distrusted the caucus so that their members were reduced to the status of mere delegates.

balance of power is held by two well-disciplined parties, neither of which has strong reason to prefer the Liberals to the Conservatives.

Not only has history, in a sense, repeated itself but it must be remembered that minority governments are by no means unique in constitutional history. There have been minority governments in Canada before, and Sir Ivor Jennings has pointed out that no less than eleven minority governments have held office in the United Kingdom since 1839.*

It is as well to remember that there is an important distinction to be made between choosing a House of Commons and choosing a government. When we went to the polls on June 10th we were not engaged in choosing a government, but a new House of Commons. If the Liberals had attained a majority of seats, they would not have "formed the next government" because no question would have arisen about a change of government at all. Mr. St. Laurent headed the 17th Ministry since Confederation, which dated from the day on which he became Prime Minister.

Mr. St. Laurent and his colleagues were as much H. M. Canadian Government on June 11th as they had been on June 10th—but with this qualification. The essence of responsible government is that a government has clear authority to make policy decisions only if it has the support of the House of Commons, to which it is responsible. Since the House of Commons elected on June 10th was evidently not one which *prima facie* would have supported a Liberal government, it is clear that Mr. St. Laurent's administration had at best only the authority to make routine decisions until the will of the new House became clear.

This does not mean that the Liberals should have stayed in office until Parliament was given an opportunity to express its will formally by acting as what Walter Bagehot called an "electoral chamber". In Bagehot's day everyone recognized the close connection between the House of Commons and the ministry and it was then believed that a government which resigned without facing the House and taking its medicine would be showing disrespect for the House of Commons.

* W. Ivor Jennings, *Cabinet Government* (Cambridge, 1947), p. 27.

This is no longer the accepted doctrine. As Jennings put it, "According to modern practice, the defeated government would not meet Parliament at all, but would resign as soon as the result of the general election was known."⁷

Before considering the proper courses open to Mr. St. Laurent it is as well to remember that the underlying principle of our constitution is that the Queen's government must be carried on. A government has no right to resign unless it is clear that a successor is ready to take over. This is the point at which the Governor-General must assume an active role in the constitution. For it is his constitutional duty as the Queen's representative to see that there is always a government in office.

Under the circumstances only two courses were open to Mr. St. Laurent. He could do as Mackenzie King had done in 1925, and as Stanley Baldwin had done in 1923. That is, he could remain in office on the assumption that he would be able to carry on the government with some kind of limited support from third parties in the House. This course, while possible, was much less certain than it had been in 1925. The Progressives could reasonably be expected to hold together to keep out the Conservatives, even if they could be expected to behave like a united party in nothing else. But apart from the fact that the Liberals in 1957 would have had to undertake humiliating negotiations with two separate and well-disciplined parties, there was little reason in fact to believe that the support of both could have been secured. The result might well have been an early and ignominious defeat in the House. A second disadvantage to this line of action was that it would look as if the Liberals were clinging to office at all costs, and this might not sit well with the electorate.⁸

The second course was to resign as soon as possible. Clearly it would not have been proper to resign at once, but only after it had been established that an alternative government could be formed.

⁷ W. Ivor Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

⁸ In 1929 Mr. Baldwin "informed the King that the public might regard it as 'unsporting' of him if he did not resign immediately, and might suspect that he was contemplating some deal with the Liberals to keep Labour out." Harold Nicolson, *King George V: His Life and Reign* (London, 1952), p. 435.

It is the duty of responsible political leaders not to leave the country without a government. Time must be left for the Governor-General to assure himself that another government can be formed, but once that is certain, resignation should follow as quickly as possible.

This was the course which Mr. St. Laurent resolved upon as soon, it appears, as he had digested the results of the election. There were those among his colleagues who argued strongly for hanging on, as Mackenzie King had in 1925. But the Prime Minister's mind was made up. His attitude must have been very similar to that of Stanley Baldwin, who said in 1929 that the verdict of the electorate meant "that whether they wanted the hon. members opposite or not, they certainly did not want me, and I was going to get out as soon as I could."⁹

The next steps followed in due course. On Wednesday, June 18, Mr. St. Laurent drove to Government House and formally tendered his resignation to the Governor-General. The resignation was not accepted until a new Prime Minister could be commissioned. The Governor-General then sent for Mr. Diefenbaker. It should perhaps be emphasized that Mr. Diefenbaker's right to be asked to form a government did not rest on the accidental fact that his party was the largest in the new House, but on his status as Leader of the Opposition.¹⁰

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This is a point at which the Governor-General might have become entangled in a point of some delicacy. Suppose Mr. Diefenbaker had agreed to form a government, but only on condition of an immediate dissolution? This course of action, which had been given wide currency in the press, could have led to a constitutional situation of great difficulty. For it would have been as important for Mr. Diefenbaker to have made such a suggestion, as it would have been for Mr. Massey to have entertained it. A similar proposal was canvassed in British Columbia in 1952, but it is significant that Mr. Bennett did not propose any such arrangement to the Lieutenant-Governor. The impro-

⁹ 261 H. C. Deb. 5s., 535. (Quoted in A. B. Keith, *The British Cabinet System 1830-1938* [London, 1938], pp. 300-1).

¹⁰ "It is the accepted rule that when a Government is defeated, either in Parliament or at the polls, the King should send for the Leader of the Opposition." Jennings, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

priety of accepting office under a condition of this kind has been made clear by constitutional authorities. Lord Haldane's view, as given to King George V, was "that the Sovereign cannot entertain any bargain for a Dissolution merely with a possible Prime Minister before the latter is installed. The Sovereign cannot, before that event, properly weigh the general situation and the Parliamentary position of the Ministry as formed."¹¹

In such a case Mr. Massey's duty would clearly have been to refuse to give such an undertaking, and to tell Mr. Diefenbaker that he could commission him as Prime Minister without conditions or not at all. Then, it might transpire that the Governor-General would be unable to accept Mr. St. Laurent's resignation, but would find it necessary to ask him to carry on the government. This, admittedly, exposes the Governor-General to ill-informed criticism and misconstruction of his action. But it is difficult to see how else the Governor-General could act without weakening the constitution.

The delicacy of the Governor-General's task was gratuitously brought into public notice in a speech by the Rt. Hon. J. G. Gardiner in the House on October 22nd. After reciting the party standings which had been produced by the election, he said:

I am advised that under the constitution . . . (it) is a matter of choice with the leader of the party which forms the government for the time being as to whether he should meet the house or whether he should advise the Governor-General to call upon some other member of the house to form the government. Well, the leader of the government decided on the latter course, that it was advisable to go to the Governor-General and discuss with him the possibility of resigning and not meeting the house, and turning the government over to some other party.

Well, naturally on an occasion of that kind the first thing the Governor-General would want to know . . . , is how do you propose that the government should be able to carry on sufficiently long to make it possible for the people of this country to know as to whether the person to whom they have given the largest representation is a person who can command a majority? There was only one way in

¹¹ This was in 1916. There is a full account of the circumstances in Neilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 288-9.

which the information could be given to the Governor-General, and that was for his adviser of that day to give it. . . .

When the government of the day found it necessary to give assurance to the Governor-General those assurances, of course, were given to the effect that we would carry on in such a manner as to make it possible for the new government to have sufficient support in the house to be able to place their policies before the people of this country and carry on from there.¹²

The purpose of this remarkable essay in constitutional theory was to explain the reason for Liberal tactics in the House. The Liberals, for obvious reasons, are in no hurry for another election. Therefore they have been harrying the government with awkward questions and provocative speeches; but provocation was kept within limits lest the Government be provided with an excuse for dissolving Parliament. In case these tactics should seem odd to the faithful, Mr. Gardiner was saying in effect that the Liberal party had an obligation to the Crown to sustain the government until its policy had been laid before the House.

Mr. Gardiner would not claim to be an authority on the constitution. Nevertheless, he is an experienced and responsible politician. He ought to know more about the rules of cabinet government than he seems to. If, as he said, he has been "advised" that he was setting forth the true constitutional position, he should seek other advisers. Apart from the questionable propriety of trying to use the Governor-General as the excuse for the parliamentary tactics of his party, Mr. Gardiner has completely misunderstood the constitutional rules which operate when there is a change of government.

Mr. Gardiner seems to be saying (1) that Mr. St. Laurent, having decided to resign, should *advise* the Governor-General to send for Mr. Diefenbaker; (2) that only Mr. St. Laurent could tell the Governor-General whether it was reasonable to suppose that Mr. Diefenbaker could form a stable government; and (3) that Mr. St. Laurent, in advising that Mr. Diefenbaker be sent for, assumed responsibility for keeping Mr. Diefenbaker in office, and must therefore give "assurances" to that effect. Apart from whether Mr. Gardiner's account bore

¹² *Canada. House of Commons Debates* (unrevised), Oct. 22, 1957, pp. 263-4.

any relation to the facts, it must be said that each of his three propositions is wrong.

First of all, a Prime Minister who tenders his resignation does not have the right—unless asked—to advise on his successor, and Mr. St. Laurent did not, in fact, advise His Excellency to send for Mr. Diefenbaker. Such advice would have been both presumptuous and unnecessary. When circumstances have clearly rejected a retiring Prime Minister, the advice will seldom be sought. Thus, although the facts are not yet clear, it seems improbable that the Queen sought Sir Anthony Eden's advice when she sent for Mr. Harold Macmillan. It is normally unnecessary to ask the advice of a Prime Minister who has been defeated at the polls, since the Leader of the Opposition, as Jennings says, has the right to be sent for.

It should also be said that such advice is not constitutional "advice" in the usual sense, for which constitutional responsibility can be assumed. If a government advises the Governor-General to make an appointment, or approve an order in council, then the government stands or falls by that advice. But when a Prime Minister advises as to his successor he is tendering advice in a less formal and more ordinary meaning of the term.

The appointment of a Prime Minister is the sole executive act which the head of state undertakes on his own responsibility. The reason for this is his responsibility for seeing that there is always a government in being, and the fact that the appointment of a Prime Minister requires no formal document to be signed, no seals to be used, and no public ritual to be performed. As Sir John Bourinot put it:

as a matter of fact, there is no appointment in the legal sense; the Governor-General authorizes a public man to assume the responsibility of forming a Cabinet. Only when the Premier takes a departmental office is there an appointment. The Premier is chosen under the conventions of the constitution.¹³

¹³ N. O. Côté, *Political Appointments in the Dominion of Canada 1867-1895* p. 31 fn. Sir Robert Borden, who left nothing to chance, caused the following memorandum to be prepared for the press on the eve of his retirement. It is dated July 5, 1920:

"Much confusion and misunderstanding seems to prevail in the press regarding the power and responsibility of a retiring Prime Minister in respect to the selection of his successor.

The selection of a new Prime Minister is one of the few personal acts which, under the British constitution, a Sovereign (in Canada and representative of the Sovereign) is

The choice of a Prime Minister is a uniquely informal act, and thus can be divorced from any kind of ministerial responsibility. Most other executive acts require the participation, and therefore the responsibility of ministers who have the custody of seals, or are needed to make up a quorum of the Privy Council.

Mr. Gardiner's second proposition is no more accurate than his first. It rests on the assumption that the Governor-General lives in a constitutional cocoon, into which intelligence from the outside world can only reach him from the Prime Minister. However, true this may be for the generality of executive acts, it is definitely not true in the case of choosing a Prime Minister. The Governor-General must form some intelligent estimate of whether the Prime Minister whom he designates can form a stable government. In this he may be aided by the counsel of others, but it is his decision alone.

Mr. Gardiner's third proposition, like the second, is based on too literal a view of responsible government. A Prime Minister who has resigned takes no responsibility for his successor, since that would be a responsibility which arose after he had lost the right to advise the Crown.

Surprisingly enough, Mr. Diefenbaker, who was sitting in his place with a preoccupied air during Mr. Gardiner's speech, had nothing to say in contradiction to it. The first reaction which caused any stir was a letter which appeared in the *Montreal Gazette* from Mr.

required to perform. A retiring Prime Minister has no right whatever to name his successor nor has he any responsibility with respect to the selection of his successor, except as follows:

The Sovereign or his representative may not see fit to ask his views of the retiring Prime Minister with respect to the selection of his successor. For example, the Queen, on the final retirement of Mr. Gladstone, did not ask his advice or his views on the question. In such a case, the retiring Prime Minister has no right whatever to express his views or to tender any advice on the subject. If, however, the Sovereign or his representative asks the views of the retiring Prime Minister, he has a right to express them, but they need not necessarily be followed. In expressing such views he does not tender advice as a Prime Minister, because he has already retired from office. His advice is to be regarded simply as that of a person holding the position of Privy Councillor, who has acquired a wide experience in public affairs, which would give a certain value to his opinion on such a subject. *P.A.C. Borden Papers* O. C. 607 (2) 65303.

It is said that King George V was much incensed to read in the press that in 1930 "Mr. Mackenzie King has issued a statement to the effect that he has advised the Governor General to send for Mr. Bennett." In the circumstances, his annoyance was clearly justified.

Leslie Roberts on October 28th. Mr. Roberts' objection was that it "again raises the question of impropriety on the part of the representative of the Crown." Mr. Roberts, writing "as an independent Liberal", was obviously thinking of the analogy of the King-Byng affair of 1926. He could have chosen better ground. The essence of his point was that the Governor-General, in proposing a "deal" was intervening in the affairs of parliament, and "if he can strike the kind of bargain Mr. Gardiner said he struck with Mr. St. Laurent, then Parliament is not supreme." This is surely not the point. While it would be questionable for a Governor-General to try to dampen the opposition in order to smooth the path of the Prime Minister designate, this was more than Mr. Gardiner was trying to say. Mr. Gardiner's difficulty arose from his belief that the Liberal Government, by resigning, assumed some kind of constitutional responsibility for enabling their successors to hold office long enough to place their proposals before Parliament. Actually, no such confusion existed in the minds of either Mr. St. Laurent or Mr. Massey. There was no bargain struck. Mr. St. Laurent rose in the House to say that "no assurance whatever was asked of me by His Excellency and that no assurance was given to His Excellency by me". He quoted from the public statement which he had issued at the time that, if Mr. Diefenbaker was prepared to form a government,

my colleagues and I will extend full co-operation to him and his party in their arrangements for taking office so that the Queen's government can go on without interruption. I have also told Mr. Diefenbaker that I feel the Liberal members of parliament will not attempt by obstruction to prevent the new government from carrying through parliament the programme it has placed before the people, though we shall, of course, exercise our right to express our views freely on the measures introduced in parliament.¹⁴

One definite good result of the events so far is that they have, in spite of the interventions of Messrs Gardiner and Roberts, quietly re-asserted the existence of the royal prerogative, and have done much to repudiate the pernicious "rubber-stamp" theory. Both principals, Mr. Diefenbaker and Mr. St. Laurent, showed the greatest considera-

¹⁴ *Canada. House of Commons Debates* (unrevised) October 28, 1957, p. 445.

tion for the position of the Governor-General and made no attempt to involve him needlessly in controversy. This one cannot say of all Canadian Prime Ministers. Mr. St. Laurent was careful not to press his resignation until his successor was able to form an administration. Nor did he advise His Excellency to send for Mr. Diefenbaker. Mr. Diefenbaker gave no sign that he was considering demanding a dissolution of Parliament before the Governor-General could reasonably grant it.

Circumstances conspired to minimize the constitutional difficulties which might have arisen. A summer session so soon after the campaign in the heat of Ottawa might not have lasted long, and the Conservatives have every tactical reason for wanting an early election. However, a summer session was made impossible by the long-standing arrangement (known to all parties but forgotten in the heat of the campaign by the Conservatives) to have the conference of the International Postal Union in the Parliament Buildings in August. The opening of the new session was further delayed by the arrangements for the royal visit in October, so that a dissolution before Christmas was in any event unlikely. After that the uncertainties of holding a winter election tend to make a dissolution before spring less likely.

Suppose, however, that Mr. Diefenbaker feels that he cannot work with the present Parliament, and asks for a dissolution after a short session? The Governor-General would be bound, in such a case, to consider whether another government could be found to carry on without the necessity of a new election. This would be 1926 all over again, and it could provoke a constitutional crisis which would make a political issue of the royal prerogative. There can be no doubt that it would be Mr. Massey's duty to do as King George V did in 1924, and inquire whether Mr. St. Laurent (or whoever at the time is leading the Opposition) wished to try to form a government.¹⁵ But what about Lord Byng's refusal of a dissolution to Mackenzie King in 1926, and its "repudiation" by the electorate? There is one stage in the

¹⁵ "The King did not agree 'immediately' (to Ramsay MacDonald's request for a dissolution): he agreed with the utmost reluctance and only after he had ascertained from the leaders of the Conservative and Labour parties that they themselves were unable or unwilling to form an Administration." Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.* p. 400n.

King-Byng crisis where the Governor-General was left in a vulnerable position. He seems to have allowed himself to accept Mackenzie King's resignation *before* finding out Mr. Meighen's intentions. Perhaps this was unavoidable, and probably Mr. Meighen was willing to form a government anyway, but things might have turned out differently if Mr. Meighen had not been forced to form a government because Mackenzie King had already resigned.

It may be argued that the results of the general election of 1926 have ruled out the possibility that the Governor-General should use his discretion in granting a dissolution.¹⁶ I cannot agree. The royal prerogative is there. It has survived even Mackenzie King. It is now unlikely that any party, for tactical reasons, would wish to take office in precisely the same circumstances as Mr. Meighen did in 1926. But that does not absolve the Governor-General from his duty to inquire as to their intentions, and to use his discretion in those rare and almost indefinable circumstances when it is necessary for the protection of the constitution. For practical reasons, a refusal of a dissolution to Mr. Diefenbaker is unlikely. As the *Montreal Gazette* concluded, "It is ironic that at almost the only time since 1926 that the issue could conceivably rise again, this practical precedent of Mr. King's 'constitutional election' of 1926 may be working out to the great advantage of the first Conservative Prime Minister to hold office in 22 years."¹⁷

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The 1957 election campaign was filled with brave talk from all three opposition parties about the "rights of parliament". There is a certain ironic justice in the results of the election, for the party which complained most—and with some justice—that the opposition was being rudely disregarded by an arrogant government, is now a government which is virtually a prisoner of the opposition. The shoe is on

¹⁶ "To this day, constitutional authorities—and authorities of the highest reputation—differ in judging Lord Byng's action in 1926. But, for all practical purposes, Prime Minister King's determination to fight an election on the issue, and his winning of that election, is generally reckoned to have guaranteed to his successors in office the right to a dissolution upon request." *The Gazette* Oct. 22, 1957. The right to a dissolution I cannot accept, but clearly the memory of 1926 improves their chances of getting it.

¹⁷ *The Gazette* Oct. 22, 1957.

the other foot, and we are beginning to see how it fits. From the point of view of the future of parliamentary government in Canada, the results of the election could not have been better. The House of Commons has now become the centre of decision. It has become important, when before it was in danger of rivalling the American college of electors in impotence. If government is to be carried on, the opposition has to be both effective and responsible. Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition now shares the big decisions, and we can now see how it can rise to the occasion.

Mr. Diefenbaker's promise to abolish closure raises the whole question of reform of the antiquated procedure of the House of Commons. Its rules are one of the last surviving relics of the age of wood, wind, and water. The recent change in the rules has done something to curtail the merely garrulous side of House of Commons debates by limiting the debate on the Address to ten sitting days and the debate on the budget to eight. However the rules still provide room for lengthy and pointless debate which accomplishes little except to interrupt the course of public business and there is still little incentive for the opposition to make economical and telling use of its available time. The mounting pressure of legislation and the growing importance of public business makes it more and more necessary that Commons debates should deal fully with essentials and less with trivialities.

The time will come, and come soon, when it will be necessary to introduce such changes in the rules as a limited number of supply days (with the opposition having the right to pick the items it wishes to debate), and methods of limiting the time of debate which are less brutal than full closure, such as the "kangaroo" and the "guillotine". But the success of these expedients depends essentially on the impartiality of the Chair. The pipeline debate reminds us of how far we are from placing the Speaker in a position of independence and authority which is essential to free debate in the House. The plight of a minority government is bound to expose these defects in the structure of the House of Commons. There is a hope that they may have the unexpected effect of strengthening the position of the Speaker. The new Speaker lacks the ultimate support of a government majority

and is forced to fall back on the great natural requirements for his office—dignity, fairness and a knowledge of the rules. Mr. Speaker Michener has already shown the gifts of a great Speaker. It will be a pity if his tenure of the chair is to depend on the frail and uncertain life of the twenty-third Parliament.

The election has brought up a further constitutional difficulty. The regional distribution of seats among the parties in the present House exposes a problem which has baffled the Conservative party since 1896—its inability to secure adequate support in Quebec (and in particular from French-Canadian members of parliament). Mr. Diefenbaker, who was chosen leader of his party over the solid opposition of Quebec Conservatives, now has a difficult task. The election strategy of the Conservatives was to concentrate their efforts in Ontario, the Maritimes and the West, and to minimize their efforts in Quebec. A memorandum prepared by the present Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr. Gordon Churchill, articulated if it did not actually inspire this strategy. The essence of the matter is expressed in this way: "The military maxim 'reinforce success not failure' might well be considered as applicable to political strategy." The essential fact was that "the great changes that result in the downfall of a government occur not in Quebec but elsewhere in Canada." In the event the Conservative success was considerable—except in Quebec where they succeeded in electing less than half a dozen French Canadian Conservatives.

Now, representation in the Cabinet for all sections of the country is deeply rooted in Canadian politics. It was first stated by Sir John A. Macdonald in the House of Commons on April 3, 1868, where he is reported to have said, "it was thought advisable that the confidence of every section of the Confederation should be invited and secured by the recognition of its right to Cabinet representation."¹⁸ This is a maxim which every Prime Minister since has ignored at his peril.

Mr. Diefenbaker has not ignored it. But his task of cabinet-making was hampered by the need to find his colleagues as far as possible

¹⁸ P.A.C. Canadian Parliamentary Debates, 1866-1870. MacDonald, incidentally, thought that a ratio of 5 to 4 between Ontario and Quebec was a proper balance of representation.

from among his successful supporters in the election. With a minority party he could not readily afford meeting the House with several of his ministerial colleagues out of the House until by-elections could be held. The results are a Cabinet which is strikingly different in structure from its recent predecessors. The pattern of representation can be seen by the following comparison, with the number of representatives in the St. Laurent Cabinet given in brackets: British Columbia 3 (2); Alberta 1 (1); Saskatchewan 2 (1); Manitoba 1 (1); Ontario 7 (6); Quebec 3 (6); New Brunswick 1 (1); Nova Scotia 1 (1); Prince Edward Island 1 (0); Newfoundland 1 (1).¹⁹

British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island have done better, but the striking discrepancy is Quebec. French Canadians have had to be content with the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, and the rather junior post of Solicitor-General. It is not surprising that the first reactions to the Diefenbaker Cabinet in the press of French Canada were chilling in their lack of enthusiasm. An editorial in *Le Devoir* at that time observed sombrely that the composition of the new Cabinet reduced Quebec "to the status of a second-class, nearly a third-class province". Neither the Conservative nor the Liberal parties, it argued, can rule without the support of at least twenty-five French Canadians in the House. "And it is in the interest of the French-language group to be strongly represented in every government, whatever may be its party name; for every time that group has lacked an influential representation, French Canadians have been subjected to grave injustices." These are words which Mr. Diefenbaker, and the country, may well ponder, for they represent one of the necessary accommodations to Canadian life.

The return of the Conservatives to power has posed a further question of constitutional importance. The operation of stable constitutional government depends as much on the political neutrality of civil servants as on the political sensitivity of politicians. One of the most important changes in the government of Canada in the twenty-two years since the Conservatives were last in power has been the

¹⁹ These figures do not include Senators in the Cabinet in either case. Mr. St. Laurent's cabinet included one Senator from Ontario, while Mr. Diefenbaker's includes one from Manitoba.

growth of the responsibilities of government for the management of the economy. In that period there has grown up a higher civil service, able and dedicated to the preservation of the elaborate and efficient government machine which has stood the test of war and the challenge of the post-war world. It has been an open secret for years that many of them felt that the opposition parties, and particularly the Conservatives, were unsympathetic to the objectives of many of the government policies which they regarded as essential, and did not understand even the elements of the problems of policy in a modern state. There was a feeling that a Conservative government might, in its ignorant enthusiasm, wreck the delicate machine and break the hearts of the operators. Furthermore, while the impartiality of the Canadian civil service is not in doubt, its anonymity has at least been compromised.²⁰ Most of the top officials have been publicly identified with policies, and since many of them originally entered the civil service from the universities, some had even written books in which their views on policy are on the record for all to see. Under the circumstances there were two ominous possibilities. The first was that in their dislike of past policies the new Ministers would thrust senior officials aside into positions of little influence with a serious impairment of efficient administration. The second was in some respects worse: that many senior officials would not wait to be sidetracked, but would resign and leave Ottawa for friendlier climates.

So far neither of these gloomy forebodings have been justified. Only in the rarest cases have officials resigned or found themselves in powerless obscurity. The only apparent source of conflict has been between the Minister of Finance and the senior officers of the Bank of Canada—and it was a Conservative government which originally set up the Bank in a position of independence from the government of the day.

A good official soon makes his indispensibility clear, and while the adjustment may be somewhat painful for both Ministers and senior

²⁰ *The New Statesman* on June 22, 1957, reflected a widespread though not necessarily accurate view, when it spoke of Mr. Diefenbaker's problem of finding "some way of working with a civil service which, many people believe, has at some levels become an outpost of the Liberal Party."

civil servants, there are grounds for hope that the consequences may be beneficial for both groups. Ministers in office soon learn caution, and senior civil servants may be fortunate enough to learn that even Conservatives are reasonable men.

It is probably a healthy thing that the new government does not have a commanding majority, for Ministers will learn under conditions in which they cannot make sweeping changes the difficulties which beset the course of high policy. There has been widespread doubt in this country as to whether the Conservative party—so long out of office—possesses the capacity to govern. The present situation is ideal for removing that doubt. One of the great achievements of Stanley Baldwin was that he was not afraid to face the possibility of a Labour Government in office, and thus he contributed to the restoration of a healthy party system in Britain. A similar magnanimity and foresight may be to the credit of Louis St. Laurent. Whether the Conservatives are in power for a year or a generation, it is now likely that the myth that only the Liberal party can govern has been dispelled.

Canadian politics has been monotonous for too long. Nothing could be better calculated to restore public interest in the political process than the tense and bracing atmosphere of the present House of Commons. The life of the twenty-third Parliament may be short and strenuous, but it will not quickly be forgotten.

II

Analysing The Vote

— The "Psephologists'" Paradise —

by

JOHN MEISEL

Canada is slowly becoming accustomed to the idea of having a Conservative government. Public attention is focused on Ottawa and the actions of the new government and of the new opposition. The question which probably more than any others intrigues us is concerned with the future: what will happen to our parties now? More specifically, many wonder when the next election will take place, and when it does, how it will go.

But while most people are looking ahead, there are some who are preparing themselves for a careful examination of the past. This minority of backward-looking individuals consists of those who would like to know what really happened in last June's election. It is made up mostly of two groups: the politicians and political workers, largely intent on learning from the past how they can improve their performance in the future, and the academic students of politics who are primarily concerned with increasing their insight into the workings of democratic political institutions. The former group has the advantage of direct and intimate contact with the hustings in both their public and behind-the-scenes aspects. Its members often display a seemingly intuitive and almost uncanny understanding of the forces influencing electoral behaviour.

The academic students of voting lack the professional politicians' first-hand and continuous knowledge of the practical and every-day aspects of an election. Like ghosts haunting the deserted polling stations long after the ballots have been counted, they seek to discover why the voters behaved as they did. Less familiar than their activist colleagues with the day-to-day working of an election campaign, they nevertheless have potent weapons at their disposal. Less

pressed for time, usually more objective in approach, more familiar than the practising politician with studies of elections elsewhere and equipped with tricks provided by the armoury of social science, the "uncommitted" student of elections can add considerably to our knowledge of voting behaviour. Another characteristic distinguishing the academic from the professional student of elections is the matter of secrecy. The practitioner is naturally often reluctant to tell what he knows: information in his possession might bring aid and comfort to the enemy. The academic analyst is usually willing to publish his findings and to discuss elections with anyone prepared to join him. He is particularly keen, of course, on "pumping" the politician since the latter may provide him with useful information he cannot obtain in any other way.

Political scientists have in recent years shown so much interest in elections that the study of voting habits and patterns has become almost a special branch of their discipline. An ingenious British scholar has even thought up an impressive name for this new field of study. It is "psephology", derived from the Greek word "psephos", denoting the pebble used by Athenians in casting their votes. Psephology flourishes in the United Kingdom and the United States. But elections and voting in Canada have not yet been subjected to the full-scale examination they have received elsewhere. This article will give a glimpse of how psephologists might tackle some problems presented by the 1957 Canadian general election.

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One type of approach requires that a study of the election be begun long before the voting takes place. This analysis is based on the same principle of sampling used by the Gallup and other polls. It requires that a statistically valid sample of the population be interviewed once or if possible more often, before the election and at least once after the voting has taken place. Psephologists using this technique differ from the public opinion pollsters in not being interested in forecasting election results. They are more interested in discovering *why* people act in a particular manner on election day, than in predicting *how* they are likely to vote in a forthcoming election. The psephologist usually assumes that social, economic and other

characteristics of voters predispose them towards particular types of electoral behaviour. Interviews with a cross-section of the eligible voters are usually designed to discover which factors are important in influencing voting preferences, in what relation to one another these factors are important, and under what circumstances they are most likely to influence political choice-making. The question then is really what makes Sammy run to the polls and what makes him vote the way he does when he gets there. The interview method is an extremely useful one, but it is expensive. Since it has never been applied to a national election we cannot draw on it for an illumination of the 1957 results.

In the absence of survey data, much can be learned from the careful examination of voting results and from comparing these with information available about the general characteristics of the population and about political developments during the electoral campaign. The painstaking analysis of all the information relevant to the election can be applied to testing various hypotheses about what happened in an election. Sometimes the cold figures reveal interesting relationships between voting and other factors and suggest previously unsuspected explanations for shifts in votes.

After June 10 a variety of reasons was put forward for the Liberal defeat. The following are perhaps among those most frequently heard: widespread displeasure at the way in which the Liberal government handled the pipe-line issue; criticism of the government's attitude toward Parliament; a general feeling that the Liberal party had been in office too long or that its majority was too great; the tight-money policy; Mr. Diefenbaker's personality and particularly his vigorous personal campaign and Mr. Leslie Frost's outspoken and aggressive support for the federal Conservative party. Sometimes it is argued that one or two of these factors are primarily responsible for the government's fate at the hands of the electorate; at other times they and others are considered to have converged and supplemented one another to bring about an attitude more favourable to the Conservative party than that prevailing in 1953.

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Psephology can be useful in providing at least provisional answers to some of the questions posed by the startling election results of last June. It can, for example, test the effectiveness of Mr. Frost's intervention in the campaign. In trying to measure Premier Frost's influence the psephologist would make a number of assumptions. They would run something like this: one of the major differences between the elections of 1953 and 1957 was the intervention of Mr. Frost in the more recent campaign. While other factors (like the change in the Conservative leadership) might complicate the issue, Mr. Frost could be considered an important factor in the Conservative victory if the Conservative vote in Ontario were higher in 1957 than in 1953. If it is higher, then to support the case for Mr. Frost's influence one would have to show that the swing to the Conservative party was greater in Ontario, than in the other provinces where, presumably, he is less influential.

The percentage of votes obtained by the Conservatives in 1957 in Ontario was, in effect, considerably higher than in the previous election. The party actively supported by Mr. Frost received 48 per cent of the votes cast, about 8 percentage points more than the Conservatives obtained in 1953. This represents a slightly greater shift toward the Conservatives than that produced by the country as a whole. The Conservatives, in other words, gained a slightly greater proportion of votes in Ontario than they did in all of Canada. But when one compares the shift towards the Conservatives in Ontario with that in other provinces, it appears that in six provinces (Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia) there was a proportionately greater increase in the Conservative vote than in Ontario. Only New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Quebec showed a smaller percentage increase in support for Mr. Diefenbaker's party than the province in which Mr. Frost, for the first time, vigorously supported it. It seems, therefore, that Mr. Frost's efforts made less difference than many observers have thought.

This can be only a tentative conclusion. It may be, that without Mr. Frost's activities, the Conservatives would have gained less support than they actually obtained. In the absence of information derived from reliable samples of the population, the psephologist can

only make provisional assessments about the causes for electoral change. He can say, however, that the examination of the results does not support the view which attributes a good deal of the Conservative success to the efforts made on behalf of his national party by Mr. Frost. It is possible that Mr. Frost's prestige helped the Conservative party to carry some of their newly-won seats, particularly in Toronto. There, some of the ridings showed a swing to the Tories greater than the total Ontario swing. The winning of seats is, of course, of fundamental importance in an election. But even although Mr. Frost may have helped his party in carrying one or two doubtful seats (and there is no obvious evidence of this in the returns) the Ontario results, when compared with those of the other provinces, show that he was not responsible for the ground-swell which carried the Conservative party to Ottawa.

How effective was Mr. Diefenbaker's personal campaign? Press reports indicated that he drew unusually large and enthusiastic crowds wherever he appeared to make a speech. Is this reflected in the election results? At present only a very rough answer can be given to this question. An adequate assessment would require that a comparison be made of the votes obtained by the Conservatives in cities, towns or villages where Mr. Diefenbaker made speeches with the support they received in comparable places which he did not visit. One might ask whether there are any "comparable" places in this sense. But even assuming that such comparisons can be made, the question cannot yet be answered because so far only election results for the constituencies as a whole are available. The breakdowns of the vote by smaller areas within the constituencies will not be available until next Spring. In the meantime we can make a small beginning. Do the results of the voting in the various constituencies as we now have them, suggest that Mr. Diefenbaker's personal contact with the voters was one of the factors explaining his party's success?

To illustrate how this test can be made, two provinces in the West and two in the Maritimes will be selected for study. Looking at the Conservative gains in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, constituency by constituency, we find that the shift towards the Conservatives from 1953 to 1957 is not proportionately greater in ridings visited by Mr.

Diefenbaker than in those the party leader omitted during his pre-election campaign. Of the twelve¹ constituencies in Nova Scotia, for example, Mr. Diefenbaker visited six. In only two of these was the shift towards the Conservatives (1953 to 1957) greater than the average of the shifts of all the Nova Scotia constituencies. At the same time in the six constituencies *not* visited there were also two which had a Conservative increase greater than the average for the province. Similar results can be found in New Brunswick. Mr. Diefenbaker spoke in five of the ten ridings. In only one of those visited was the swing towards the Tories above the average of all the ten Conservative shifts in New Brunswick. Two of the five ridings *not* visited produced above average Conservative swings.

The matter can also be looked at in a somewhat different manner. The ten New Brunswick constituencies can be ranked so that the riding with the highest Conservative shift appears first on the list, and the constituency with the smallest shift is last. Do the places visited by Mr. Diefenbaker appear towards the top or the bottom of the list? In New Brunswick Mr. Diefenbaker spoke in the first, fourth, seventh, eighth and ninth of the constituencies when they are arranged in order according to the size of the Conservative gains. Nova Scotia exhibits a similar pattern. The party leader visited ridings standing second, third, sixth, eighth, ninth and tenth in terms of the magnitude of the Conservative shift. These figures suggest, therefore, that Mr. Diefenbaker's personal appearance in the constituencies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick was not an important factor in the Conservative victory.

In the West the story is quite different. Six of the fourteen Manitoba constituencies were visited by the Conservative leader. Of the six, five produced above average shifts towards the Conservatives. In the eight ridings *not* visited by Mr. Diefenbaker, two had shifts² above the average for all the ridings in the province, but six produced swings which were below average. Similar results prevail in Alberta. In six of the nine constituencies on Mr. Diefenbaker's campaign itinerary

¹ Halifax, which elects two members, is here counted as two constituencies.

² In this case, the total 1957 Conservative votes obtained in ridings where there were no Progressive Conservative candidates in 1953 are counted as "shifts".

the swing towards his party was above average; in all of the eight ridings *not* visited the swing was below average.

The present Prime Minister's considerable personal influence in the West seems also to be attested by the ranking of constituencies according to the size of the Conservative shift. In Manitoba, ridings in which Mr. Diefenbaker made a speech stood first, second, third, fourth, sixth and ninth; in Alberta they occupied the first seven spots as well as the ninth, and curiously also the last, the seventeenth. A comparison of this sort suggests strongly, then, that Mr. Diefenbaker's personal appearances were much more effective as vote-getters in the Prairie provinces than in the Maritimes. Assuming for the time being that the evidence on this point is conclusive, what are we to make of this finding?

In the first place, the student of elections might suggest that being a Westerner, Mr. Diefenbaker is more likely to carry weight with the voters in his own part of the world than in the distant East. The argument might also be put forward that politics in the Maritimes tends to be more constituency-centred than elsewhere, so that local matters are more important than national issues and personalities. Or again it might be argued that the presence in the West of doctrinaire splinter parties does in some ways explain the seemingly different response to the Conservative national leader. Perhaps Mr. Diefenbaker's personality appeals more to the allegedly extroverted Westerners than to the more reserved Easterners. These and other reasons might satisfy the casual observer of Canadian party-life. Serious students of politics, however, will consider them merely as hypotheses to be tested individually and together in a series of further analyses of detailed voting returns, population statistics, and by examining the electoral contest in each constituency.

So far in our guided tour of the Canadian voting scene we assumed that the evidence submitted above on Mr. Diefenbaker's personal appeal is valid. This assumption requires a second look. For the planners of his election campaign most certainly drew up Mr. Diefenbaker's itinerary according to a scheme of priorities which carefully selected for a personal visit those constituencies where Mr. Diefenbaker was thought to be able to do the most good. Our "sample" is,

therefore, clearly "rigged" and since we do not know exactly according to what principle, we must be cautious in interpreting our results. Election strategy in Canada demands that the greatest attention be paid to the winning of seats and not primarily to totals or to shifts in the popular vote. In our attempt to measure the Conservative leader's popularity we have ignored the number of seats won or lost and have emphasized shifts in the popular vote. In so doing we have frequently ignored local conditions which are often at least as important as the personalities of the national leaders. Yet a third qualification needs to be mentioned in relation to our study of Mr. Diefenbaker's influence. We have looked at the effects of the Conservative leader's *personal* appearance in a constituency. But much of the effect he has on the public is not through face-to-face contact—it is through the press, the radio and T.V. An analysis of the kind partially outlined above does not measure anything like the total effect of a particular national leader; it simply examines one aspect of his performance. All these qualifications notwithstanding, the type of analysis we applied to Mr. Diefenbaker's campaign can be highly illuminating. It removes some of the guess-work from political analysis; when it is carried out in detail and in relation to other evidence, it will explain one of the more intriguing aspects of the 1957 Liberal defeat. Similar work will have to be done on Mr. St. Laurent's campaign travels and also on the 1953 electioneering of Mr. Drew.

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Some observers of the last election have ascribed considerable Liberal losses to the so-called tight-money policy. This assertion might also be tested by scrutinizing election returns. The method to be used can be briefly outlined. As in most of the tests devised by psephologists one must begin by making an assumption. In this case it is that voters living in the new suburbs were among those most seriously affected by the shortage of credit and by the high interest rate. This assumption can be questioned since those already in the suburbs can be assumed to have raised most of the money needed for acquiring a home. But there is much evidence suggesting that this group of citizens was hard-hit by the high cost of borrowing because it had made heavy commitments dependent on future relatively

easy and cheap credit. Having already assumed considerable financial responsibilities this group was harder hit by the government's "credit freeze" than those who had merely been frustrated in plans for a new modern home. Being physically segregated outside the older settlements, the suburbanites make it possible for us to examine their voting record.

One convenient way of locating the suburban vote is by reference to 1956 Census data. The Dominion Bureau of Statistics publications showing population characteristics by Census tracts within cities and metropolitan areas are particularly useful. These reports contain information on the sex, marital status and age of individuals, and on the size of households within relatively homogeneous economic areas. A map showing the percentage change in population between 1951 and 1956 is also appended and facilitates the easy spotting of various areas within cities, including the new suburbs. An examination of the information on Hamilton, Ontario, for example, reveals that the greatest population increase since 1951 took place in the Southern and Eastern parts of the city. The electoral maps for the three Hamilton constituencies show that almost all of this newly expanded and rapidly-growing part of the city is in the constituency of Hamilton South. While the population in the other two Hamilton constituencies declined after 1951, Hamilton South's rose from 73,049 to 97,438. The map makes it clear that much of the new population lives in suburbs. If our earlier assumption is correct, therefore, this constituency is likely to include a large number of people hard hit by the tight money policy. How did the vote here compare with the other parts of Hamilton?

The shift towards the Conservative party in Hamilton South was only slightly greater than in Hamilton East and about two percentage points greater than in Hamilton West. Liberal losses were actually greater in Hamilton East, although they were considerably smaller in the West constituency. One cannot, therefore, escape the conclusion that on the whole, Hamilton South, the newest, most suburban-type part of the city voted much like the older districts. This illustration is, of course, relevant for only one city. An adequate test of the effects of the tight money policy demands that similar analyses be

carried out in many constituencies and in smaller areas within them. Should results similar to those in Hamilton be found, it would of course be clear either that the tight-money policy was not as important an issue in the election as is sometimes thought, or that the assumption made about the effects of the tight-money policy *on the suburbs* was inadmissible. In the latter case new attempts will have to be made to isolate areas hard-hit by the late government's fiscal policies.

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From what has been said above it is clear that electoral analysis, as compared with electoral guesswork, is a lengthy, laborious and frequently frustrating work. In the absence of data derived from surveys, without the full returns and the careful examination of them it has so far failed to explain what really happened on June 10. Up to this point, we have illustrated the psephologist's craft by showing how he looks at some of the factors influencing electoral behaviour. These techniques are useful in showing how voters displaying various social or economic characteristics respond to a variety of political issues and tactics. But political scientists also want to know the wider significance of events taking place in an election. For example, what is the meaning of a particular voting pattern in relation to the general political life of the community? In asking this sort of question psephology approaches the field of political theorists and becomes of particular importance to them.

The recent Canadian election has raised one such question of general political importance. At our present state of knowledge we must conclude that the events of June 10, 1957 were the result of the convergence of a whole series of factors which persuaded significant numbers of people to vote against the Liberal party. Everyone has commented on the fact that of the not inconsiderable number of seats retained by the Liberals, the vast majority is French-speaking. This means in effect that one important group of Canadians—the French-speaking population—remained untouched by the factors which produced the otherwise fairly general swing towards the Conservatives. Whatever the complex of forces was that carried Mr. Diefenbaker into the Prime Minister's office, it had little effect on the

vast bulk of our French population, whether in Quebec or elsewhere. In addition to the French-speaking Canadians, there was at least one other group which remained immune to the pro-Conservative mood of the electorate—the armed forces.

It is easy to explain the aloofness of the French Canadians from the general climate of political opinion in the rest of the country. This can be done, for example, by referring to a long-standing Liberal voting tradition, the personality of Mr. St. Laurent and perhaps also that of Mr. Diefenbaker. The service vote can also be accounted for by pointing to the apprehension said to have been widespread among military personnel prior to the election about the reforms advocated by Conservative military critics. But to mention these explanations is not to say why they were apparently able to stem the pro-Conservative tide when other factors favouring the Liberals were not able to do so. Of the many possible reasons why the above explanations of the typical voting pattern of the French-speaking and the service population were effective, one deserves special attention.

Both of the groups which remained loyal to the Liberals live, in a sense, in isolation. The French Canadians are isolated from many of the cultural themes of the overwhelmingly English-speaking North American continent. In their educational and legal systems, in language, family life and in many respects in general outlook they are different from the rest of Canada. These and other differences, often jealously guarded, give them, as a group, a sense of non-participation in the activities of the rest of the country. In a way, they may have become so isolated from national political developments as to be outside what we might call the main Canadian political community. The same may be true of the service voters. It is well known that service personnel and their families tend to form strong attachments to one another not only in their official but also in their private activities. The sense of community and of belonging imposed by compound life often persists even when the compound is no longer physically present. The service people may therefore resemble the French Canadians in being, and in feeling themselves to be, excluded from the main stream of Canadian life.

It seems likely that groups which are segregated in this way respond not at all or perhaps more slowly to the political forces which

agitate the rest of community. They may have the same rights and duties as everyone else, but they may respond differently to the social, economic and political stimuli to which they are exposed. Sometimes, in modern history, groups of this sort have become so detached from others in the country that they have turned against the very system of government under which they became alienated. There is, of course, not the slightest suggestion that there is any danger of this in Canada. The result of the apparent political "non-conformity" in 1957 of the French Canadians and of the service voters does not presage the imminent collapse of our political system. Nevertheless, the Canadian psephologist is interested in explaining the causes for the aloofness of certain groups and in making comparisons between electoral phenomena in Canada and elsewhere.

The apparent "isolation" in 1957 of some groups of Canadian voters (and much work needs to be done to show if and how these groups really are isolated) poses some interesting problems for the student of politics. What is the relation between political and non-political causes for the isolation of certain groups? Is the "withdrawal" of certain groups from the main political community merely an indication of a different rate of responding to political issues? In other words, do some groups simply respond more slowly to political changes than others? If there is real "isolation", how long does it last? What adjustments are required to bring it to an end, assuming that it is undesirable? These and the simpler questions posed earlier in this article are waiting to be answered by Canadian political scientists and particularly those among them who are studying elections. In the midst of the current demands for greater expenditure on research in the natural sciences, it is not likely that impressive resources will be made available to them. But if they are to help us understand those of our political problems which are related to voting patterns, they will need considerable financial support. For their activities are expensive not only because they are extremely time-consuming, but because many of their problems cannot be solved without the extensive use of costly sample-surveys.

The Paradox of Socrates *

— An Essay in Communication —

by

GREGORY VLASTOS

What shall it profit a scholar if he gain the treasured knowledge of his own field of specialisation and then is unable to share it with others? This was the question Professor Vlastos posed as he confronted a mixed audience representing every conceivable discipline. Here in this wise, lucid essay on one of the world's greatest and most puzzling philosophers he triumphs over his self-imposed challenge. Never once does he dilute his argument or evade a difficult problem. We are led on to new depths of discovery that make this essay an "intellectual experience" which we are pleased to share with our readers.

Most of the results of scholarly work are not communicable to the public or even to scholars in other fields. They are reportable, certainly; but that is not the same thing, else why should these reports prove so boring? In this I see nothing to be ashamed of; university presidents and foundation potentates have no cause to scold us over it. In spite of glib talk of the community of scholarship on ceremonial occasions, the world of scholarship is of its very nature separatist, if not downright sectarian. Here the people who do the work, instead of the hiring or the paying or the talking, go out singly or in small groups, scattering widely, to do different jobs with different tools in different locales. To appreciate the value of what these search-parties turn up one should know their language, which is not a carelessly concocted jargon, but an idiom ingeniously devised to say things which can be said in no other way; one should also be acquainted with their methods of collecting facts, assessing evidence, and testing generalizations. How can the outsider, who has not learned the vocabulary or the syntax or the discipline of a given field of investigation be expected to get the point of findings in that field? And is it

* An address to a meeting of the Humanities Association of Canada at Ottawa on June 13, 1957.

surprising if, missing their point, he should think them pointless—bizarre, or picayune, or merely dull?

Are we then to give up the idea of a community of scholars? As a Humanities Association you have the faith that such a community can exist, and I did not accept the honour of your invitation to come to tell you that yours is a *credo quia impossibile*. But perhaps you might allow me to tell you that your faith (and mine) is a *credo quia difficile*. Scholarship of itself does not breed community—only communities. To bring together companies of specialists into a grouping that is not a conglomerate but a community, something more than scholarship is needed. What is that?—I should be willing to call it *humanism*, if you would go along with my homespun definition of a humanist as 'a scholar who makes a strenuous effort to be human'. There are various ways of being *inhuman*, and all of them are offences against community. Some of these are graver than others, as are cruelty and pride as over against, say, mere grumpy eccentricity. The scholar's form of inhumanity is probably the least objectionable of all, generally harmless, even benignant, for the by-products of his work are sure to bless his kind in one way or another in the end. But it is inhumanity nonetheless, a withdrawal from the common language and the common values of humanity.

Historically, the humanist has been the learned man aware of the perils of this alienation of learning from humanity. In the confident period of the Renaissance the first generations of humanists looked to scholarship itself to heal the breach. They thought that to be a humanist it is enough to be a scholar. To revive their hope today would be to indulge in an illusion. Today it is a well-known fact that one can be a good scholar, an excellent one, without a peer in one's field, yet not be a humanist at all. To be a humanist now-a-days calls for a special effort: first, to find the relevance of our individual work to our common humanity; secondly, to state our findings in common speech—by which, of course, I don't mean folksy talk, but (for those of us who speak English) just the Queen's English, unassisted by a suit-case full of technical glossaries. For most of us this is costly and hazardous work: costly, for it takes time which the scholar in us grudges to anything but scholarly work; hazardous, because it compels

us to say things we have not weighed as carefully as the scholarly conscience would require, so that, while saying them, we are never wholly free from the suspicion that we may not mean all we say, if only because we don't know precisely what we mean. Here are two good reasons for refraining from the performance on which I am about to launch. Yet in spite of cost and hazard this work is worth attempting from time to time, for unless some of us are willing to do it I fail to see how the community of scholarship can be anything but a phrase, and humanism anything but a memory.

It was some such thought as this—not just vanity, nor just the pleasure of a reunion with my Canadian friends, though I plead guilty to both—that made me accept your invitation. And the same thought fixed the choice of the topic. For Socrates is one of those rare figures that have the power to interest scholars in several fields—the philologist, the philosopher, the historian, the critic of culture, the student of religion; and not only scholars, but all sorts and conditions of men. As a person and as a thinker he has, I believe, the truly human importance that entitles him to your attention for the duration of this address.



The Socrates I have in mind is the Platonic Socrates, or, to be more precise, the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues. That this figure is a faithful imaginative recreation of the historical Socrates is the conclusion of some very reputable scholars, though not of all. It is also the conclusion I have reached myself after working on the problems at first-hand. To report on this work in any detail would be out of keeping with the purpose of this address. But you are certainly entitled to some assurance that my Socrates is not Platonic fiction but historic fact. This I can give you in a few plain words:

There is one, and only one, serious alternative to Plato's Socrates, and that is Xenophon's. The two are irreconcilable at certain points, and these are crucial:

—Xenophon's is a Socrates without irony and without paradox. Take away irony and paradox from Plato's Socrates, and there is nothing left.

- Xenophon's Socrates is so persuasive that, "whenever he argued," Xenophon declares, "he gained a greater measure of assent from his hearers than any man I have ever known" (*Memorabilia* 4.6.16). Plato's Socrates is not persuasive at all. He wins every argument, but never manages to win over an opponent. He has to fight every inch of the way for any assent he gets, and gets it, so to speak, at the point of a dagger.
- Xenophon's Socrates discourses on theology and theodicy, argues for the existence of a divine mind that has created man and ordered the world for his benefit. Plato's refuses to argue over anything other than man and human affairs.
- Plato's Socrates maintains that it is never right to repay evil with evil. He says this in studied defiance of the contrary view, axiomatic in Greek morality from Hesiod down, and fixes here the boundary-line between those who can agree with him on fundamentals and those who can't. Xenophon's Socrates has never heard of the boundary-line. He stands on the wrong side, the popular side, parrots the common opinion that the good man will "excel in rendering benefits to his friends and injuries to his enemies" (*Memorabilia* 2.6.35).

What does this prove? If Plato and Xenophon cannot both be right, why must Plato be right? That his Socrates is incomparably the more interesting of the two figures, in fact the only Socrates worth talking about, proves nothing. We cannot build history on wish-fulfillment. Fortunately there is another consideration that proves a great deal. It is that Plato accounts, while Xenophon does not, for facts affirmed by both and also attested by others. For example: that Critias and Alcibiades had been companions of Socrates; or again: that Socrates was indicted and condemned on the charge of not believing in the gods of the state and of corrupting its youth. Xenophon's portrait will not square with either of these. Not with the first, for his Socrates could not have attracted men like Critias and Alcibiades, haughty aristocrats both of them, and as brilliant intellectually as they were morally unprincipled. Xenophon's Socrates,

pious reciter of moral commonplaces, would have elicited nothing but a sneer from Critias and a yawn from Alcibiades, while Plato's Socrates is just the man who could have got under their skin. As for the second, Plato, and he alone, gives us a Socrates who could have plausibly been indicted for subversion of faith and morals. Xenophon's account of Socrates, apologetic from beginning to end, refutes itself: had the facts been as he tells them, the indictment would not have been made in the first place.

So I trust you may be reconciled to the thought of parting company with Xenophon for the rest of this address, and may even concur with me that the best thing we can do with this very proper Athenian is to make an honorary Victorian out of him, and commend him to the attentions of some bright young man who would like to continue the unapostolic succession to Lytton Strachey. But that still leaves us with the question: How far can we then trust Plato? From the fact that he was right on some things it does not follow, certainly, that he was right in all his information on Socrates, or even on all its essential points. But we do have a check. Plato's *Apology* has for its *mise en scène* an all-too-public occasion. The jury alone numbered 501 Athenians. And since the town was so gregarious and Socrates its public character number one, there would have been many more in the audience. So when Plato was writing the *Apology*, he knew that hundreds of those who might read the speech he puts into the mouth of Socrates had heard the historic original. And since his purpose in writing it was to clear his master's name and to indict his judges, it would have been most inept to make Socrates talk out of character. How could Plato be saying to his fellow citizens, "This is the man you murdered. Look at him. Listen to him,"¹ and point to a figment of his own imagining? This is my chief reason for accepting the *Apology* as a reliable recreation of the thought and character of the man Plato knew so well. You will notice that here, as before, I speak of *recreation*, not reportage. The *Apology* was probably written several years after the event, half a dozen years or more. This, and Plato's genius, assures us that it was not journalism, but art. Though the emotion with which

¹ Here and throughout I use inverted commas to indicate an *imaginary* quotation, reserving regular quotation marks for citations from the texts.

Plato had listened when life and death hung on his master's words must have branded those words into his mind, still that emotion recollected in tranquillity, those remembrances recast in the imagination, would make a new speech out of the old materials, so that those who read it would recognize instantly the man they had known without having to scan their own memory and ask, 'Did he open with that remark? Did he really use that example?', or any such question. This is all I claim for the veracity of the *Apology*. And if this is conceded, the problem of our sources is solved in principle. For we may then use the *Apology* as a touchstone of the like veracity of the thought and character of Socrates depicted in Plato's other early dialogues. And when we do that, what do we find?

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We find a man who is all paradox. Other philosophers talked *about* paradox. Socrates did not. The paradox in Socrates is Socrates. But unlike later paradoxes, Scandinavian, German, and latterly even Gallic, this Hellenic paradox is not meant to defeat, but to incite, the human reason. At least a part of it can be made quite lucid, and this is what I shall attempt in the main part of this address. For this purpose I must put before you the roles whose apparently incongruous junction produces paradox:

In the *Apology* (29de) Socrates gives this account of his life-work:

So long as I breathe and have the strength to do it, I will not cease philosophizing, exhorting you, indicting whichever of you I happen to meet, telling him in my customary way:

Esteemed friend, citizen of Athens, the greatest city in the world, so outstanding in both intelligence and power, aren't you ashamed to care so much to make all the money you can, and to advance your reputation and prestige—while for truth and wisdom and the improvement of your soul you have no care or worry?

This is the Socrates Heinrich Maier had in mind when he spoke of "the Socratic gospel".² If "gospel" makes us think of the Christian gospel, the evocation is not inappropriate at this point. Socrates could

² *Sokrates* (Tuebingen, 1913), pp. 296 ff. All things considered, this book is the best single scholarly study ever made of Socrates.

have taken over verbatim the great question of our gospels, "What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"

The only gloss I need add here is a caution that you should not be misled by the other-worldly associations with which the word 'soul' is loaded in our own tradition and which were nearly as heavy in the Greek. If there is anything new in the way Socrates uses the word 'soul' it is that he quietly narrows down its meaning to something whose supernatural origin or destiny, if any, is indeterminate, and whose physical or metaphysical structure, if any, is also indeterminate, so that both theological and anti-theological, mystical and naturalistic, doctrines of the soul become inconsequential. His is a gospel without dogma. You may hold any one of a great variety of beliefs about the soul, or none of them, without either gaining or losing any essential part of what Socrates wants you to think about and care for when he urges you to "care for your soul". In particular you don't have to believe in the immortality of the soul. Socrates himself does believe in it, but for this faith he has no argument. In the *Apology* he muses on how pleasant it would be *if* it were true, the soul carrying along to Hades all its intellectual equipment, so it could carry on Socratic arguments with no more fear of interruption. Such a life, he says, would make him "unspeakably happy". But he does not say this is a good reason for believing in it, or that there is some other good reason. He says nothing to exclude the alternative he mentions: total extinction of consciousness; death could mean just this, and if it did, there would be nothing in it to frighten a good man, or dissuade him from the "care of the soul". The soul is as worth caring for if it were to last just 24 more hours, as if it were to outlast eternity. If you have just one more day to live, and can expect nothing but a blank after that, Socrates feels that you would still have all the reason you need for improving your soul; you have yourself to live with that one day, so why live with a worse self, if you could live with a better one instead?

How then is the soul improved?—Morally, by right action; intellectually, by right thinking; the two being strictly complementary, so that you can't have one without the other and, if you do have either you will be sure to have the other. This, of course, is his famous doctrine, that 'virtue is knowledge', which means two things:

First, that there can be no virtue without knowledge. This is what gives such intensity to Socrates' arguments, such urgency to his quests for definition. He makes you feel that the failure to sustain a thesis or find a definition is not just an intellectual defeat, but a moral disaster. At the end of the *Euthyphro* that gentleman is as good as told that his failure to make good his confident claim to know "exactly" (5a,15d) what piety is, means not just that he is intellectually hard up, but that he is morally bankrupt. I am stating what Socrates believes in as extreme a form as Plato allows us to see it. One of the many things for which we may be grateful to Plato is that, as Boswell said of his own treatment of Johnson, he "did not make a cat out of his tiger". Unlike Xenophon's cat, Plato's tiger stands for the savage doctrine that if you cannot pass the stiff Socratic tests for knowledge you cannot be a good man.

No less extreme is the mate to this doctrine: that if you do have this kind of knowledge, you cannot fail to *be* good and *act* as a good man should, in the face of any emotional stress or strain. The things which break the resolution of others, which seduce or panic men to act in an unguarded moment contrary to their best insights—"rage, pleasure, pain, love, fear" (*Protagoras* 352b)—any one of them, or all of them in combination, will have no power over the man who has Socratic knowledge. He will walk through life invulnerable, sheathed in knowledge as in a magic armour, which no blow from the external world can crack or even dent. No saint has ever claimed more for the power of faith over the passions than does Socrates for the power of knowledge.

So here is one side of Socrates. He has an evangel to proclaim, a great truth to teach: Our soul is the only thing in us worth saving, and there is only way to save it: to acquire knowledge.

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Well, what would you expect of such a man? To propagate his message, to disseminate the knowledge which is itself the elixir of life. Is this what he does? How *could* he, if, as he says repeatedly in the dialogues, he does not have that knowledge? Plato makes him say this not only in the informality of private conversations but also in

that most formal speech of all, the *Apology*. If he is wiser than others, Socrates there declares (21d), it is only because he does not *think* he has the knowledge which others think they have but haven't.

Could this be true? If it were, then on his own teaching, he too would be one of the damned. But if there ever was a man who breathed greater assurance that his feet were planted firmly on the path of right, this is surely Socrates. He never voices a doubt of the moral rightness of any of his acts or decisions, never betrays a sense of sin. He goes to his death confident that "no evil thing can happen to a good man" (*Apology* 41D)—that "good man" is himself. Can this be the same man who believes that no one can be good without knowledge, and that he has no knowledge?

But there is more to the paradox. It is not merely that Socrates *says* things—as in his disclaimer of moral knowledge—which contradict the role of a preacher and teacher of the care of the soul, but that he *acts* in ways which do not seem to fit this role. Socrates' characteristic activity is the *elenchus*, literally, "the refutation". You say A, and he shows you that A implies B, and B implies C, and then he asks, 'But didn't you say D before? And doesn't C contradict D?' And there he leaves you with your shipwrecked argument, without so much as telling you what part of it, if any, might yet be salvaged. His tactics seem unfriendly from the start. Instead of trying to pilot you around the rocks, he picks one under water a long way ahead where you would never suspect it and then makes sure you get all the wind you need to run full-sail into it and smash your keel upon it.

This sort of thing happens so often in Plato's Socratic dialogues and is so perplexing, that one can't help wondering whether the historical Socrates could have been really like that. I have had to ask myself more than once whether this pitiless critic, this heartless intellectual, this man who throws away his chances to preach a gospel so he may push an argument instead, is not, after all, only a Platonic projection, and tells us more about the youthful Plato than about the aged Socrates. As often as this doubt has reared its head in my mind, I have chopped it down by just going back to the *Apology*. Here, where Socrates' evangelistic mission is stated so emphatically, it is most distinctly implied that his customary conduct did not fit the

evangelist's role. I am thinking, of course, of that story about the supposed oracle of Delphi that no one was wiser than Socrates; this supposedly started Socrates on his search for someone wiser than himself, trying everyone who had the reputation for wisdom, first the statesmen, then the poets, then, scraping the bottom of the barrel, even the artisans, only to find that the wisdom of all these people, from top to bottom, was worse than zero, a minus quantity. What to make of this whole story is itself a puzzle for the scholar, and I will not try to crack it here. But whatever the Pythian priestess may or may not have said in the first place, and whatever Socrates may or may not have thought about whatever she did say, the one thing which is certain is this: the story frames a portrait of Socrates whose day-in, day-out role was known to his fellow-citizens as that of a destructive critic, whose behaviour looked from the outside like that of a man who saw nothing in his interlocutors but balloons of pretended knowledge and was bent on nothing else but to puncture them. So the *Apology* confirms the conduct which presents our paradox. It tells of a Socrates who says the care of the soul is the most important thing in the world, and that his mission in life is to get others to see this. And yet it also as good as says that if you were going down the Agora and saw a crowd around Socrates you could take three to one bets that Socrates would not be saying anything about the improvement of the soul, nor acting as though he cared a straw for the improvement of his interlocutor's soul, but would be simply arguing with him, forcing him into one corner after another, until it became plain to all the bystanders, if not the man himself, that his initial claim to know this or that proposition was ridiculously false.

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Here then is our paradox. Are we ready for the answer?—Perhaps you are, but I am not, for there is still another side to Socrates I must bring up, and I will, if you can bear the suspense. It is the role of the *searcher*. "Don't think," he says to the great sophist, Protagoras, "that I have any other interest in arguing with you, but that of clearing up my own problems as they arise" (*Protagoras* 348c). Or again, when that nasty intellectual, Critias, accuses him of just trying to refute him instead of advancing the argument, Socrates replies:

And what if I am? How can you think that I have any other interest in refuting you, but what I should have in *searching myself*, fearing lest I might fool myself, thinking I know something, when I don't know (*Charmides* 166cd)?

Moments of self-revelation like these are rare in the dialogues. Socrates is not a character out of Chekhov introspecting moodily on the public stage. He is a man whose face is a mask, whose every word is deliberate, and seems calculated to conceal more than to reveal. One gets so used to this artful exterior, that one is left unprepared for moments like these, and is apt to discount them as irony. I speak for myself. This is the way I used to take them. And so long as I did, I could find no way through the paradox of which I have been speaking. But then it occurred to me that in the statements I have just read Socrates means to be taken at his word, and in this one too:

Critias, you act as though I professed to know the answers to the questions I ask you, and could give them to you if I wished. It isn't so. I inquire with you . . . because I don't myself have knowledge (*Charmides* 165d).

Can he really mean this? He can, if in such passages he is using "knowledge" in a sense in which the claim to know something implies the conviction that any further investigation of its truth would be useless. This is the sense in which the word "knowledge" is used in formal contexts by earlier philosophers, and nothing gives us a better sense of the dogmatic certainty implied by their use of it than the fact that one of them, Parmenides, presented his doctrine in the guise of a divine revelation. In doing this Parmenides did not mean in the least that the truth of his philosophy must be taken on faith. He presented his system as a purely rational deductive argument which made no appeal to anything except the understanding. What he meant rather is that the conclusions of this argument have the same certainty as that which the devotees of mystic cults would attach to the poems of Orpheus or of some other divinely inspired lore. This, I suggest, is the conception of wisdom and knowledge Socrates has in mind in those contexts where he disclaims it. When he renounces "knowledge" he is telling us that the question of the truth of anything *he* believes can always be sensibly re-opened; that any conviction he has stands ready to be re-examined in the company of any

sincere person who will raise the question and join him in the investigation.

Consider his great proposition that it is never right to harm the enemy. Would you not think that if there is anything Socrates feels he *knows*, this is it; else how could he have taken his stand on it, declaring that for those who believe it and those who do not "there can be no common mind, but they can only despise each other when they confront each other's counsels" (*Crito* 49d)? But even this he is prepared to re-examine. He continues to *Crito*:

So consider very carefully whether you too are on my side and share my conviction, so we can start from this: that neither doing nor returning wrong nor defending oneself against evil by returning the evil is ever right? Or do you dissent and part company with me here? For myself this is what I have long believed and still do. But if you think differently, go ahead, explain, show me (49de).

You would think this hardly the time and place to re-open this issue, but Socrates is quite willing. And I suggest that he is always willing; that he goes into every discussion in just this frame of mind. Previous reflection has led him to many conclusions, and he does not put them out of his mind when jumping into a new argument. There they all are, and not in vague or jumbled up form, but in a clear map, on which he constantly relies to figure out, many moves in advance, the direction in which he would like to press an argument. But clear as they are, they are not finally decided; everyone of them is open to review in the present argument, where the very same kind of process which led to the original conclusion *could* unsettle what an earlier argument may have settled prematurely, on incomplete survey of relevant premises, or by faulty deductions. Nor is it only a matter of re-examing previously reached conclusions; it is no less a matter of hoping for new insights which may crop up right in this next argument and give the answer to some hitherto unanswered problem. And if this is the case, Socrates is not just the fighter he appears to be on the surface, intent on vindicating predetermined results by winning just one more victory in an ordeal by combat. He is the investigator, testing his own ideas in the course of testing those of his interlocutor, watching the argument with genuine curiosity to see whether it will really come out where it should if the results of previous arguments

were sound, and scanning the landscape as he goes along, looking for some new feature, he failed to notice before.

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Does this show a way out of our paradox? I think it does. It puts in a new light the roles that seemed so hard to reconcile before. Socrates the *preacher* turns out to be a man who wants others to find out his gospel as much as possible by themselves and for themselves. Socrates the *teacher* now appears as the man who has not just certain conclusions to impart to others, but a *method of investigation*—the method by which he reached these results in the first place, and which is even more important than the results, for it is the means of testing, revising, and going beyond them. Socrates the *critic* is much more than a mere critic, for he exhibits his method by putting it to work; even if not a single positive result were to come out of it in this or that argument, the method itself would have been demonstrated, and those who saw how it works could put it to work for themselves to reach more positive conclusions. Even Socrates the *professed* agnostic becomes more intelligible. His 'I don't know' is a conscientious objection to the notion that the conclusions of any discussion are secure against further testing by further discussion. Seen in this way, Socrates no longer seems a bundle of incompatible roles precariously tied together by irony. He seems one man, unified in his diverse activities by the fact that in all of them he remains the searcher, always pursuing his own search and seeking fellow-seekers.

May I now give you a particular illustration, for I would not like to leave this solution hanging in generality. I take the *Euthyphro*, though almost any one of Plato's early dialogues would do. On your first reading of this dialogue you come to the end with a sense of disappointment that after all this winding and unwinding of argument no positive result seems to be reached, and Socrates is ready, as he says, "to begin all over again" with the original question, "What is piety?". As you watch Euthyphro hurry off, this is what you feel like telling Socrates: 'I don't believe you really care for that man's soul, for if you did, how could you have let him go with his head still stuffed with his superstitions? You know that the pollution he fears has nothing to do with the only piety you think worth talking about, the kind that

will improve what *you* call the soul. Why then not tell him this, and show him the difference between religion and magic?

But if you go back and re-read the dialogue more carefully, you can figure out Socrates' reply:

'That is what I did try to show him. But I wanted him to find it out for himself. For this purpose it would have been no use telling him his notion of piety was all wrong, which would not even have been true. It was *not* all wrong, but a jumble of right and wrong beliefs, and my job was to help him see that he could not hold both sets at once. If he could see this, he would become his own critic, his own teacher, even his own preacher, for if this man could see the implications of some things he already believes, I would not have to preach to him that he should care for his soul as it should be cared for. He would be doing his own preaching to himself.'

Socrates might then add that though he failed in this objective, the fault was not entirely his own. For sheer sluggishness of intellect it would be hard to beat this complacent fanatic whom Plato ironically calls *Euthyphro*, "Straight-thinker". How straight he thinks on matters of religion we may judge by his response when Socrates shows him that, on his view, religion is a business-relationship between men and gods, a barter of divine favours for human offerings. Faced with this consequence our Mr. Straight-thinker sees nothing positively wrong with it: "Yes, you may call it (piety) a commercial art, if you like" (14e). Yet even with such unpromising material on his hands, Socrates tries hard, and makes good headway, coming at one point within a stone's throw of success: He gets Euthyphro to admit that piety cannot be defined as "that which is pleasing to the gods", i.e., as obedience to any demand the gods might happen to make on men; the demand must itself be *just*, and piety must consist of discharging services we *owe* the gods. Socrates then pushes Euthyphro to say what sort of services these might be. Why do the gods *need* our services, he presses; what is that "wonderful work" (13e) the gods can only achieve through our own cooperating efforts? I suppose it was too much to expect Euthyphro to see the answer once Socrates has led him so far, and say to himself, in line with Socrates' reasoning, with all of which he agrees: Since the gods are great and powerful

past all imagining, they surely don't need our services to improve *their* estate; and since they are also good and benevolent, they do desire what is best for us—and what can this be, but the improvement of our souls? Isn't this then the object of piety, this the discharge of the highest obligation we owe the gods? Socrates evidently thought this was *not* too much to hope that Euthyphro would have seen for himself on the strength of the Socratic prodding. When Euthyphro went hopelessly off the track in a wordy tangent, Socrates remarked:

Certainly, Euthyphro, you could have answered my main question in far fewer words, if you had wished . . . Just now when you were on the very edge of telling me what I want to know, you turned aside (14bc).

Clearly Socrates has *not* been playing a cat-and-mouse game with Euthyphro in this dialogue, putting questions to him only to pounce on the answers and claw them to pieces. He has been doing his best to lead Euthyphro to the point where he could see for himself the right answer. What he positively refuses to do is to *tell* Euthyphro this answer, and this, not because he does not think Euthyphro's soul worth the saving, but because he believes there is only one way to save it and that Euthyphro himself must do the job by finding this one right way, so that he too becomes a searcher. Whether or not you think Socrates was right in this, I trust you will agree with me that he was at least consistent.

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But *was* Socrates right? A scholar could ignore that question in good conscience. A humanist cannot. He could, of course, turn the question back to you, as Socrates would. But it is pretty late for me to start playing Socrates now, and it would hardly be consistent with so un-Socratic a performance as an unbroken monologue to a speechless multitude. Anyhow, to follow Socrates at this crucial point would be to imply that I *do* think him right after all. And the fact is that on some fundamental points I think him wrong.

I do not think the Socratic way is the only way to save a man's soul. What Socrates called "knowledge" he thought both necessary and sufficient for moral goodness. I think it neither. Not necessary, for the bravest men I ever met would surely have flunked the

Socratic examination on courage. Why this should be so would take long to unravel, and I have no confidence I could do it successfully. But I don't need to for the point at issue. For this I need only stick to the fact: that a man can have great courage, yet make a fool of himself when he opens his mouth to explain what it is that he has. I am not saying that it would not be a fine thing if he could talk better, and know more. I am not depreciating Socratic knowledge. I am only saying it is not necessary for what Socrates did think it necessary. And I would also say that it is not sufficient. For this I need no better example than that famous saying of his, in the *Apology*, (29ab) that the fear of death is the pretence of wisdom. 'Why do we fear death?—Because we think we know it is a great evil. But do we *know* this?—No. We don't know anything about death. For all we know to the contrary, it might be a great good.' So argues Socrates, and implies confidently that if you saw all this, your fear of death would vanish. Knowledge—in this case, knowledge of your ignorance of what death is and what, if anything, comes after it—would dissipate your fear. You couldn't fear death or anything else unless you knew it to be evil. But why couldn't you? 'Because it would be absurd,' Socrates would say. But could it not be absurd, and exist just the same? Aunt Rosie is afraid of mice, but she knows quite well that a mouse can do her no great harm. She knows she runs a far graver risk to life and limb when she drives her car down Main Street, but she is not a bit afraid of that, while she is terrified of mice. This is absurd, but it happens; and her knowing it is absurd does not prevent it from happening either, but only adds shame and guilt to fear. This is not evidence of a high order; it is just a *fact* that does not square with Socrates' theory.

But Socratic knowledge has all too little interest in facts. That is the main trouble with it. Socrates' model for knowledge was what we would call deductive knowledge now-a-days. The knowledge he sought, and with such marked success, is that which consists in arranging whatever information one has in a luminous, perspicuous pattern, so one can see at a glance where run the bright lines of implication and where the dark ones of contradiction. But of the other way of knowing, the empirical way, Socrates had little under-

standing, and he paid for his ignorance by conceit of knowledge, failing to understand the limitations of his knowledge of fact generally, and of the fact of knowledge in particular. Had he so much as felt the need of investigating knowledge itself as a fact in human nature, to determine just exactly what, as a matter of fact, happens to a man when he has or hasn't knowledge, Socrates might have come to see that even his own dauntless courage in the face of death he owed not to knowledge but to something else, more akin to religious faith.

But to explain Socrates' failure merely in this way would be itself to concede more to Socrates' theory than the facts allow, for it would be to explain it as only a failure of knowledge. I will put all my cards on the table and say that behind this lay a failure of love. In saying this I am not taking over-seriously the prickly exterior and the pugilist's postures. I have already argued that he does care for the souls of his fellows. But the care is limited and conditional. If men's souls are to be saved, they must be saved his way. And when he sees they cannot, he watches them go down the road to perdition with regret but without anguish. Jesus wept for Jerusalem. Socrates warns Athens, scolds, exhorts it, condemns it. But he has no tears for it. One wonders if Plato, who raged against Athens, did not love it more in his rage and hate than ever did Socrates in his sad and good-tempered rebukes. One feels there is a last zone of frigidity in the soul of the great erotic; had he loved his fellows more, he could hardly have laid on them the burdens of his "despotic logic,"³ impossible to be borne.

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Having said all this, as I felt I had to, confronting Socrates as man to man, let me now add that grave as these complaints are, they do not undermine his greatness. Let me tell you in the last part of this address why in spite of this or a longer bill of particulars which might be drawn against him, he is still great.

Let me start where I just left off: his character. To be different in some way or other from everyone else one need not be a great man; one need only be a man. But to find in this difference the material for a personal creation wherewith to enrich the common life of humanity

³ I borrow here from Nietzsche, who called Socrates "this despotic logician" (*Birth of Tragedy*, Section XIV; translation by Francis Golffing, New York, 1956, p. 90).

—this is a difficult achievement for anyone, and was exceptionally so for Socrates, for his initial endowment was so discouraging: physical ugliness. This he had to live with among a people who adored beauty. Socrates solved the problem classical antiquity would have judged insoluble. In the world of the fine arts—plastic, graphic, auditory—classical antiquity just took it for granted that if the product is to be fine the materials must be beautiful to begin with. Socrates proved this was not so in the medium of personal life. He showed how there at least art could fashion beauty out of ugliness. He did this by stylizing his deformity, making an abstract mask out of it, and so detaching himself from that, while he could never put it off, he could always laugh at it as from a great distance with his mind. And as a good artist does not drop a theme once he gets hold of it, but puts it to new and surprising uses, so Socrates with this theme of ugliness as a comic mask. He made his words common and vulgar, like his face. He said he could not make fine speeches, or even understand the fine ones others made. His memory, he said, was short, he could only take things in a sentence or two at a time; nor could his wits move fast, so everything must be explained to him in painfully slow, dragging steps. His manners, too, he said, were poor; he must be forgiven if he could not be as polite in argument as other men. With this cumulative renunciation of ornaments of culture and graces of mind he built his character. Its surface traits, uncouth, ludicrous to the casual eye, were so severely functional, so perfectly adapted to the work he had to do, that men with the keenest eye for beauty, men like Alcibiades and Plato, found more of it in Socrates than in anyone they had ever known. The test of art is: Will it last? And for this kind of art: Will it last in adversity? Socrates' art passed this test. The self behind the mask was never shown up as just another mask. He was the same before his judges as he had been in the market-place. When he took the poison from the hands of the executioner there was "no change of colour or expression on his face" (*Phaedo* 117b).

Secondly, Socrates was great as a reformer of morality: not a social reformer, but a reformer of the conscience which in the very long run has power to make or break social institutions. A poet like

Aristophanes sensed this, without really understanding it; so did Callicles in the *Gorgias* (481c), when he asked Socrates:

If you're serious, and what you say is really true, won't human life have to be turned completely upside down?

I trust that even some of the incidental illustrations I have used before in this address will document the truth of this rhetorical question. Think of the answer to 'What is piety?' Socrates is fishing for in the *Euthyphro*. How could Athenian piety remain the same, or how could ours for that matter, if Socrates is right on this, if man's obligation to the gods is one he would have to his own self, even if there were no gods: to improve his own soul? Again, how many practices or sentiments in Socrates' world or ours would remain intact if his conviction that it is never right to return evil for evil were taken seriously as really true?

There is also another change Socrates wrought in the texture of the moral conscience, one which is scarcely mentioned in the books about him. I cannot hope to remedy this deficiency here. But I can at least remind you that Greek morality still remained to a surprising extent a class-morality. The conviction that high-grade moral virtue was possible only for a man who was well born or, at least, moderately well off, ran wide and deep. The disinheritor of a majority of the urban population—not only the slaves, but the free-born manual workers—from the life of virtue is a reasoned belief in Aristotle. Even that radical remoulder of the social fabric, Plato, did not reject the dogma; he only sublimated it. Socrates did reject it. He expunged it from the universe of moral discourse, when he made the improvement of the soul as mandatory, and as possible, for the manual worker as for the gentleman of leisure, when he redefined all the virtues, and virtue itself, in such a way as to make of them, not class attributes, but human qualities.

But even this is not his greatest contribution. If the solution of the paradox of Socrates I put before you in this address is correct, then certainly Socrates himself would have attached far more importance to his method of moral inquiry than to any of its results. If we could get past the palaver of his mock-humility and make him say in simple honesty what he thought was his greatest achievement he

would certainly have put that method far above anything else. I trust I need not argue all over again this point which is as crucial to my estimate of Socrates' greatness as it was to the resolution of the paradox I have put before you. Let me only remind you that if what I am now contending were not true, that paradox would not have been there. Had he valued the results of his method above the method itself, he would have been just a preacher and teacher of moral truths, not also the professed agnostic, the tireless critic, examiner and re-examiner of himself and of others; in other words, he would not have been the Socrates of the Platonic dialogues and of this address.

Why rank that method among the great achievements of humanity? Because it makes moral inquiry a common human enterprise, open to every man. Its practice calls for no adherence to a philosophical system, or mastery of a specialized technique, or acquisition of a technical vocabulary. It calls for common sense and common speech. And this is as it should be, for how man should live is every man's business, and the role of the specialist and the expert should be only to offer guidance and advice, to inform the judgment of the layman, leaving the final decision up to him. But while the Socratic method makes moral inquiry open to everyone, it makes it easy for no one. It calls not only for the highest degree of mental alertness of which anyone is capable, but also for moral qualities of a high order: sincerity, humility, courage. Socrates expects you to say what you really believe about the way *man* should live; which implies, among other things, about the way *you* should live. His method will not work if the opinion you give him is just *an* opinion; it must be *your* opinion: the one you stand ready to live by, so that if that opinion should be refuted, your own life or a part of it will be indicted or discredited, shown up to be a muddle, premised on a confusion or a contradiction. To get into the argument when you realize that this is the price you have to pay for it—that in the course of it your ego may experience the unpleasant sensation of a bloody nose—takes courage. To search for moral truth that may prove your own life wrong takes humility that is not afraid of humiliation. These are the qualities Socrates himself brings to the argument, and it is not entirely clear that he realizes how

essential they are to protect it against the possibility that its dialectic, however rigorous, would merely grind out, as it could with impeccable logic, wild conclusions from irresponsible premises.

But is there not still a residual risk, you may ask, in making the Socratic method the arbiter of moral truth, inviting thereby every man to take, on its terms, a place in the supreme court which judges questions of morality? Certainly there is a risk, and a grave one. For though the method has some built-in protection against moral irresponsibility—the one I have just mentioned—it offers no guarantee whatever that it will always lead to truth. On this Socrates himself, if the foregoing interpretation of his agnosticism was correct, is absolutely clear. His ‘I don’t know’ honestly means ‘I could be mistaken in results reached by this method.’ And if Socrates could be mistaken, how much more so Tom, Dick and Harry. Why then open it to them? Socrates’ answer is clear: Because each of them is a man, and “the unexamined life is not worth living by man” (*Apology* 38a). I could not go so far as he did at this point. I believe that many kinds of life are worth living by man. But I do believe that the best of all is the one in which every man does his own examining. I have dissented earlier from Socrates’ assumption that his is the only way by which any man’s soul can be saved. But I can still give whole-hearted assent to Socrates’ vision of man as a mature, responsible being, claiming to the fullest extent his freedom to make his own choice between right and wrong, not only in action, but in judgment. I do not see how man can reach the full stature of his manhood unless he claims the right to make his own personal judgments on morality; and if he is to claim this right, he must accept the implied chance of misjudgment as a calculated risk. This is the price he must pay for being free. I am using now, you notice, very unSocratic language, and I will compound the offence by adding that this Socratic vision of human freedom, of which the Socratic method is an expression, could not be appropriately described as knowledge, and that the best name for it is faith. That the man who had this faith to a supreme degree should have mistaken it for knowledge, is yet another part of the paradox of Socrates—but one which I cannot attempt to unravel this evening.

The Last Promenade

— A Short Story —

by

COLLEEN THIBAUDEAU

The afternoon of the first Thursday, said *Madame la Directrice*, is ever reserved for the educational promenade of the *Quatrième Nouvelles*. The last one started off much as usual; it was a chilly afternoon, and we felt increasingly unsure of the educational value of the trip—at least as far as we were concerned. Inger was openly rebellious, and, as we stood beside the dripping *Lycée* wall waiting for the bus, she protested she wasn't interested in coal mines, even ones where Caesar had passed.

"And it's an imposition, making us chaperone these kids," said Suzanne, the junior English teacher. "If we had a communist government we could protest how we were made to give up a free day. I have copies and copies to correct at home."

"Ah, Miss and Fraulein," said Madame Moreau, who came limping up at the last moment and grasped us firmly by the elbows. Gnarled and cane-tapping from all those years in concentration camps, she was the least charming of companions. And rumored to be *Madame la Directrice's* personal spy. After creating an awkward situation, she used to ease the moment over with a compliment, giving, for instance, little strokes and pats to Inger's handsome fur coat. "We Germans deserve some nice things," Inger used to say politely. "After all, we lost the War." When we were with Madame Moreau all unforgotten bitterness overwhelmed us; when with Suzanne, niggling discontent with the present and terror of the future. We were trapped here, and the thirty milling *Nouvelles*, childishly mocking all ideals of education, forced the promenade each month to assume a definite character. It was a little capsule of poison containing all one feared and hated and acting against all one found proud and hopeful.

The leader, Madame Dionnet, was calling roll and moving like a jittery blackbird among the girls, repeating: "Architectural. Educational. Industrial. Just as the Minister wishes." When she had us all

in our places in the bus, Madame Moreau spoke up sarcastically: "As usual, Madame, you have forgotten what interests these girls chiefly. There will be ample time, after the Merovingian church, for your goûter. And there will be time again after the *Ecole Militaire*. But *Madame la Directrice* specially requests that orange peelings are not to be strewn about. You, Mademoiselle, and Miss, and Fraulein here, are to see that the girls put the peelings in their pockets."

Madame Moreau banged her cane with authority and we set off. We passed the *Lycée* boarders leaving for their walk through the *Jardin des Plantes*, and at the far end by the Monkey Gate we came to a dead halt.

"Lydie again," said Madame Moreau. "She is really most ungrateful."

It was Lydie, the ragamuffin. Always late and picked up somewhere enroute looking as if she had run all the way from home. But she did make you smile, all sweaty and fierce about getting aboard and proud about jamming her ticket in the box and garrulous in her excuses to Madame Dionnet.

"This time she says it's because her mother needed the bicycle," said Madame Moreau. "A good thing she made it." This in reference to the thirty francs apiece we had chipped in for her ride.

It was a blustery day. The sea gales of February had brought high winds inland; winds had rubbed the cherubs off the facade of the Cathedral and slap-slapped tiles down into the cobbled streets. Here in the country one sensed how those same fingers of weather had pinched and pulled at pollarded ways and hedges. The little farms with their blown orchards and straggling vineyards were pathetically back country. Earth and sky had the same look of skim milk or of little underfed children.

"It's ridiculous to take children round and expect them to gather impressions," said Madame Moreau, who was a believer in a classical education. "And here's where we turn back. The bridge is out. Bombed by a Canadian squadron," she informed me.

"And you've had to make this detour since '44," said Inger.

Madame Moreau reached thoughtfully out. "I do love a good piece of fur," she said.

Thursday, March 3 many of the *Nouvelles* had jotted in their little black notebooks. They all tried to look like little journalists. The town girls, ones Suzanne called capitalists, succeeded best in this; they did their research before they came. The *Lycée* boarders, stiffly uniformed, were inclined to go moony-eyed at the mere idea of freedom; they wrote their impressions next day from library books. And the rest, Lydie was the worst, used to cover up a pitiful ignorance in churches and museums by childish scuffling and too-loud talk.

One of them seized a strayed Grammar at the *Ecole Militaire* (where, said Suzanne, we stop to leave a cake for Madame Dionnet's son), and, in the exact chirrup of Madame Dionnet, cried out, "O, Vingtième siècle!" Here we promenaded the freezing *Nouvelles* dozens of times round the courtyard past the Triumph Gate, where the names of all the little boys who had left the school for the various wars were chipped in the stone. And each time we passed the infirmary two little soldiers, confined with scarlatina, set up a reverberating roar of pleasure.

The light was nearly gone when we turned again at the bombed-out bridge and began to climb up to the mines at Trois-Ponts. A torturing wind blew over the landscape, and the miners' cottages, straggling along the hill road, showed scarcely a sign of life. Yet in those cindery gardens the tops of ragged onions and cabbages poked grimily through, and in many a dusty court the line of washing, pathetic, grey and meagre, told the tale of domestic sadness and futile thrift.

"The poor souls," said Madame Moreau reflectingly. "It is sometimes very hard to keep oneself clean."

Halfway up the hill the driver tried to change gears and stalled the bus altogether. Madame Dionnet peered out. While she pondered the dirt and the deserted-looking tracks and sheds, the girls leaped on the treadle and poured out of the bus. They rushed into the swirling black landscape past a watchman and his dog, shouting, "Follow Lydie. Come this way." And they disappeared.

"Because of the strike," said Suzanne with the slightest sneer, "this mine has been closed since last summer. I'm afraid the girls won't see this one in operation."

Madame Dionnet's discomfiture was however momentary. She said the Minister had ordered her to produce a mine in operation; if

we would get the girls back in, she would see how long it would take to do the lime kilns at Marny.

"Those girls will be back," said the slippered old watchman, placidly. "When that Lydie one sees her mother coming, she'll make a dash for home no doubt. Those city ones won't like playing in the caves that well; it's too dirty." He patted the grimy dog's fat ruff. "Not much to do here, is there. It's my personal opinion that the Union has forgotten all about them up here. But now the women are taking a hand. They have the March every day. To protest. They ought to be home now."

"The Union hasn't forgotten them," said Suzanne. "But they don't want them to give up. After all, if they go back now"

Madame Dionnet had climbed up the hill to call the girls personally; now she turned back, and so the *Lycée Nouvelles*, coming back petulantly from play, met the procession of the women who came just then pushing their bicycles up the hill. They just passed by, abstracted, not looking up, their coats and kerchiefs straining back against the fierce wind. Their thoughts were fixed on the rear tire of the bicycle ahead, not on the futile day's march to town where they had picketed the Syndicate to entreat them to call off the strike, not on the immediate prospect of home, the empty soup pot and the cold hearth. They had their small children strapped to the iron grid seats behind them, and these little ones rode without protest, though their thighs showed mottled and blue where a cushion had slipped. Like a party of silent Bedouins in their flapping clothes and with their inscrutable faces, they passed by.

When they began to go over the hill and into the next valley the *Nouvelles* began to talk once more. Lydie excused herself for taking the girls to the caves, and Madame Dionnet in turn excused her the trip to Marny, since she would have had to walk five kilometres home afterward. The last thing we saw was Lydie running as hard as she could after the bicycles, and on the ground where the *Nouvelles* had been standing there were the fluttering white fragments from someone's little journalist notebook left where one of the *Nouvelles*, emotional for her twelve years, must have stood tearing it up in her fingers.

The Canadian Revolution

— The bourgeoisie versus Marx —

by

D. J. GOODSPEED

"Canadians, not without a sense of wonderment, are now becoming aware that they are living in a society which is virtually free from any generally accepted stratification." How has this silent, bloodless revolution—more complete and successful than any Marx envisaged — taken place in Canada? What has become of our aristocracy? Where is our proletariat?

Revolutions are not always marked by fighting in the streets, aristocrats dangling from lamp-posts, and blood running in the gutters. Of course, these are all in their way good things and calculated to rejoice the hearts of honest men, but sometimes more solid and lasting results are achieved quietly and over a period of time without so much as a single head falling into the basket or a solitary volley from the firing squad.

Canada is a case in point. We in this country are the heirs of a revolution, but it has all happened so decorously and with so little fuss that most people never think of it in that way. Yet in Canada the only one of Marx's dreams not tainted with madness has indeed come true—we have achieved a classless society.

A moment's reflection will confirm the broad outlines of this thesis. There is no Canadian aristocracy. True, there are still a few Canadians who hold titles, but for the most part—when they still reside in this country—they are rather shame-faced and embarrassed about it, as though they have grown tired of explaining that they really *are* Canadians and not immigrants trying to evade the income tax regulations of less happy lands. On the other hand, anyone who calls a Canadian farmer a peasant or refers to a Canadian industrial worker as a member of the down-trodden proletariat would do well to guard with his right at the same time. There is no Canadian peasantry and no Canadian proletariat.

Nor can the hypothesis that Canada possesses a classless society be rejected by referring to the inequalities which still exist, by pointing to differences of wealth, of education, or of occupation. These inequalities are indubitably present, but to raise them in this regard is probably to commit the fallacy of the irrelevant thesis. A classless society, like jesting Pilate, cares for none of these things. It is not dependant upon economic parity, nor upon the system of occupational relationships, nor even upon cultural and educational differences. On the contrary, a society is stratified in accordance with only two, interconnected, criteria: privilege and prestige.

Privilege is a function of undistributed power, while prestige is the result of a general acceptance of feelings of superiority and inferiority among the society's members. A class system thus possesses, as it were, both body and soul—the material effects which result from an uneven distribution of power and the moral effects which are the aggregate of similar individual judgments concerning deference.

In Canada there has not, for these many years, been any basic inequality in the distribution of power. Representation by population, the universal franchise, the secret ballot, a judiciary separated from the legislature and the executive, and a reasonable balance between the various major interest groups—religious, racial, economic, and regional—have protected Canadians both from those terrible vicissitudes which accompany drastic shifts of political power and from the still more terrible oppressions of a power which is consolidated and irresponsible. Privilege cannot thrive under such conditions, and in fact it has not thriven. As for prestige, this is even less evident on the Canadian scene. We are, fortunately, an irreverent race where our fellow citizens are concerned. Moreover, real prestige must usually be associated, closely and over a long period of time, with privilege, for there is nothing—not even wealth—which men are so reluctant to grant to others as deference. Accordingly those Canadians who, because of their blood, or wealth, or attainments, demand the general deference of their fellows must either be extremely selective in their social contacts or else must be prepared to face the robust denial of their claims. In short, they do not belong to a class; they have merely acquired a complex.

Canadians, not without a sense of wonderment, are now becoming aware that they are living in a society which is virtually free from any generally accepted stratification. And in their attitude towards the Canadian Revolution most of them are not unlike the man who suddenly discovered that he had been talking prose all his life without realizing it—they react with a pleasantly self-congratulatory complacency to an event which they feel does them credit, and then they forget all about it. There are, of course, exceptions. There are a few squeals of outraged pride from those who believe that, in a less homogenized society, their own natural talents would bring them to the top like the cream in a bottle of milk. And there are a few baffled curses from the demagogues of the extreme Left who fear that they cannot lead the *canaille* if there is no *canaille* to lead. But on the whole the Revolution is accepted as it was made—as a matter of course.

Nor should anyone be surprised that all this has come about in a manner diametrically opposed to the forecasts of the Marxian dialectic, for Marx was almost always irrational even when he was right. Marx, of course, predicted that society would more and more be divided into two great classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and that there would be an ever-sharper distinction and an increasingly bitter antagonism between them. He believed that this dialectical conflict would find its inevitable synthesis in the total victory of the proletariat and he concluded with irrefutable logic that when there was only one class left the result would be a classless society. We need not begrudge Marx a certain amount of vicarious satisfaction from the contemplation of this outcome. The satisfaction was, of course, premature, but when such a process of class unification is complete, one may expect to see a smile on the face of the tiger. Marx's major mistake was that he picked the wrong tiger.

It was not his only error, as the course of events in Canada has proved. This country has placidly and absent-mindedly evolved into just that classless society which the professional revolutionaries have always claimed could be attained only as the crown of victory after a bloody class war. (In 1789 the French vainly tried to establish such a society with the assistance of the guillotine—and they ended with an Emperor instead of a king. In 1917 the Russians tried to usher in

the classless state with the aid of the Cheka—and Stalin became the new Autocrat of All the Russias.) But in his own quiet way the average Canadian has succeeded where Robespierre and St. Just and Lenin failed. Only in Canada it has not been the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but the bourgeoisie which has absorbed the aristocracy and the proletariat.

When we come to consider how all this has happened we must again take issue with Marx. In fact, of course, the action of privilege and prestige upon society has not in the past produced only two classes. Mankind has never been so simply divided. There has not been, on the one hand, merely the powerful and the proud and on the other the dispossessed and the downtrodden. Stratified societies are almost infinitely complex and their internal boundaries are remarkably amorphous, but in general we may distinguish, not two, but three classes—an upper, a middle, and a lower. And with modifications, this was also true of Canada in the past. Thus for a classless society to emerge the action must be not single but dual. Marx ignored this by the simple expedient of declaring that all who were not for the proletariat were against it—a dogma, incidentally, which was later to cost the Russian peasantry dear. However, in Canada, where any such simplification would have been patently ridiculous, a classless society could only come about by one of the classes absorbing the other two. Obviously this was a task beyond the capabilities of the aristocracy. There is no point in being Sir Brian if there are no villagers to kick into the pond; and although everyone can feel superior, quite evidently everyone cannot obtain general acceptance of his claims. The choice then of which class was to enter into the Kingdom lay between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. And the bourgeoisie, it may be noted in passing, had this initial advantage: it did not want to be absorbed by the proletariat, but the proletariat was extraordinarily ready to be absorbed into the bourgeoisie.

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In Canada the two processes of the decline of the aristocracy and the elevation of the lower class proceeded concurrently. Yet in this country the vitality of aristocratic institutions was always so low that they died almost without a struggle. The proletariat, on the other hand,

although anxious to commit class suicide by bettering its lot, survived much longer.

Aristocracy was never an indigenous growth on Canadian soil, for there has not, at least since 1759, been the military necessity in Canada which alone justifies the establishment of such a caste system. Historically the count came into being because he was the man who defended the country. The marquis originally stood guard on the threatened marches; he was a marshal before he was an aristocrat, and when he ceased to be a marshal he became an anachronism. After the British victory at the Plains of Abraham there was patently no need in Canada for a military aristocracy. The seigneurs disappeared here thirty years before they did in France, and in Canada they never returned.

Even before 1759, however, the *noblesse* of Canada were in an anomalous position. Those few who were members of the old aristocracy remained French rather than Canadien and almost invariably returned to France when their tour of duty was finished. In 1628 Louis XIII began to create a native Canadian aristocracy by letters patent, but most of those who were so ennobled were hardly of the type who in France would have been qualified to ride in the king's carriage. The most famous of these families was probably the Le Moynes, and the grandfather of the first baron, Charles Le Moynes, had been an inn-keeper in Dieppe. Some French aristocrats did indeed remain in Canada, but they were always few in number and most of them came from families of the minor nobility who could aspire to no more than the purchase of a commission in a regiment of the line for one of their sons. When the Carignan Regiment came to Canada in 1665 it brought with it a number of such officers, but most of them were glad enough to return to France as soon as they could. In a little while those who remained were scarcely distinguishable from the mass of their fellow citizens. With the victory of the British, there was another exodus of aristocrats, while those who stayed behind were not seriously perturbed at having to forget their pretensions to rank, pretensions which had never been taken very seriously in any case.¹

¹ Lart, Charles E., "The Noblesse of Canada," *Canadian Historical Review*, Sept. 1922, p. 222.

When Canada became a British possession, however, it seemed perfectly natural to the powers in the Colonial Office in London that a native Canadian aristocracy should be created here. What was good for General Bullmoose was good for everybody. Of course, it would be an aristocracy with a difference. Titles would go only to the deserving—to lieutenant-governors, judges, and the like. Thus the Canadian aristocracy would always be a cut below the real thing, since the highest claim of a true nobility is, as Palmerston said of the Garter, the fact that "there's no damned merit about it".

Not unnaturally, therefore, the new Canadian aristocracy always had a hard time of it. The majority of immigrants to this country had had their fill at home of an aristocratic system. It was among the first of reasons for their becoming immigrants. From the beginning the Canadian people were woefully lacking in respect for their betters. They muttered about Family Compacts; they talked about the rights of man; they were painfully susceptible to the democratic influences which were wafted into Canada from across the American border; they even staged two abortive rebellions. Yet despite the fiasco of the armed uprisings of 1837, it remained true that in Canada's frontier society the inherent worth of an individual was always more highly regarded than his ancestry. Moreover, even after representative government had been granted, the Colonial Office continued to recommend the honours lists, and this did nothing to reconcile the Canadians to an aristocratic system.

Nevertheless, titles continued to be granted, and the extent of this benefit was gradually broadened. In 1860 the Speakers of the Legislative Council and of the Houses of Assembly were knighted, and with Confederation Macdonald, Cartier, Galt, Tilley, Tupper, Howland, and MacDougall were offered titles. Macdonald was to be made a Knight Commander of the Bath; the others commanders. Cartier and Galt, however, refused, not because they disapproved of titles but because they felt the distinction offered them was insufficient. This awkward situation was resolved when Cartier was offered a baronetcy and Galt was created a Knight Commander of St. Michael and St. George.

After that it looked for awhile as though things might get out of hand, but in 1879 Macdonald warned the British government not to bestow titles too freely on the colonial Canadians, since as he pointed out, many public men in Canada, although worthy individuals, lacked the formal education and social graces so necessary to a member of the aristocracy. As a consequence, no more titles were granted to Canadians for nearly twenty years, but by the turn of the century Canadians were again appearing in the honours lists.

In 1902 Laurier sponsored an Order-in-Council which described the system of granting titles on the recommendation of the Colonial Office as an invasion of local self-government and which urged that honours should only be given on the recommendation of the Governor-General acting on the advice of his responsible ministers. London, however, replied that the granting of titles rested with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and that that high official must necessarily be the sole judge of what would be the best advice to follow.²

In 1911, under Sir Robert Borden's government, titles began to fall thick and fast upon Canadians. Industrialists, railway builders, and men of letters now for the first time began to be admitted within the magic circle. But the opposition to an aristocracy was already beginning to harden. When John W. Dafoe, the editor of the *Manitoba Free Press*, was offered a knighthood, he spoke for much of Canada. "Good heavens," he chuckled, "I shovel off my own sidewalk and stoke my own furnace."

Laughter, however, was not the decisive weapon. The First World War was fought to make the world safe for democracy, and the democrats made the most of it. In Canada there was much indignation at some of the titles which had been granted during the conflict. Such embarrassing slogans as "equality of sacrifice" were heard, and there were numerous pointed references to "Junkerism" and "autocracy". Seizing this current at the flood, Mr. W. F. Nickle, the Conservative member for Kingston, introduced, on 8 April 1918, a bill to parliament to discontinue hereditary titles. Nor was Mr. Nickle the only member anxious to prove himself to be on the side of the levelling angels, as was shown when his bill was promptly amended

² Thomson, D. W., "The Fate of Titles in Canada," *Canadian Historical Review*, Sept. 1929.

to include all titles. Sir Robert Borden, however, warned that he wanted the matter shelved until the Imperial authorities in London could examine it and declared that if the vote went against him he would resign. On this occasion Borden was able to hold his side together, but in April of 1919 Nickle again tabled a bill which this time demanded that all title-giving should be discontinued. Again he was denied the last word, for this bill was again promptly amended to include the demand that all existing titles should become extinct on the death of the holders. The matter was referred to a special committee whose report was adopted by the House on 14 May 1919. The Canadian Parliament thereupon addressed His Majesty George V, requesting him:

- (a) to refrain from conferring any title of honour or titular distinction upon any of your subjects domiciled or ordinarily resident in Canada . . .
- (b) to provide that appropriate action be taken . . . to ensure the extinction of an hereditary title of honour or titular distinction . . . on the death of a person domiciled or ordinarily resident in Canada, at present in enjoyment of an hereditary title or titular distinction . . .²

This was not quite the end. In 1928 a motion to reconsider the matter of titles was voted down in the House by 114 to 60, but when R. B. Bennett became Prime Minister in 1933 he held that his government was not bound by the decision of the Parliament of 1919. The Bennett government revived titles, including hereditary titles, and the honours lists both in 1934 and 1935 included the names of Canadian citizens. When Mackenzie King came to power in 1935, however, the previous policy was restored and no more titles went to Canadians.

So perished the Canadian aristocracy, not with a bang.

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The second portion of the process by which Canada has achieved a classless society is far less easy to demonstrate. The lower classes in Canadian society could not, by the nature of things, disappear with the same gratifying decisiveness as did the aristocracy. Here there has been a gradual blurring of the lines of distinction, a steady ameliora-

² House of Commons Debates, 14 May, 1919, Vol II, p. 2485, 2486.

tion of working conditions, pay, educational opportunities, security benefits, and the like.

Some things, however, can be said quite positively. There never was in Canada a lower class in the sense in which other, less fortunate, countries, have had a lower class. Canadian farmers have always owned their own land. There has never been any appreciable number of Canadians who have had to rent their fields. There was too much arable land in Canada for this country to tolerate the squires. The Canadian farmer has at times been poor, but he has always been independent. Moreover, even during the depression of the '30's, it is doubtful if Canada possessed a proletariat as Marx would have understood the term. The reason for this is that in Canada the industrial revolution came very late. The workers of Britain, the United States, and Germany had already wrung the major concessions from their employers before there was any considerable body of Canadian workers. The battles for the recognition of trade unions, for the eight hour day, for arbitration procedures, and for just wages were on the whole won elsewhere, and before an indigenous industry became a vital part of the Canadian economy. The Canadian industrial worker thus reaped the benefits of others' sacrifices. In recent years at least, he has had a measure of economic security and of prosperity which has generally been at least equivalent to that enjoyed by small tradesmen and many in the professional classes.

The results of this have been very evident in the social sphere. A generation or two ago in small Canadian villages there were almost always two men who represented a social class generally acknowledged to be superior to the rest of the community—the minister and the school-teacher. Where there was a country doctor he too joined this little rural élite. Today this stratification has disappeared. The carpenter, the plumber, the market-gardener, to say nothing of the insurance salesman, the commuter, the storekeeper, and the bank employee have often drawn level—and in some obvious cases have far surpassed—the economic level of some professional men. The educational differences, too, are less apparent. With higher incomes available to them, the majority of Canadians have spent longer in school, and with veterans' benefits many thousands, who would other-

wise have been unable to afford it, have gone to university. All this has decisively eroded, and on the whole obliterated, the distinctions between the lower and middle classes—distinctions which were never very great or very widely accepted in any case.

This then is the Canadian Revolution. It has been achieved in a typically Canadian manner—quietly, and without bloodshed, and without strong emotions. It has come about in a mature and civilized way and has therefore been able to dispense with all the incidental untidiness of massacres and the tragical end of princes. Yet the historian of the future will undoubtedly catch the magic and the romance of it, even although we who are living through it may find it commonplace. What has happened in Canada has indeed all the basic elements of a fairy tale, or Dick Whittington turning again to be thrice Lord Mayor of London, of Cinderella marrying the prince, of the mighty being put down from their seats and the exaltation of the humble and the meek. We have won where Danton lost; we have accomplished a task which proved too hard for Trotsky.

Psychiatry and Its Neurological Future

— After Freud, What? —

by

DENIS NALDRETT WHITE

In Canada today, out of every 100 children born and growing to adulthood, nearly 10 will spend some part of their lives in a mental hospital. What are the limitations of the psychotherapy treatment prescribed for mental illness by the discoveries of Freud? What are the possibilities in recent experiments with surgical and medical treatments? Can we visualize a day when preventive medicine will make a "break through" into this unknown universe of man's mind?

During the year just passed there were celebrations all over the world to mark the centenary of the birth of Sigmund Freud, one of the great men of all time. It is often said that it takes full fifty years for the meaning of the teachings of the leaders of our times to be widely appreciated. At the turn of the nineteenth century in the vanguard of human progress there stood three men, the effects of whose teaching we might now expect to have become universal. Although their interests were widely different, nevertheless each brought to his sphere an order and sense of cause and effect.

The tremendous advances in our knowledge of the physical world that sprang from Einstein's teachings need not be emphasised. We live today at the threshold of an era where man can tap undreamt-of power and yet lives under the threat of almost limitless catastrophe. Charles Darwin showed us that the present order of life followed logically an orderly pattern of evolution, of cause and effect similar to the pattern we see in the physical world. Sigmund Freud showed that this same thesis of cause and effect could equally well be applied to man's behaviour.

It would I think, be hard to over-estimate the profound influence that Freud's teachings have had upon our everyday lives. Hard because the effects of his teachings are difficult to appreciate even now,

half a century after they burst upon the world, since they still arouse profoundly emotional responses in many people and this makes a dispassionate evaluation of them difficult to reach. The very violence of this unreasoned response is, of course, an indication of the tenderness and potency of the emotions that Freud sought to understand. But whether one's reaction be that of uncritical adulation or of unreasoning condemnation, it would be impossible to deny that the influence of his teachings is seen in all our institutions, in our family circles, schools, churches and prisons, and has modified and changed our ways of thinking about man's behaviour. Having for the first time some rational explanation of the complex patterns of human behaviour we seek to relate effect to cause. Naturally it is in the field of psychiatry that we would expect these teachings to have their most profound effect and certainly I think it is fair to state that an understanding of the principles of psycho-analytical thought and practice is a major part and sometimes the only part of the teachings of psychiatric schools today. Thus it may not be inopportune to examine rather critically the influence that these teachings have had upon psychiatry in the last half-century, to assess the progress that has been made with their aid, and perhaps to take a cautious look into the future.

It will be remembered that Freud's fundamental discovery was that there existed an unconscious mind and he showed that this has the most profound effect on both the conscious mind and upon human behaviour. Prior to his teachings, our various actions had been ascribed either to innate virtue or to original sin and it was assumed that man's will alone determined his behaviour. Freud showed us that behaviour, which on the surface appeared to be irrational, could readily be understood and even anticipated by a knowledge of the subconscious forces present. He showed that these subconscious drives were identical in all persons and differed only in degree. In addition he showed that in this unconscious mind there was a storehouse of memories quite apart from the memories which we can readily recall to consciousness. These subconscious memories differed from the ones we can readily bring into consciousness in that they were usually associated with extremely unpleasant emotions. Freud suggested that so unpleasant

were these emotions that the memories had been repressed from the conscious mind into the unconscious mind. He pointed out that nevertheless, even though they were unconscious to our ready recall, they still had the most profound effect upon behaviour since they were activated by any situation that paralleled their original formation. That is to say that in the unconscious mind were stored most of the unpleasant experiences of our past life, so unpleasant that we could not bear to think about them. He further pointed out that each of these memories of past events had associated with it the same original unpleasant emotion experienced at the time of its formation. That is to say that if a child had been rejected by a parent, he not unnaturally felt rage and hostility against that parent. To feel hatred against a parent is unacceptable to the conscious self and society and as such the emotion had to be repressed and with it the memory of the experience that evoked it. However having been repressed, it still exists within the individual so that decades later when that individual is rejected by an employer he reacts all the more vehemently because of the original rejection by the important parental figure which had so profoundly upset him as a child. Moreover his reaction to rejection by the employer would bring to light all the hatred and hostility that he had originally felt but not expressed when his father had rejected him as a child. Since hatred against an employer is more socially acceptable than hatred against a father, then this second episode is likely to become associated with an undue degree of expressed anger and hostility, disproportionate to whatever rejection the employer might have shown. Thus Freud showed us that previous experiences and particularly childhood experiences of an unpleasant nature might have a very profound effect upon the individual's future behaviour under similar or parallel conditions. So violent might be the eruption of the repressed emotion that had been activated at this later date that it might seriously impair that individual's ability to live and adjust to society. Indeed where the amount of repressed hostility or other emotion was very great it would break out in later life under circumstances which on the surface seemed quite trivial but which of course would all have in common the characteristics of rejection. Such an individual would of course find it extremely hard to meet all

the varying demands of adult life without showing often such angry emotions that his adjustment in society became difficult or impossible.

However Freud did more than give us an understanding of the influence of emotions associated with past experiences upon present and future behaviour. He showed us a way to overcome these ill effects. He showed that if the individual could gradually be brought to recover into his conscious memory the episodes of the original injury and at the same time, little by little express the hitherto socially unacceptable emotions associated with that episode, these emotions would become dissipated and no longer harmful. Originally it will be remembered that the emotions had been repressed because they were socially unacceptable and therefore recovering them into consciousness and expressing them would be of necessity an upsetting experience which could only occur over a rather long period and in small degrees. However once this had been effected, the storehouse of resentment and anger would no longer be present to warp that individual's reaction to future situations. Thus, in the case we have been considering, the man who reacted so violently to his employer's criticism would gradually be brought to realize that he did this because his employer's criticism reminded him of his father's rejection. Then having remembered the terrible emotional upset that his father's rejection caused him long years' ago, he would gradually become able to talk about this and increasingly to vent his real anger and hatred at his rejection, an anger and hatred which he never expressed in the childhood experience. Eventually, having felt and expressed all these hostile emotions, he would find that both the original and the more recent experience had lost their explosive qualities and could take their place quite quietly with other experiences in his conscious mind without arousing great anger. Under these circumstances he would no longer see his father as the repressive ogre that had haunted him all his life and would also be able to judge his employer more dispassionately. Moreover under future circumstances of criticism or rejection, he would be able to react in a more moderate and temperate fashion, more in accord with the facts and less biased by his own repressed hatred.

This then is the basis of psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytical treatment. First to reach an understanding of the causes for the

disordered behaviour, to trace them to their origin and then to bring into consciousness the emotions associated with these injurious experiences so that these emotions may be expressed and dissipated. Let me point out that when this occurs the individual loses the pattern of disordered behaviour even though nothing has been done to change those original events which were traumatic to him. The only change has been in the individual. This change occurs because that individual has brought to expression emotions previously imprisoned within himself, and which he could not formerly express because these emotions were usually socially or personally unacceptable.

For the first time since man started to try and study his behaviour, these theories gave him an explanation upon which to work. They explained why some men were hypersensitive to criticism and were angry and aggressive, sometimes to the extent of causing bodily harm to their fellows. It provided an explanation for selfishness and generosity, for aggressiveness and humility, for shyness and brashness, for laziness and great energy, and all the other traits that humankind shows. It explained moreover the reasons behind disordered behaviour and allowed us to find an explanation for that group of emotional diseases known as the neuroses. All of this understanding it will be appreciated, related man's behaviour to his environment. The environment was all important. Past experience determined the future man. Parents of today are hag-ridden by fear of the effects of their behaviour towards their children and how this may mould or warp the adult sons and daughters that these children will later become. All our energies and attentions were directed towards the environment, towards the experiences that converge upon us and the effect that these will have upon us later. No one bothered to stop and ask whether environment was the only factor to be considered. So intoxicated were we with the knowledge that at last we had some means for understanding man's personality and behaviour that we did not pause and reflect whether this was the whole story.

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As the implications of this understanding of the factors behind man's behaviour became apparent, I think there were many people who believed that this understanding and treatment of emotional

disorders would mean the end of mental disease. It was felt that by avoiding emotionally traumatic experiences in our children or, if these could not be avoided, by treating them once they had occurred, we would be able in the course of time to breed a race free of emotional disorders. As a result all sorts of cults and schools grew up and everywhere the emphasis was laid upon the injurious effects that environment might have particularly upon our children. Moreover once it became apparent that it was not so easy to prevent children from having injurious experiences, increasingly the psychotherapeutic couches were filled and the demand for psychiatrists and psychoanalysts and psychotherapists grew daily. Even today when they comprise one of the largest bodies of medical specialists the cry is for more psychiatrists.

With all these measures and efforts, what progress has been made? What inroads have been made against mental and emotional disease? Has the tide turned and are we about to relegate emotional and mental disease to the history books as one of man's medical conquests, as we have relegated small pox and the infectious bacterial diseases? Unfortunately, no. I think that we must all agree that still today the progress we have made in the last half century in treating the mentally ill has been extremely disappointing. The diagnosis of insanity still carries with it a horrifying implication of incurability which really has not changed so very much from the days when lunatics and criminals were mixed together and equally ill treated. That our mental hospitals have a high discharge rate I do not doubt, but I believe we must largely ascribe this to the fact that now we are admitting to mental hospitals milder cases of insanity, cases which in former years would have remained in the community because there would have been no room for them in the limited asylum space then available. Despite the fantastic sums of money spent by all governments on the care of the mentally sick and despite the magnificent facilities now available for their treatment and care, mental illness is and remains the most serious health problem of all civilised nations. It accounts for a stupendous wastage of human talent, quite apart from the appalling cost. To this we must add an unmeasurable but horrifying degree of anguish and suffering from those afflicted by

mental disease. If we realise that in Canada today, out of every 100 children born and who grow to adulthood, nearly 10 will spend some part of their lives in a mental hospital we may appreciate the terrible toll we have to pay. But mental disease is by no means the whole story because far more numerous are those persons crippled to a greater or lesser degree by emotional ill health or neuroses; such people, while still able to take their place in the community, are nevertheless disabled from full enjoyment of their lives and from full contribution to the community and family by reason of their emotional disability. The appalling incidence of such neuroses does not need to be emphasised. Everywhere we look amongst our friends and families we see behaviour which, with the new understanding Freud has given us, we can recognise as examples of emotional disorder. Although we can sympathise with the difficulties that they daily encounter, yet nevertheless, we must regret the wastage of their talents and energies that go to combat their own inner conflicts. I do not wish to enter into the controversy of whether emotional ill health is becoming increasingly common or whether we are becoming increasingly adept at recognising its symptoms, but I do know that it can fairly be described as an almost universal disease and that the well adjusted individual is, in today's world, a rarity.

How is it then that with all this increase in our knowledge of man's emotions and their effect upon his personality and behaviour, so little has been added to our ability to reduce his sufferings from emotional and mental disease? Some I think would have me answer that this is because Freud's teachings and the teachings associated with him are fundamentally wrong. I cannot accept this explanation because these teachings have worked too well in helping us to understand the workings of the mind even though they may not have significantly improved treatment. They have stood up well under that acid test of all theories, namely to serve as a basis for prediction. By using them we may with a fair degree of accuracy forecast the nature of an individual's behaviour under certain given circumstances. If we can do this then the theories that we are using cannot be wholly erroneous. I would suggest rather that although experience and practice have shown us that these teachings are fundamentally not in-

correct, yet nevertheless we may have erred in thinking that they *alone* were the whole explanation for man's behaviour. If environment alone is responsible for man's behaviour and actions, then a poor environment should always lead to emotional ill health. It is of course true that there is more emotional ill health in the families of drunkards, divorcees and where poverty and criminality exists, but this is not always the case. In our worst slums there are families of which any country should be proud although undoubtedly slums do contribute to delinquency, insanity and other ills. Moreover this also can be seen at the individual level; from the worst homes and out of the most appalling circumstances come at times some of our finest citizens. Similarly, the reverse is often true.

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It would seem to me that in our enthusiasm to study the environment of man and to ascribe to it all man's emotional ailments we have ignored the fact that no two men are born equal. Just as every individual has a different intelligence, so it seems to me logical to assume that each individual has an inherent and individual ability to adjust to environmental stress: and this inherent ability is something with which he is born, just as he is born with inherent intelligence. This would better explain the reasons why a poor social or family environment results in a high percentage of abnormal or disordered behaviour in some families but in a low percentage in others which presumably have in common inherited a higher resistance to emotional ills. It would also better explain the discrepancies between individuals within the families themselves. In the same way we know that each individual has an inherent resistance or susceptibility to other diseases such as tuberculosis and cancer.

Is there any way in which we can get experimental evidence to test this hypothesis? How great a part does environment play in shaping the personality and how great a part does constitutional inheritance? Such experimental evidence is very difficult to obtain but there is one type of experiment that nature makes which may bear directly upon the problem. Identical twins have of course an identical genetic inheritance; usually identical twins also are brought up in fairly identical environmental circumstances but occasionally

they are separated in childhood and brought up separately. The study of such cases would of course give us an excellent opportunity of comparing the effects of different environments on genetically identical individuals. However, such cases are rare and when they do occur present formidable problems in collecting accurate information. All too often this information is not sufficiently accurate or detailed to satisfy the rigid requirements of any scrupulous investigator. Thus the case reported by Eliot Slater is almost unique. In 1945 he described a pair of identical monovular twins whose mother died when they were nine months old. Immediately after this, Florence was adopted by an affectionate maternal aunt who gave her a stable and happy home life quite different from Edith who continued to live with her drunken violent father who beat her so severely that she bore the scars of her beatings throughout her life. These twins after parting at the age of nine months never met again until they were 24 years old. After 8 miserable years with her father who had married again, Edith was put into an orphanage until she was 19. Despite the very different quality of their upbringing and the absence of any contact between them, their careers bore very striking resemblances. Both showed neurotic traits as children and later stole as children or adolescents. Both entered domestic service and neither married. Both became gradually deaf and both implied that the other merely pretended deafness. Both were religious though Edith was more so, and Slater remarked that their personalities were very similar though Florence was the more open and conciliatory of the two. Even more remarkable was the fact that soon after their first meeting at the age of 24, symptoms of mental disease in the shape of delusions of persecution began to appear in both. From the first Edith directed her suspicions against her sister while Florence suspected her fellow employees of plotting against her, only later, as Edith's accusations increased against her, did she too turn her suspicions against her sister. As the schizophrenic illness developed, the personality of both girls remained well preserved though Edith was more severely affected. It was even more remarkable that the nature of the delusions of the twins was very similar: Florence suspected Edith of telling a fellow employee she had been in prison at a time when Edith was

writing letters accusing Florence of spying. Later Edith thought she was accused of having an illegitimate baby while Florence said people hinted she was sex starved. Thus it would appear that a stable and happy home life availed Florence naught against the over-riding influence of her genetic predisposition to deafness, thieving, neurosis and insanity.

These two girls known to have an identical genetic inheritance had in fact utterly different environmental upbringings, the one as favourable as one is likely to experience and the other as harmful as one can imagine; and yet despite these differences in their environment in childhood and adolescence, the end result was the same: an end result apparently shaped at the time of conception by their genetic inheritance and not by parental love or ill treatment.

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If, then, inherent characteristics play so important a part in determining the individual's susceptibility or resistance to emotional disease, these inherent characteristics must lie within the central nervous system. What evidence is there to determine how much of the structure and function of the nervous system depends upon genetic factors and how much depends upon environmental factors? For this information I would like to draw your attention to the interesting work done by Sperry when he was in Chicago. He was interested first in the very complex changes that are associated with the development of the nervous system. It will be remembered that the nervous system starts as a plate of cells running the length of the embryo and which then curls on itself to form a tube. In the layers of the cells lining the tube arise most of the cells that form the nervous system; these subsequently migrate through the walls of the tube to collect together in the ganglia and nuclear of the adult nervous system. At the same time there grows out from these cells the long processes called axones and dendrites which enable these cells to connect with different sensory organs and with other nerve cells to form the complex but orderly network that is the mature nervous system. Sperry was interested not only in the factors that controlled this migration of nerve cells but also in those that enabled the outgrowing axones and dendrites to make their proper connections within the nervous system.

He wondered how it was that those nerve fibres from the groups of nerve cells that were to control the muscles of the eye, never grew into the muscles of the face. For a long time it had been assumed that function was the controlling factor and that as the nerve cells developed they tended to make random connections but that only those with functional significance and use persisted and grew. It was assumed therefore that the nervous system developed by trial and error, that the nerve fibres from the nuclei controlling the muscles of the eyes *did* in fact make random connections with the muscles of the face and elsewhere, but that when they came to use these connections the resulting function was useless to the individual and therefore the connections withered and disappeared. Only those that served a useful purpose persisted. It is perhaps not irrelevant to draw attention to the fact that this theory was carried to its greatest limits during the first half of this century, a time when psycho-analysis was emphasising in a different field the over-riding importance of experience, environment and functional significance upon human behaviour. Thus it will be seen that both in psychiatry and in neurology it was assumed that previous experience, that is to say, environment, was all important in determining the behaviour patterns of mature individuals.

Sperry however performed a whole series of ingenious experiments which showed quite conclusively that this was not the case. He showed that function had no influence whatever upon the growth of nerve fibres, nor upon their function once they had grown. Some of these experiments were on animals in whom the nerves from the eyes were cut and turned back to front, upside down or the right side interchanged with the left. Despite the fact that the nerve regeneration followed a chaotic pattern the vision that returned when the nerves regenerated was not chaotic but orderly; it was normal in all respects except that the world as seen by that animal was upside down or reversed according to the displacement given to the severed eye and optic nerve. Moreover not only did the fibres regenerate so that sensation was wrongly perceived but this erroneous perception persisted for the rest of the animal's life despite the painful lessons of experience.

In summarising the work that he has done over the last fifteen years and to which I would refer you, Sperry says "It would seem that almost no behaviour pattern need be considered too refined or too complicated for its detailed organisation to be significantly influenced by genetic factors. The extent to which our individual motor skills, sensory capacities, talents, temperaments, mannerisms, intelligence and other behavioural traits may be products of inheritance would seem to be much greater than many of us had formerly believed possible."

It would seem therefore that this may well provide us with the explanation for the disappointing results that have followed the introduction of psychotherapy as a means of alleviating emotional disorders. We see suggestive evidence from our studies of human beings which admittedly are far too limited; and very strong evidence from our studies of the lower animals, that in fact behaviour is largely moulded by inherited factors and very little influenced by environmental factors. Thus any means of treatment aimed solely at removing the harmful effects that the environment may cause upon the individual is of necessity bound to have only limited therapeutic value. Moreover it seems to me that the evidence is every year becoming more convincing to show that this is in fact the case. As this has become increasingly recognised there have been cries of dismay because it has been the opinion of many people that characteristics that are inherent and genetically determined are immutable. If our personalities are largely determined at the moment of conception and at that time our adult behaviour pattern is fairly clearly laid down, is there really nothing that can be done to help those with abnormal behaviour patterns or to treat their emotional diseases? Are genetic characteristics immutable and unchangeable? Moreover, if they are unchangeable is there nothing that can be done to the adult organism to enable it better to adjust to the inherited traits of disordered behaviour? It is these questions that have dismayed so many people who believed that nothing could be done in either context. But I would like to suggest that this is very definitely not the case. Not only can we enable the body better to adjust to inherent weaknesses but also I believe that it is possible in the future we may be

able to eliminate these inherent weaknesses at their conception, to modify the genetic inheritance of the individual so that he will be less liable to disease.

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It seems surprising that people should have taken such a pessimistic view of behaviour disorders as it became increasingly apparent that these were largely genetically determined. Surprising because of course it is not only the central nervous system that may inherit weaknesses and susceptibility to disease. Some people come from families with a high incidence of vascular disease and others from families with metabolic diseases. Does this fact prevent doctors from treating them when these diseases appear? Certainly not. The insulin treatment of diabetes is as potent in the son of a diabetic as it is in any other person.

If psychotherapy and other methods of endeavouring to remove the harmful effects of previous experience are found to have only limited success in the treatment of disorders of the personality and behaviour, what other methods of treatment might we try, what other methods are more likely to be successful in re-ordering the disorder of inherited emotional or mental disease?

Before we can attempt to answer this question however, we must realise that treatment of disease of any system or organ can never proceed along scientific lines and can only be undertaken on an empirical basis until a knowledge has been gained of the mechanisms that make the normal organ function. What do we know about the functioning of the normal mind? It is here I think that our greatest deficiency lies, here that we need to concentrate our attention most particularly at the moment and in the years to come. In all honesty we must confess that we know very little about the mechanisms of human thought and behaviour on a physiological or chemical plane. Moreover for this deficiency it is my belief that the neurologists must bear a very large share of the blame. The science of neurology grew up in the last century as the result of the study devoted to two aspects of the function of the central nervous system. In addition to the sensory inflow into the central nervous system they also studied intensively the motor output and classified the diseases that are asso-

ciated with disorders of movement. It should be realised of course that the only way in which the nervous system can be influenced is by a sensory mechanism—by vision, hearing, touch, smell etc. Similarly, the only way in which it can effect a response to the activity that occurs within it is by causing a movement: a movement of limb or of pen or of articulation, in no other way can the nervous system cause a response, nor can we make our will known. The neurologists devoted their entire attention to the sensations that pour into the nervous system and to the motor responses that come from it but they completely ignored the obviously complex, infinitely complex, processes that go on in between this input and outflow. This study of the central organisation of the nervous system which presumably is concerned with thinking and volition, they ignored completely, leaving it to the psychiatrists. Indeed they considered that the study of such processes was somewhat unscientific, or even rather indecent. It was the great British school of neurologists which contributed so much to the development of this specialty and who were responsible very largely for shaping its interests and traditions. A neurologist from this traditional British school would gladly devote his entire attention and interest to a case of paralysis and would take infinite time and trouble in studying its nature, unless by chance it became apparent that the paralysis was emotionally determined and hysterical in type, in which case he could not be more scornful nor more quickly rid himself of any interest in, or contact with, the patient.

Thus, we see growing up two groups of men studying the same system but with utterly different approaches and understandings. On the one hand psychiatrists endeavouring to study the central integrative processes responsible for the mind and on the other the neurologists concerned solely with the sensations that go into the brain and the movements that come from it. These two groups of specialists maintained a distance from each other and each went his separate way. How stupid that in studying one organ, one system, the central nervous system, we should use two groups of specialists each with little understanding of the other's problems. Indeed it is part of my thesis that these two groups of specialists should, in fact, be one, and that our greater understanding of the nervous system cannot proceed

so long as they remain divided. That this is becoming recognised can be seen in the realm of neurophysiology where increasingly the physiologists are turning their attention away from the study of sensations and movements and towards the functions of thinking and emotions, studying their localisation and modes of action within the nervous system. Obviously our therapeutic approach to diseases of the mind must await the advances of these men, must wait until they can give us a better understanding of how the mind works.

However, this understanding is proceeding apace and has received tremendous impetus from the development of the sub-specialty of electrophysiology; the study of the electrical activity of the nervous system which has greatly increased our means of probing the mechanisms by which the central integrative activities of the mind work.

Having taken this brief look at the state of our knowledge of the workings of the normal mind we may now return to the question we asked ourselves: If psychotherapy has such a limited effect in the treatment of emotional disease, what other methods are likely to have more success?

Traditionally the treatment of disease in man has been divided into a surgical approach and a medical or chemical approach. As will have been apparent from what I have just said, our surgical colleagues have not had the opportunity of contributing greatly to the surgery of the mind since our knowledge of its normal activity has lagged so far behind. Only one gross surgical operation has ever become extensively practised in the realm of psychosurgery. This is the procedure known as prefrontal leucotomy where cutting of the fibres of the brain above the eye causes, in those with grave mental sickness, some improvement in their behaviour and certainly reduces the difficulties of their management. However surgeons have been reluctant to undertake this operation because the individual afterwards is very different from the person his family formerly knew. This uncontrollable interference with the structure of a personality explains the understandable reluctance of many surgeons to venture upon this field.

There is another popular procedure which should not perhaps fall within the realm of surgery but which was discovered empirically

as a means of improving some types of depressive illness. The passage of an electrical current through the brain results in a convulsive seizure occurring and in some types of depression the effect of several such convulsions may be beneficial. That such treatment has its merits I do not deny but it always seems to me that it is analogous to the little boy who, not understanding the workings of the television set, gives it a good kick in the hope that this may improve the picture. Similarly, of course, gross surgery such as prefrontal leucotomy even in the hands of the most skilled surgeon, must remain an extremely crude operation. When we are treating an organ so complex and delicate as the central nervous system, the knife and ligature are crude instruments with which to deal with the infinite delicacy of living cells: pickaxes with which to repair an electronic computer.

Thus it is perhaps in the field of micro-surgery that we are more likely to see the greatest advances in the next few years. Here upon the heels of the physiologists who every day are learning more about the structure and function of mental processes within the brain, the neurosurgeons are following and producing important effects upon behaviour by causing minute lesions in the depths and substance of the brain with a precision hitherto unknown. In the same way they can also place stimulating electrodes within the substance of the brain with an accuracy of a few millimetres and, by using these to stimulate small groups of nerve cells, can produce amazing and profound effects upon behaviour. That this work at the moment remains almost entirely experimental and upon animals does not in my opinion detract from the probability that its application to human disease will shortly follow, and indeed is even now being used in some cases of insanity. Here then is one great field of surgery of the mind that opens up ahead of us and which may enable us the better to treat patients born with an inherent predisposition to chronic emotional or mental disorder.

Coincidentally with these advances, our biochemical and neurochemical colleagues have not been lagging behind. The discovery of drugs that would produce a temporary period of mental disorder closely resembling some of the naturally occurring mental diseases led quickly to the discovery of other substances that would block these effects. It had been hoped that these drugs might also have

therapeutic value in the treatment of the naturally occurring diseases. These initial aspirations have not as yet been fulfilled but they have led us to the discovery of a series of drugs of undoubted value with a tranquilising action upon man's all too prevalent anxieties. If anyone should ever doubt the need that mankind feels to obtain relief from his emotional stresses, he should consider the almost hysterical stampede that has been made to the shops of druggists to obtain these new tranquilising agents. That other substances will be discovered with even more specific and potent effects, there can be no doubt, and these discoveries will probably follow hard upon the heels of the men studying the chemistry of the activity of the normal and the abnormal brain.

That the therapeutic results of these new approaches to the treatment of diseases of the mind is as yet disappointing, must be admitted, but I think it should be clear to all that in these fields we stand on the threshold of advances that will proceed along roughly parallel lines and which must lead us into increased understanding and ability to relieve the sufferings of mankind.

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These then are the lines along which we may expect to see advances made in the treatment of emotional and mental diseases. The one, the production of minute destructive lesions placed with great accuracy at specific points within the brain, or the introduction of appropriate electrical or other stimuli, again at specific points within the brain, and the other, a more refined and sophisticated method aimed at interfering chemically with the activity of the nerve cells themselves. But these are treatments directed at cases of established mental and emotional disease. We have seen however that such cases of emotional disease may have occurred largely as a result of a predisposition to disorders of the personality determined at the moment of conception. Is there any way in which this predisposition or weak inheritance could be modified or prevented? If genetic influences play such a large part in our susceptibility to mental and emotional disorders, what likelihood is there of our being able to modify any malign genetic influences with which the individual would otherwise be born?

This brings us to a field of preventive medicine which so far has been little explored in the realm of psychiatry. However it is in the field of preventive medicine that the greatest advances of all have been made in the last century or so with regard to other diseases. That this is not so readily appreciated by the public is easily understandable. It is much easier to appreciate the drama and skill of the physician who cures one's sick child than to appreciate the skill of the workers in public health who prevent that child from becoming sick. We all are aware and are grateful for the fact that today a baby born in this country looks forward to many more years of life than one born half a century or longer ago. However the greatest part of this increase in our life's span is due not so much to advances in our ability to cure disease but rather to advances that have been made in preventing disease from occurring. Let us therefore look briefly at the problem from this point of view as it concerns emotional and mental disease. Is there any hope that we may be able so to modify the genetic inheritance of the individual that he will have a more stable nervous system, one better able to adapt to the insults of later life, one less liable to break down in emotional or mental disorder?

Our ability to tackle this problem, like the others we have just discussed, must of necessity await the increased understanding of the structure and function of the cells of the nervous system. However it is in the probing of the secrets of the cells and their nuclei that the biochemists have in recent years made some most striking advances. It has for long, of course, been known that in the nucleus of the cell the chromosomes carry the inherited characteristics from one generation to another. It is presumably to these inherited characteristics that we refer when we suggest that some people are born with a greater or lesser resistance to emotional and mental disease. What do we know of the structure of these chromosomes, how does this structure influence their activity and can we interfere with the structure and thereby change the activity of the chromosome?

We know that the chromosomes are composed largely of protein, ribonucleic acid and desoxyribonucleic acid, or D.N.A. for short. It would appear that the chromosomes exert their effect upon the function of the cells in which they exist by serving as patterns for

the formation of specific protein enzymes. These enzymes are the tools of the living cell and are responsible for the chemical activity of that cell. Of course it is this chemical activity which is responsible for the function of the cell and for its healthy or diseased activity. Thus fundamentally the function of the cell depends upon the chromosomes which pattern the enzymes formed within it. Of the various constituents of the chromosome it would seem that the D.N.A. is the substance that serves as this template or pattern, and which thus determines the cell's properties and functions. D.N.A. consists of a molecule with a very long chain to which are attached various purine or pyrimide bases. It is the order in which these bases occur along the D.N.A. chain that confers its specificity to that molecule by determining the types of enzymes that this molecule can make. It is as if the pattern of the sequence of these bases serves as a kind of genetic code, storing information as a template does. Thus, in order to change the functional activities of the cell, the sequence of bases along the D.N.A. molecule must be re-ordered. Fundamentally it must be the functions of the individual cells that are responsible for the normal or abnormal behaviour of the organism at large, and thus such changes must exert their influence upon the activity of the organism as a whole. It should be noted that this pattern of the D.N.A. molecule within the chromosome is the very substance of inherited function. It is fairly easy to show that such molecules when they reproduce themselves, do so exactly, so that subsequent generations inherit precisely the same pattern and therefore the same functions and characteristics as the preceding generation. Thus not only do the cells that multiply within the nervous system retain the same characteristics as their predecessors but, on a greater plane the cells of the nervous system of the son resemble those of the nervous system of the father.

This then is the crux of the problem. In this very long molecule of D.N.A. containing, as it were, coded chemical information, what chances have we of understanding the significance of this code? Upon this code depends the activity of the cell and hence of the organism. If we can change the sequence when it becomes disordered or diseased it is possible that we could change it to a more benign form.

It may be thought that I am speculating rather wildly and indeed I probably am. Obviously we must learn a great deal more about the functions of the enzymes produced by these D.N.A. molecules. But that I am not completely divorced from reality can perhaps be seen by the fact that now it has proved possible to transform one type of bacterium into a different bacterium, merely by the addition to the first bacterium of D.N.A. isolated from the second. Presumably the pattern or template carried by the second D.N.A. molecule becomes transferred to the D.N.A. in the chromosome of the first bacterium and thereby changes its properties and characteristics into those of the second bacterium. Moreover this change in bacterial type can then be passed on without further chemical interference through subsequent generations, and breeds true. That is to say that by introducing a new substance into the cell, the structure of the hereditary material has been changed so that one bacterium loses its original specific activity and functions and changes into a second type of organism with different functions and then breeds true as that second organism.

That a bacterium is a very different organism from an adult human being is quite true but I wonder if it is expecting too much of the neurochemists to think that eventually they may so increase their understanding of the nature of the chemistry of the cells of the body and of the nervous system in particular that they may be able to influence these cells to avoid building enzymes that disorder the function of the cell or that predispose to, or cause, disease.

That I have been looking ahead I do not deny. That at times I have been looking far ahead, perhaps beyond our lifetime, I also will not deny. But I hope that in looking ahead I may have given reason to feel that there is no need to be dismayed by our lack of progress to date in combating emotional and mental disease. This has been due I believe to our concentration upon the environment as a cause of these emotional ills. It would seem that the time is now ripe for us completely to re-orientate our outlook towards the future. Let us now direct our attention towards the structure and function of the mind, remembering that much of this is inherent in the individual. This is not to deny that the environment may play a part

in shaping to some small extent our personalities. Let us not exclude such factors nor indeed discredit the value of psychotherapy which still remains largely the only available treatment of the neuroses. But let us remember that environment plays only a part, a small part, in causing these disorders. With this new understanding I believe we can make real progress first in treating the emotional disorders to which we may be predisposed from birth, and later possibly even in preventing them from being inherited by mankind's children.

The Residence Hall and The University

— An adjunct to a liberal education —

by

T. H. B. SYMONS and R. L. WATTS

University residences should not be treated as mere 'body shelters' or as experimental laboratories for counsellors intent on 'adjusting' their charges. What a residence hall can contribute to the life of the university community and what physical or other amenities seem desirable are here discussed by two experienced dons.

High among the problems facing Canadian universities is the question of residence. As university enrolment increases, more and more students each year are unable to find rooms which are congenial, convenient, or even tolerable. In university towns the supply of possible lodgings is almost exhausted; in larger cities there is a danger that the university, if it fails to develop residences, will become just a neighbourhood institution, a kind of "Metro College", perhaps seeking redemption by means of a good Graduate School, but losing the participation of undergraduates from diverse places and backgrounds. Mounting enrolments give the problem urgency, but there is, as well, an increasing awareness that, for most students, living in a hall of residence provides a notable enrichment of their university experience.

In Britain, the United States and Canada interest has been growing in the important part which the residence hall can play in the university. In England, the six colleges that have achieved university status since 1945 have all aimed from the outset to be largely residential. Their Vice-Chancellors seem agreed that residences are an important factor in higher education, and they have concentrated upon a parallel development of teaching faculties and halls of residence. Since 1944, 67 residences have come into use in Britain, including one at least in almost every university.

In the United States, since 1945, residences have been built at nearly every university. Driven by the need to accommodate their

expanding numbers, many of the state universities have gigantic programmes under way: such universities as Illinois, Connecticut, Purdue, and Michigan State have under construction or have completed accommodation ranging in capacity from 1400 to 4450 men. The older eastern universities have re-awakened to the educational importance of halls, too: Cornell and Brown have, within the last few years, completed similarly large residence construction projects and the new "Program for Harvard College" calls for an expenditure of twenty-five million dollars on residence.

In Canada, new residences have been opened at the Universities of New Brunswick, Toronto, Montreal and Queen's; and the planning of residences is in various stages at the Universities of Western Ontario and British Columbia, at Carleton and Memorial Universities, and, indeed, on nearly every campus. The National Conference of Canadian Universities at its 1957 meeting held a symposium upon the subject of residence halls and their academic significance. A committee of the Conference was asked to explore possible sources of financial assistance for the construction of residences.

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In view of the present interest in residences it may be helpful to review briefly the major residential traditions which have influenced university planning through the centuries.

The housing of students was already a matter of concern by the end of the twelfth century when thousands of wandering students gathered at Bologna, Paris, Montpellier and Oxford. At a time when cities seldom consisted of more than five thousand people, Paris and Bologna attracted some six or seven thousand students, while Oxford had between fifteen hundred and three thousand. Moreover, many of the students were poverty-stricken and the majority were not over fourteen or fifteen years old. In the early days students lived anywhere they could find lodging. Some rented garrets, others boarded with masters, or with townsmen, and a wealthy few kept houses of their own. Some time during the twelfth century students at Bologna began to organize themselves into groups which hired houses and set up establishments known as *hospicia* or hostels. This type of arrangement spread to Paris where the hostels were called *paedo-*

gogies and to Oxford where they were called halls. The halls were self-governing communities which developed their own financial and disciplinary regulations and their own methods of enforcement. They elected their own leaders, or principals, who were free of university control.⁽¹⁾

Later special halls were organized and endowed by pious founders for poorer students. Over these endowed halls the university came to have a certain authority, usually appointing or confirming in office their principals. After 1284 when John Peckham, the Archbishop of Canterbury, spoke of Walter of Merton as "the founder and planter of your college" these endowed halls at Oxford and Cambridge came to be known as colleges. At the start of the fourteenth century there were three colleges and 300 halls at Oxford. Two centuries later, as the noble fashion of founding colleges continued, ten colleges had appeared and the number of halls had been reduced to fifty-five. After 1565, the policy of requiring all scholars to register with a master or tutor in some college or hall made these institutions the framework of the university. Gradually, the colleges and halls concerned themselves with the education of their members, providing more and more of their instruction, until they had become teaching establishments as well as communities of lodgers. Today, Oxford and Cambridge consist basically of colleges and halls which are separate residential corporations. The responsibility for formal instruction is divided between the university and the colleges, with the university arranging certain courses and the general system of lectures, while each college maintains its own teaching staff of tutors and fellows to undertake a more individual form of instruction. In this manner, the original residential hall has become the centre for much of the formal education of its members.

At the outset, the pattern at continental universities was similar to that developed at Oxford and Cambridge. Indeed, the English universities had been inspired by the example of the University of Paris which served as a model for all northern universities. The Reformation, however, changed the character of continental universities and in many the halls disappeared. In Germany, the system of halls,

(1) H. Rashdall, *The Universities in Europe in the Middle Ages*, Vol. II, Oxford, 1895.

a system identified with celibacy, the religious orders, and monasticism, was destroyed. The colleges and halls were retained in France but the French Revolution which closed for a time every educational institution, eliminated the residential foundations. In Germany and France, educators, under the influence of the Encyclopaedists, devoted their enthusiasm to the advancement of knowledge. Whatever funds were available they preferred to devote to research, publication, and the lecture system of instruction. It was felt that the university should not be concerned with its students outside the classroom. Thus, when the University of Berlin was established in 1809, no provision was made for housing the academic community. Only in England, protected by its insularity from the full impact of the Reformation and the French Revolution, did the development of university residential halls continue on the original European design.

The colonial American colleges were begun upon the English pattern. However, pioneer conditions and the bogey of student discipline led to the development of a somewhat different tradition.⁽²⁾ At Oxford and Cambridge the teaching staff had fortunately been relieved, during the eighteenth century, of practically all disciplinary responsibility. This was made the task of special university officials, the proctors, deans and bedels, so that the dons were not hampered in their tutorial relationship with students by the necessity of enforcing regulations. This made possible that student-teacher relationship which has become the heart of the intellectual and social spirit of Oxford and Cambridge. In the United States, on the other hand, the faculty members living in residence was charged with enforcing regulations, and thus became the student's natural enemy. Students lived under the eye of suspicious clergymen and professors; the teacher was required also to be detective, sheriff, and prosecuting attorney. In consequence, student riots and rebellions against the faculty were frequent until the last decades of the nineteenth century. President White, describing his experiences as an undergraduate at Hobart, wrote:

it was my privilege to behold a professor, an excellent clergyman, seeking to quell a hideous riot in a student's room, buried under a

(2) W. H. Cowley, "The History of Residential Housing", *School and Society*, December 1 and 8, 1934.

heap of carpets, mattresses, counterpanes and blankets; to see another clerical professor forced to return through the panel of a door under a shower of lexicons, boots and brushes, and to see even the Principal himself, on one occasion, obliged to leave his lecture room by a ladder from a window, and, on another, kept at bay by a shower of beer bottles.⁽³⁾

The burning down of Nassau Hall at Princeton in 1802, the Yale "Bread and Butter Rebellion" of 1828, the Yale "Conic Section Rebellion" of 1830, and the maiming of a Harvard tutor by a group of students were results of this tradition.

Chiefly because of the magnitude of this disciplinary problem, the whole concept of residence was repeatedly attacked during the nineteenth century. In particular, during the 1850's, President Tappan of the University of Michigan, inspired by German educational theory, described residences as the unwholesome remnants of mediaeval monkish cloisters. His view was supported by hundreds of American university teachers who had pursued their studies at Berlin, Leipzig, Heidelberg and Göttingen. As this view grew in popularity, residences were frowned upon, occasionally abolished, and certainly seldom built at the many new state universities. Moreover, students at these state universities were usually poor, and often preferred to live in an attic or a cellar rather than in a more expensive dormitory. At the older colleges, students, irked by the regulations and primitive conditions under which they were expected to live, moved in large numbers to fraternity houses and private homes, and at Harvard to dormitories run as private profit-seeking ventures. The widespread growth of fraternities in this period was largely caused by the failure of universities to provide residence accommodation or adequate centres for the development of some corporate life.

A reaction to the decline of residences set in at the turn of the century with the protest of President Hadley of Yale against "the shattering of College life", the enthusiasm for residences of President Harper at Chicago, the attempt of Woodrow Wilson to establish at Princeton a Quadrangle Plan modelled on the English universities, and the need at many universities, for the first time, to accommodate

(3) *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White*, Vol. 1, New York: The Century Co., 1905.

women students. Two decades later, President Lowell established a system of residential Houses at Harvard University. These precedents and the attendant publicity revived the belief that where and how students live is of great educational importance. However, residences in the American Universities have usually differed significantly from the Oxford and Cambridge model. In most cases American residences are not centres for the formal instruction of their members. They provide living accommodation together with varying facilities for social life. Some are dormitories which are mere body shelters, others are halls which house resident faculty members, common rooms, libraries, reading rooms, music rooms, and recreation rooms in order to encourage the informal education of their members.

There are, thus, three main Western traditions concerning the place of the residence in the university, and each has its adherents among Canadian universities. First is the collegiate tradition of Oxford and Cambridge in which the residence hall is a substantially self-contained academic community undertaking much of the formal education of its members. In the United States, this tradition has given special character to the Harvard House System and to the Yale Colleges. In Canada perhaps the closest approach to it may be found at the University of Toronto with its federated Arts Colleges and associated Theological Colleges. The second tradition, largely of German origin, encourages the belief that the university is concerned only with the formal instruction of its students. This has been the philosophy of many of the big city universities in the United States.

The third tradition follows a middle road. In this view, the value of residences in the informal education of the student is realized, but the halls are not used as the centres of formal instruction. This concept of a non-teaching but educationally important hall of residence has steadily developed and been widely applied during the twentieth century. It has been adopted by a large number of American universities and it has become a characteristic of most of the universities of Britain other than Oxford and Cambridge. The present programme of residential development for men at Queen's is an instance of the application of this concept in Canada, and residences of this type are being built or studied at several other Canadian Universities.

In many ways the third of these approaches to halls of residence seems best suited to most Canadian needs. The non-teaching residence can usually be more easily incorporated into the existing teaching framework of a university. Such a residence can, nevertheless, make an important contribution to the informal education of its members and so play its part in the primary function of the university. Unfortunately, few of our universities have sufficient residence halls. Most university teachers and students are aware of the educational possibilities of residences, but this view is held with something less than full conviction by some university authorities, and even its advocates have not always realized its full implications. It is important therefore to press the question, "What degree of educational importance really belongs to hall life?"

The cumulative case for the value of residence halls as significant educational agencies is, Sir Walter Moberly suggests, "overwhelmingly strong."⁽⁴⁾ The United Kingdom University Grants Committee has this year published a study whose authors report that the last half century has established the value of halls of residence and they conclude: "We believe that the evidence shows that on educational grounds, as well as to meet the demand for accommodation, the numbers of Halls of Residence should be increased rapidly and considerably."⁽⁵⁾ This view of the educational importance of residence is shared by the United Kingdom Association of University Teachers which concurs in the finding of the Report that "There is an immense national need for more halls of residence." Similarly, Harvard University, after a generation of trial and experiment with her residential House system, has now decided upon a considerable expansion of it in the interests of "the Climate of Scholarship". A statement in connection with her expansion plans notes that "above all, the Houses represent an environment for a specific educational purpose — the association of students and scholars and the promotion of learning." Perhaps of particular interest is the recent decision of such a specialized institution as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to launch

(4) Sir Walter Moberly, *The Crisis in the University*, London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1948.

(5) University Grants Committee, *Report of the sub-committee on Halls of Residence*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957.

a halls of residence programme. President Killian has declared: "In the long view the basic reason for the Institute's going into housing, at all, in my judgment, is to assist it in providing a better educational program." Among other gains, the M.I.T. Committee on Student Housing felt that the residence hall can be the vehicle of a good deal of that wider education through discussion, reading, and the introduction of new interests, particularly from the humanities, which the Institute would like to add to the educational experience of its students.⁽⁶⁾

In Canada evidence from a number of universities makes clear that there is a significant direct relationship between academic results and membership in a good residence. At one university, where selection for residence is basically in order of application, in the final examination only 39% of the freshmen in the Faculty of Applied Science passed without supplementals, whereas, of those in residence, 53% were successful. Of the Medical freshmen 42% passed clear while 58% of those in residence did so. At another college, where the residents are selected on academic grounds, good students have become better students, and an astonishing number have headed their courses. At a third residence where attention is paid to breadth of interest as well as academic standing in the selection of residents, there have been a much lower than average number of failures, a much higher than average number of honours, and an unusual number of scholarships and awards. Moreover, a residence often makes its richest contribution in that intangible area of academic value which cannot be measured in marks and statistics.

It is dangerous, however, to regard the provision of residences as being itself an educational panacea. The mere congregation of students under one roof may be useless or even harmful. Mere dormitories, designed to provide rooms for as many students as possible with the least unit expenditure, are a poor second best. The quality of a residence's contribution to the education of its members will depend on the extent to which it meets certain conditions. The principal conditions are the provision of satisfactory accommodation, the en-

(6) The Massachusetts Institute of Technology, *Report of the Committee on Student Housing*, Cambridge, 1956.

couragement of an atmosphere conducive to scholarship, the facilitation of a process of mutual education among the students, and the creation of some further communion between student and teacher by encouraging members of faculty to live in residence as dons.

Satisfactory accommodation must be the foundation of a good residence. Accommodation to be satisfactory need not be expensive so much as adequate and suitable. From Plato on, educators have recognized the powerful indirect influence of physical surroundings. A mean, dingy, or barrack-like building will defeat the purpose of the university by its effect upon the work, outlook and conduct of a student. Yet there have been cases of dormitories where room sizes and plumbing arrangements were below the minimum standards required by statute for penitentiaries. On the other hand experience shows that buildings with even a modest dignity and a character of their own will elicit a pride and an appreciation which will be reflected in the residents' conduct, outlook, and academic work. Tasteful interior decoration and furnishing combined with a sympathetic management and efficient cleaning arrangements can contribute much to the morale of the residents. Acoustics, illumination, and ventilation are chronic sources of trouble which require careful consideration. The provision of certain facilities such as common rooms, reading rooms, and music rooms are particularly important to the kind of life and character that a residence can develop. Residences are, indeed, more than an item of the University's 'physical plant'; they are an integral part of its educational facilities.

One specific question should perhaps be raised under the heading of satisfactory accommodation. Should there be single or double rooms? Financial exigencies and the need for maximum accommodation will inevitably influence decisions here. However, in the light of the experience of a number of universities, a few suggestions may be ventured.

The current tendency to build double rooms is probably due to understandable financial and administrative pressures. But it is interesting to find the trend sometimes justified on such grounds as, "people should learn to live together" or, as by the Dean of an American State College: "College boys should be made to live together. It's unhealthy if they don't want to." One might counter that uni-

versity is the very place a man ought to learn to live unto himself, and that at its heart learning must be an individual pursuit. There are undoubtedly a few students who work well together, but experience has shown that for most students assignment to a double room will mean the certain loss of at least some hours each week of study, reading, and meditation.

A residence with only single rooms, however, will be unable to provide for those students who do benefit by working together, and in design it is difficult for such a residence to avoid a suggestion of endless corridors servicing rows of monastic cells. Nevertheless, a single room is clearly in the best academic interests of most students. Perhaps the happiest arrangement would involve a mixture of single and double rooms along the lines recommended at M.I.T.: residents should be accommodated "principally in single rooms" but "there should be a few rooms for double occupancy". Such an arrangement would be realistic academically and would also make for a desirable variety. Yet the merits of a suite arrangement in which two or more students share a sitting room with their own rooms adjacent to it, should not be neglected. The suite can combine the advantage of single and double rooms, a measure of privacy together with facilities for joint study, for discussion, and for the use of leisure.

The further question of room dimensions must receive careful attention. Allowance must be made for the fact that students will be living and studying in their rooms during many hours of each day for a scarcely interrupted period of eight months. Planners should have in mind the special purpose of the buildings in other ways. Students studying architecture or engineering, for example, will need space in which to operate drafting boards. One residence at a Canadian university has been rendered useless for many students registered in the professional faculties because its very small rooms cannot be used for a large part of their academic work. Fortunately, a good deal of specific information on such matters does exist and it should not now be necessary to 'plan' by guesswork and general impressions.

One may perhaps leave the vexed question of room accommodation with the thought that it would always be well at least to calculate what extra cost, what loss of revenue, and what reduction in enrolment, would in fact result from providing better accommodation.

Frequently some further modest expenditure in terms of the whole cost, or some slight reduction in terms of the total enrolment, could make possible improvements in accommodation which would be of decisive importance to the academic value of a residence.

The second qualification for a good residence is that the hall should possess an atmosphere conducive to scholarship. This is not just a matter of providing expensive amenities in a luxurious style, but rather a matter of emphasis. The kind of activities encouraged or sponsored by the Dean or Warden, and the participation in residence affairs of both resident and non-resident members of the teaching faculties are of fundamental importance. Much will then depend upon the response of the senior students and the various undergraduate committees, upon their outlook and example, upon the nature of the activities which they plan and operate, and upon their concern for quality. In such a milieu most students will begin to discover and develop their academic abilities and to seek to do their best.

Here, again the character of the buildings is of importance. Certain facilities will be both the setting and source of much that is of educational value. The inclusion of a music listening room where fine recordings may be heard on a good machine, or of a music rehearsal room equipped with a piano, where members may practise with this and other instruments, are examples. Perhaps chief amongst the facilities of direct educational value is a residence library. This should be a reading room as much as a place to shelve books, comfortably furnished so that a visitor would wish to browse and to settle down with a book. Besides standard works of reference the shelves might contain a variety of good literature and the scholarly, professional, and literary periodicals, which few individual students can afford, but to which a university student ought to be introduced. It is encouraging to note that the Canada Council made the inclusion of a library and reading room a condition for its recent grant towards the construction of a residence at Queen's University. Through this emphasis, the Council may do much to encourage the building in Canada of residences designed to further scholarly interests.

The third qualification for a good residence is that it should foster a process of mutual education within the student body. This has been described by Sir Ernest Barker as the chief value of the

residence and, indeed, the basic ingredient in higher education. Newman has provided us with the classic assertion of the value of this process in his book, *The Scope and Nature of University Education*.

When a multitude of young persons come together and freely mix with each other, they are sure to learn one from another, even if there be no one to teach them; the conversation of all is a series of lectures to each, and they gain for themselves new ideas and views, fresh matter of thought, and distinct principles for judging and acting, day by day.

The quality of this process will depend in large measure on the size and nature of the resident community. The size of residences has varied, with as many as 1179 living under one roof at the University of Michigan and as few as 28 in a building at Brandeis. But there is a remarkable degree of unanimity in both Britain and the United States, as well as in Canada, that a hall of between 130 and 200 members will have the advantages of adequate scope and diversity without yet being too unwieldy. Such a number is large enough to provide a variety in its membership and is small enough to be a meaningful community in which the Dean or Warden and resident faculty members are able to know the students and the students are able to come to know one another. Moreover, from the financial point of view it is large enough to allow an economic operation.

In view of the tendency to isolation and specialization of various university departments and faculties, a residence which draws its membership from more than one field of study is particularly valuable in widening the interests of its members. Similarly, the presence of overseas students will not only assist them in fitting into new surroundings but at the same time contribute to the education of the Canadian members of the hall. The demand for accommodation has often led to the idea of reserving residences for freshmen. It has usually been found, however, that the benefit a freshman can obtain from the residence will largely depend on there being an adequate proportion of senior students in the House. The quality of the informal education going on within the residence will depend on both variety and continuity in its membership. Students will derive greater benefit from each successive year they spend in a residence, and the final year may be of supreme importance.

The Common Room will be the effective centre for the mutual education of the residents. 'Reception Rooms', 'Recreation Rooms',

and 'Multipurpose Rooms' which can be quickly adapted to different activities, while useful, are no substitute for the informal and relaxed atmosphere of the comfortable common room which encourages conversation and discussion.

The special contribution that corporate dining may make to academic life has long been recognized on both sides of the Atlantic. The recent M.I.T. report on residential expansion speaks out clearly on the subject:

Each House should have its own dining room. Pleasant and relaxed dining within the students' own House can and should be a significant educational experience. Very few other occasions can so profitably be utilized for the exchange of ideas between students, and between students and their elders.

The Carnegie Committee of Educational Inquiry at Queen's University endorsed this view, urging that "a dining room ought to be an integral part of a residence", in spite of the greater cost of construction.

Yet the value of corporate dining, like a number of other important but intangible facets of higher education, has often been sacrificed in the face of the increasing demands made upon our universities. It is, therefore, interesting to note that the grouping around a central kitchen of a number of dining halls, is a frequent compromise between the economic advantages of a large kitchen, and the social advantages of dining halls identified with specific living units. The evidence that residence dining halls can fully pay their way and indeed, even prove a source of revenue should that be thought desirable, is also encouraging.

A specific problem which must be mentioned here is the relation of residences to the Students' Union. It is sometimes argued that the Student Union should be the effective centre of all student activities and that, therefore, little beyond living accommodation need be provided in a residence. The U.K. University Grants Commission report on halls of residence suggests that this view is based on a misconception and states: "The hall is different from the union, not a substitute for it." The two, it suggests, should be complementary. The Union is the appropriate home both for university-wide activities and for many specialized activities. On the other hand, the residence can

make its contribution as the home for a more intimate academic community.

One of the most important requirements for a good residence is the participation by members of the teaching faculties in the life of the hall. The report of the University Grants Committee on halls of residence concludes that "the success of a Hall as an instrument of education depends more than anything else upon the qualifications, personality, and status of the Warden." Certainly the conception of Residence held by the Dean or Warden and his presentation of it to the members will be important, as will be the kind of activities which he encourages or sponsors, his relations with the undergraduates, his selection of students and dons, his relations with the teaching faculties, and the effectiveness of his concern with administrative, financial and superintendence matters.

Each hall should have, in addition to the Dean or Warden, a number of resident faculty members as dons. The University Grants Committee report suggests that ideally "the proportion of resident staff should, where possible, be one for every twenty students." The chief value of a good don lies in the enormous contribution which he can make to the academic and social education of the undergraduate members. The don may act as a source of inspiration, a lending library and a painless mentor. He may arouse a student's interest in a variety of new things and introduce him to books, ideas, and good talk. He may also act as an informal tutor, giving to residents some direct help with their curricular work. The gifted student may be spotted and given help and encouragement, thus allowing some escape from the conveyor belt system of education. The friendly, unobtrusive interest of faculty members in the studies and concerns of students, outside the lecture room, might be described as the art of 'Donsmanship.' The good don may do much to change the indifference, distrust and even hostility, with which an increasing number of students entering university view teachers and learning. Indeed, one good don may make a greater contribution to the ideal of a university as one academic community than numerous special committees on student-staff relations.

It is important that the don should be an academic person, that he should himself be engaged in study and research or teaching.

There has been a tendency to discard this conception of the academic don at many American and some Canadian universities, perhaps because its purpose and significance were not too well understood. At many universities, the academic staff have been replaced by 'personnel workers', and 'counsellors', who are inclined to treat the residence as a human relations laboratory happily reserved for their usage. All too often they aim "to adjust these boys" rather than to inform or inspire them. In the words of one such Dean, "Our job is to siphon off the surplus of non-conformity." Other alternatives to the resident faculty members have been the 'Housing Manager' who lives in the residence and runs it as a business operation, and the 'House Mother', who is perhaps an outgrowth of the extraordinary part played in American society by the concept of Mother. These rival concepts to the academic don are alien to our Canadian university tradition, and, indeed, perhaps to the nature of higher education.

A major problem, however, may be that of finding enough academic dons. If university teachers are to be prevailed upon to live in residence, the accommodation offered must be suitable and the terms generous enough to attract them. It may be advisable to make provision for a number of married dons. Important, too, will be some official recognition by the University of the special contribution of the dons. A recent report at Harvard notes that faculty members "have come to feel that time spent with their students is often wasted professionally." With an eye to salary and promotion, they sense that their time would more profitably be spent getting something published or, perhaps, on administration. In most cases the decision to accept a position as a don means that the person concerned is undertaking many more hours of work as a university teacher in the fullest sense. To some extent the possibility of his contributing to other academic endeavours will be curtailed. The Harvard report suggests that in fairness, and in its own interests, the university should take this into consideration in discussing such a person's academic future.

The concept of a residence as an academic place can be further strengthened by associating with each House a number of faculty members in addition to those living in as dons. Honorary and non-resident members of the residence faculty might be invited to make

use of the common rooms, dining hall, reading room and other facilities of the House. They might be encouraged to attend and join in a number of the residence functions. The provision of a number of offices for non-resident members of the faculty and perhaps of a few seminar rooms in each residence would often be in the interest of both the residence and the teaching faculties.

If the resident dons are to perform their proper function as friendly representatives of the faculty, it is important that, as far as possible, the initial responsibility for the maintenance of a reasonable order and discipline should be in the hands of the students themselves. This will avoid the student hostility towards teachers which developed in the early American universities when the resident faculty members were expected to act as policemen. Given the opportunity to manage their own affairs, students usually develop a pride in their self-governed community. Moreover, the experience gained in these activities will contribute to their education.

In conclusion, a hall of residence which meets the conditions suggested, which provides satisfactory accommodation, induces a scholarly spirit, is in the fullest sense a community, and includes within this community members of the faculty, will inspire and stimulate its members, and will provide them with the most ample opportunities for learning. The ramifications of such a residence community extend well beyond the confines of its buildings. Any community in which there is confidence, sympathy and a helpful relationship between students and staff, and student and student, will be making an important contribution to the temper and character of the life of the whole university. The nature of undergraduate activities and outlooks, the degree of sympathy between student and faculty, the notion of the university as a community of scholars, the educational capacity of the university itself, will all be affected by the point of view which members of a successful residence carry with them as they go about the campus.

The value of residences and in particular their academic significance, will become all the greater as a university expands. To some extent residences can provide an answer to the breakdown of liaison between faculty and student, and to the loss of identity which members of a large or expanding university are bound to experience. In-

deed, the optimum size of a university will be largely determined by the amount of residence accommodation available. In a number of ways a hall of residence can preserve within a university the special values of a smaller academic community. The development of good residences would be one form of expansion consistent with Newman's definition of a university as "not a foundry, or a mint, or a treadmill", but "an Alma Mater, knowing her children one by one."

Rocket To The Moon

by

J. MUNRO MACLENNAN

Poor Luna, goddess of the darkening skies!
To shepherd, husbandman and pilgrim kind;
In happier ages, graciously inclined
To hark to poets' tales and lovers' sighs;
But now first victim of the prying eyes
Of arrogant, no-more-earthbound mankind—
Our souls compressed beneath the weight of mind,
Ever more knowing, ever still less wise!

A reckless new Actaeon, unaware
Of chase by hounds that he himself has bred—
In the cold name of Science, sworn to spare
Of Nature's veil no last enchanted shred—
From earth, disfigured with his conquest's scars,
Man reaches with his muck-rake to the stars.

THREE POEMS

by

JAY MACPHERSON

The Limits in Fire

Still stander in a trembling flame,
You let me touch and take no harm;
With bodies glorified may claim
That you are diamond, and still warm.

The just are so: so are not such
As give their precious selves entire
To cold dull rock, stiff under touch,
But tremble in a steady fire.

Faith

The sleeping king my breath lays on the air
Sustains me in his dream as world does weather.
He calmly comes and goes till I despair:
Then he and I snap out like lights together.

The Two

On Noah's shoulder sit the white and black
Oracular, opposed till doom shall crack.
The raven's world is carrion and old,
The dove sees green the hidden leaf unfold,
And Noah through their eyes
Becomes a two-ways-looker, doubly wise.

Bedded in him, the contraries relent
And make one careful man a continent
Reared upward from the flat sea like a mountain
And quickened with a four-armed silved fountain.
In him the watching two
See sun from shadow, field from flood, all things from seed renew.

Stars Over Evil Houses*by***H. G. JONES**

It is not love reveals the world
Or lays one naked with the earth,
It is aloneness when all loves are laid to bed
And in the unaccompanied darkness every star
Submits her abstract maidenhead.

It is not isolation or a forced retreat
Brings us barefoot to a foreign camp,
It is an error when intent on act or thought
We stray beyond the last low fence to wake
Outside the surveyed and the deeded lot.

It is a place by day where stones and trees
Leap up upon the eye, and birds
Burst from every bush and scrape and then explode in air;
The very sun booms out upon a spotted void
And silence like a snow is everywhere.

It is not distance in the sense of miles,
It is a step across the bedroom to the window pane,
There barns loom up and there the stars
Lie fathoms deep in space and in the brain—
Where blood is not as red as Mars.

All our streets and all our evil houses
Defend us from surrender to the naked world;
One lapse, one slip from off our narrow ford
Sweeps us out past every lighted buoy
To drift like children on the unexplored.

Explorer's Tale

by

GEORGE WALTON

'Hawkrige . . . had formerly been in the Newfoundland trade, of which we have evidence in a statement by Captain Richard Whitbourne, who says (A DISCOURSE AND DISCOVERY OF NEW-FOUND-LAND, London, 1620, p. 73), that, in the year 1610, one morning early, as he was standing by the water's side, in the Harbour of St. John's, a strange and beautiful creature with a head and face resembling a woman, shoulders square and white like those of a man, and a fluked tail, swam towards him and approached so close to him that he retreated from the water's edge; "but the same came shortly after vnto a boate, wherein one William Hawkrige, then my servant, was, that hath bin since a Captain in a ship to the East Indies, and is lately there employed againe by Sir Thomas Smith in the like voyage; and the same creature did put both his handes vpon the side of the boate, and did strue to come in to him and others then in the said boate, whereat they were afraide, and one of them Strooke it a full blow on the head, whereby it fell off from them . . . This (I suppose) was a mermaide." Captain Whitbourne was an Exmouth man.' (Hakluyt Society Publications, First Series, No. XCVII, 1897, p. xcii, note 1.)

Documentary evidence exists
—although read with incredulity to-day—
that mermaids have been encountered
on the coasts of Newfoundland.

And yet the tale was labouriously written out,
hard, tarry fist cramping a cranky quill,
and printed in quarto, London, sixteen-twenty,
A DISCOURSE AND DISCOVERY OF NEW-FOUND-LAND
by Captain Richard Whitbourne, an Exmouth man.

This Whitbourne, in the Harbour of St. John's,
walked by the water's side one morning early,
—to clear a rum-racked head, to dream of Devon,
we never learn. Over the shifting water
he gazed unconsciously with sailor's eyes
which fastened near the shore on naked beauty,
with ivory bosom fronting the morning tide
and swimming toward him, silent as the tide;
but fearful, he retreated.

That same day
the Captain's servant, Hawkrige, (since a Captain
to the East Indies for Sir Thomas Smith),
was out about the harbour in a boat
with others of the crew. The same strange creature
swam up and made to join them. They in terror
beat Beauty off with short-clubbed oars and rowed
all lobster-eyed and panting to the ship,
wanting both rum and manhood. The narrative
ends then with Whitbourne's idle supposition,
'this was a maremaide'.

By God, when I read this,
in slippered ease before a winter fire,
I fell into an ecstasy, the book
slipped from my nerveless fingers to the floor,
and I—removed through Time and Space to where
once Whitbourne found a path beside a harbour—
stood looking over ever shifting water,
seeking the beauty he had feared and fled,
—and, I should wager, mourned a whole life after—
but saw no more than slowly blackening coals,
and shivered, and took myself to bed, to dream
of utter beauty, breasting an ebbing tide,
and moving toward me, silent as the tide.

Trail At Dawn

— Some Footnotes on Footprints —

by

KERRY WOOD

The mink spent the light hours of yesterday in the snug quarters of a deserted beaver bank-den alongside First Lake in our town's wildlife sanctuary. Apparently it had fed well and late, for it did not stir from the temporary den until the early hours of the morning. That much could be determined by the weather pattern of last night: there had been fresh snow and a strong wind, the wind dying at dawn but the snow falling at intervals all morning. The mink's trail was almost fresh, hence the tracks must have been made after the wind-drift was over at dawn.

The spoor was easily seen, because the fresh snowfall was nearly three inches deep and the animal's body left a trough-trail in the soft covering. At first it had stopped many times to test the air, turning this way and that as though undecided which way to hunt. Then it began searching exposed grasses along the lakeshore, going from hummock to hummock and making frequent detours into nearby woodlands to investigate prominent landmarks such as a willow knoll, a log tangle, or the stub of an old spruce. At this stage the hunt was unproductive: there was no other fresh trail in the vicinity, not even the snowshoe prints of a rabbit. Wild creatures usually stay in their forms or dens during a storm, and apparently this mink was the first hunter abroad in his section of woodlands.

Around one end of the lake the mink left an etching of its erratic progress, with a dramatic episode when it took a short cut across the frozen bay. Here the trough-trail looked different; footprints were spaced farther apart to show that the mink had put on a sudden spurt of speed. The trail led in a straight line to a fallen log poked at an angle out from the shoreline. Just before it reached that shelter, two new marks showed on each side of the mink's tracks and about a yard apart. The new snow had to be brushed aside to solve this puzzle: the marks were made by wing-tips of a Great Horned Owl.

The night bird missed its quarry, however. The mink reached the protecting log and stayed under it quite a while. Perhaps the owl patrolled the air above or perched on a tree nearby in the murky dawn, hoping that the mink would venture out and give the bird a chance for another swoop. But the animal remained under the log until the owl moved away. How long this took there was no way of knowing, but it was noticeable that mink tracks coming from the haven were fresher in appearance than those leading to it, which had been snow-dusted.

For a distance of several hundred yards the animal stayed close to willow bottomlands. A few old rabbit runs were there, all covered with fresh snow. The mink's deep trail was the only fresh sign of life in this whole area. At one spot the animal left the willows for a brief time, moving under the spruces where it sniffed at the stale tracks of red squirrels. Safe in their tree drays or dens some thirty to forty feet above the snow level, the squirrels were in no danger from the foraging mink. A weasel can climb a tree, and possibly the closely related mink is able to climb a few feet too. But certainly not fast enough to pursue a nimble squirrel. So the hunter paused under the largest spruce, sniffed at the trunk where squirrels had marked the bark with sharp claws, then the mink went its laborous, deep-trough way back to the willows.

Luck came when it left the bottomlands and climbed to the bench where poplars grow. Here the trail slowed to a wary crawl, an inch or two at a time. Then there was a long leap and success. The mink caught a victim under an angle-sloping balsam tree and dined on the morsel at once. The quarry was probably a mouse: all that remained of the feast were a few droplets of blood. What else but a mouse would be under the snow-bound log at this wintery season? A shrew, perhaps? Most likely a white-footed mouse of the forest, or one of those larger voles called red-backed mice.

Encouraged by this success, the mink moved more quickly for a while, the tracks being longer spaced at this region. At one spot it slowed to make another stalk near a snow-covered log, but nothing came of it and the mink turned at a tangent and followed the fence-line. There was another low spot where willows grew thickly and

old rabbit runs were carefully investigated, then the animal climbed a knoll.

It came to a well travelled road at the southern boundary of the wildlife sanctuary. The mink crossed the highway and foraged among downfalls next the deserted toboggan slide. Tracks were confused here; perhaps it caught another mouse under the dense tangles. Leaving them, it left a clearly marked spoor up the heights towards houses on the hilltop where it would be in danger of meeting cats and dogs and perhaps a pelt-coveting human.

I left the trail at this point and circled around by the road, going down back alleys at the edge of the hill and trying to pick up the trail again there. But it was not seen. Perhaps the mink found a snug hide-away in one of the caves dug last summer by small boys, and decided to sleep away the daylight hours in it and hunt again tonight. I find myself wishing it good luck, with a hope that the animal has a mouse feast tonight and gets safely back to the sanctuary wilderness once more.

The Satiric Novel In Canada Today

— A Failure Too Frequent? —

by

D. J. DOOLEY

Has Canada produced a satirist to rival Leacock? Professor Dooley examines the leading candidates for the crown — Ralph Allen, John Cornish, Earl Birney and Robertson Davies.

In the Queen's Quarterly for Summer 1951, Desmond Pacey describes how the Canadian scene appeared to one writer: "This new, aggressive, bumptious, and unduly materialistic Canada needed above all a satirist to moderate its pretensions, to question its smugly optimistic assumptions."¹ Though the diagnosis and prescription seem to fit present-day Canada, the statement actually refers to the first two decades of the twentieth century. This period, Pacey goes on to say, did find a satirist—Stephen Leacock; but even he chastened manners only half-heartedly and intermittently, because the general cultural negligence of the time made it too difficult and unpopular a task. Has anyone been found to moderate the vastly greater pretensions of the Canada we now live in? Certainly no one of the stature of Leacock. But a number of satiric novels have attracted considerable attention during the last ten years. Though our own cultural negligence may partly explain why they have not made a greater impact, their weaknesses are also partly to blame. It may be worthwhile examining their merits and defects, estimating the extent of their success, and if possible deriving from them some conclusions about the use of satire in the Canadian novel.

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Our first example will illustrate one of the commonest defects of Canadian satire: too often it is imitative, and, what is worse, too often it chooses poor models for imitation. The 1954 Survey of Letters in

¹ Desmond Pacey, "Leacock as Satirist," *Queen's Quarterly*, LVIII, (1951), p. 208.

Canada says that Ralph Allen possesses most of the virtues necessary for satire²; but in *The Chartered Libertine* Allen describes an implausible situation patterned, I believe, on one of the sillier conceptions of a major American satirist. In many of his novels, Sinclair Lewis exposed the sinister machinations of leagues of do-gooders, whose pious slogans mask their drives for power over the minds and wills of their fellow-countrymen. In *Arrowsmith*, there was the League of Cultural Agencies; in *Elmer Gantry*, the Napap (National Association for the Purification of Art and Press); in *Gideon Planish*, the Cizkon (Citizens' Conference on Constitutional Crises in the Commonwealth) and the DDD (Dynamos of Democratic Direction); in *Kingsblood Royal*, the Sant Tabac (Stop All Negro Trouble, Take Action Before Any Comes). Merely to name these is to ridicule them; but Ralph Allen invents an equally absurd organization called LIGHT—League for Godly and Humanistic Training. A clever and unscrupulous radio tycoon named Garfield Smith employs LIGHT to force a code of censorship on the CBC; the ensuing turmoil brings about the dissolution of the CBC, and Garfield succeeds in supplanting CBC Wednesday night with a two-hour girls' softball extravaganza. Brief as it is, this summary does justice to the plot; the problem of the tyranny of commercial and plebeian standards is a most important one, but in this book it is not dealt with in a way which commands attention.

To make Garfield Smith succeed, Allen has to deprive the other characters of normal intelligence and perspicacity. Canada's leading lady intellectual would not accept the presidency of LIGHT, as Dr. Hilary Bonnisteel does; but as her speech to the Toronto Chamber of Trade amply demonstrates, Dr. Bonnisteel is not Canada's leading lady intellectual. How little human complexity Allen allows his puppets is shown in Chapter 2, which brings the chairman of the CBC before the parliamentary committee on broadcasting. With one exception—an urban version of Lewis's village atheist type—each committee member is merely the voice of a prejudice, sounding

² See the survey of fiction by Claude T. Bissell, *University of Toronto Quarterly*, XXIV, (1955), p. 265.

automatically and mechanically whenever the prejudice is appealed to:

The woman in the flowered hat sprang erect and blazed emotionally. "Speaking for the Canadian Mother . . ."

"Speaking for the Conservative-Liberals . . ." Mr. Bollinger boomed, his earlier floridity now restored and embellished.

"Speaking for the CCF . . ."

"Our sons and daughters . . ."

"The home . . ."

"Order!" Glock-glock-glock.

"God . . ."

"Speaking for the Liberal-Conservatives . . ."

"Adjourned!" Glock-glock-glock-glock-glock.

Since there are references to Bertrand Russell, probably the chapter is partly based on the controversy surrounding some broadcasts by him and by four psychologists in 1951, and the subsequent defense of CBC policy by Chairman Dunton before the Commons Committee on Broadcasting. Accounts of the Committee's hearing show that some comments were of the order depicted by Mr. Allen (one honourable member referred to the programs as "more or less tripe") but they also show that most of the discussion was intelligent (particularly the observations of Mr. Mutch, Mr. Diefenbaker, and Mr. Fleming), that it did not proceed along party lines, and that Mr. Dunton came off very well.³ Since there is so great a difference between the actuality and the fiction, the fiction cannot make a very great impact on the reader; he is inclined to say, "It's not like that at all." The last incident in the book is perhaps symbolic. On the day when we see a Toronto radio magnate so victimized by his own advertising methods as to go through a form of matrimony with an emasculated male (a Christine Jorgensen) in a Toronto ball park, we will have to listen to Allen's warning; until such things become possible, we do not have to worry very much.

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The early chapters of John Cornish's *The Provincials* (1951) reflect another literary tradition—that of Arnold Lunn's *The Harrovians* and Alec Waugh's *The Loom of Youth* and a thousand other fictional

³ See the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, Nov. 21, 1951, p. 8.

accounts of English public-school life. But Cornish's school, for all its atmosphere of high tea and bloods and cricket, and its boast that it is "run by traditional-English gentlemen to produce the traditional-English-gentleman type", is located in the Okanagan Valley of British Columbia. It fosters and serves a cultivated, decadent, mandarin class which is shut off by geography from the rest of Canada and by wealth and caste from the life of its own region. Its provincialism is therefore extraordinary, and extraordinarily vulnerable. If the reader contrasts this mandarin existence with life in Canada as he knows it, then the book is likely to appear highly ironic.

Through ruthless opportunism, Mr. Dunseith has become a wealthy lumberman, with a yacht and a summer home as big as a hotel and a battlemented mansion in Vancouver. He is described as a "crashing materialist". His wife Annie keeps herself amused with a succession of "court eunuchs"—a bearded musician, a poet with a collapsed chest, a Jap who collects scrap iron by day and arranges flowers by night, and so on. Though her cultural pretensions are high, she can complain that "a perfectly darling Harlequin and Columbine" has been replaced in the art gallery by a painting of a "wretched woman from Victoria"—Emily Carr. Their children live in cloud-cuckooland, almost unbothered by the great depression which makes Vancouver swarm with unemployed. Bunty, the only girl in the family, is a perfect product of her class, demanding everything and giving nothing:

She wanted only the perquisites of one beloved. She wanted my love to manifest itself in terms of money, in service, in indulgence of follies.

This is excellent material for satire, but Cornish does not make the most effective use of it. His first-person narrator, Kenneth Menzies, is at first too wrapped up in the Dunseith world to see it satirically; he does not point out that "middling-high tea involving boiled eggs" is incongruous with a Canadian environment, and he criticizes his public school only in the traditional English ways. The only real satire in the early chapters is by implied irony; for example, Mr. Dunseith's insistence that his sons are going to be brought up as English gentlemen must be meant to have an ironical effect, and so must the repetition of certain motifs like the cavaliers dancing atten-

dance on Mrs. Dunseith. But during this time the narrator refrains from adverse comment; he is a sort of Paul Pennyfeather, accepting things at their face value. However, he acquires a new perspective during the war, when he is away from Vancouver for five years. On his return, the satire is no longer muted; it becomes alive and vigorous. In fact, the only part of the book which seems to possess much vitality is the last chapter, in which Kenneth returns after the war, subjects the Dunseith world to critical examination, and rejects it. For no good reason, Cornish restrains his narrator until nearly the end of the book. This seems illogical; the narrator, viewing the whole action in retrospect, possesses the same point of view at the beginning as at the end, and ought to adopt a consistent attitude throughout. If the author wanted to show changes in his hero's perspective, he ought to have told his story in the third person.

Basically the book is a chronicle of the Dunseith family, from the time Kenneth first meets them till the time when he ceases to be the complacent husband of the promiscuous Bunty. Therefore the narrative consists largely of descriptions of what the various members of the family were like at various times and of climactic episodes in their story. But it is all delivered with a curious flatness. We pass from one inconsequential and easily forgotten episode to another; names come and go; none of it seems to have much point. By the end of Part One (nearly half the book), none of the characters seems alive. Some of them are "tagged"; with every mention of Monica, there is a reference to her woman's-angle stories for magazines, and Mac Smith always has his stomach pills within reach. Effects seem tame and blunted. The material could be funny and isn't; it could achieve the sad desolateness of *A Handful of Dust*, but it doesn't. It remains a picture of a society which interests the outsider because of its unusualness, and probably interests the Vancouverite still more because of the fun of guessing what prominent residents of the city may be appearing under aliases in it.

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When Earl Birney's *Turvey* appeared in 1949, it was predicted that it might become one of the most popular Canadian books of recent years. Such has not proved to be the case. It is not for lack of

interest in military affairs; the volumes of the official history of the Second World War sell out their first printings almost on the day they appear. It seems to me that *Turvey* is too undisciplined to be a first-rate novel, and too bookish to be a popular account of military experiences.

Birney describes it as a military picaresque. The picaresque takes a character through a number of situations which usually offer opportunities for comic or satiric exposure, and in so doing builds up a picture of the society the character lives in. Birney restricts himself to one half of the military world—the base details. His novel deals with holding units and army hospitals; the combatant part of the army does not come in, since *Turvey* never really reaches it. In a sense, *Turvey* is an exposure of this behind-the-lines part of the military system. *Turvey* wants to get to the Sharp End of the salient held by the Canadian Army; the reinforcement system is so self-defeating that it keeps him at the Blunt End. But this satiric pattern is not followed consistently throughout the book. For one thing, *Turvey* is greatly to blame for his own misfortunes. Also, he is not always the little man buffeted about by the system; at times, he is the lucky fellow who lands on his feet, the man who finds a friend just when he needs help most. The book does not hold together as a satire of the military system or as a dramatic conflict between the little man and the impersonal system; instead it remains a collection of broad army stories, or, as Claude T. Bissell called it in "Letters in Canada, 1949", a succession of *fabliaux*.

Every reader of the book probably has his favourite episodes—the Army's first attempt to assess *Turvey's* intelligence, the court-martial scene, the night in a mine-field, the stereophagосcopy. But many readers must feel that numerous episodes are not particularly memorable. The book goes on too long, and the comic invention flags. The humour is derived from a rather small number of types of situation—most of them involve sex, drink, medical treatment, army discipline, or personnel selection methods—so that the later pages bring *Turvey* into variants of situations he has already been in.

In all these episodes, however, the author seems to put comic effect ahead of satire. In many of them, no one is being attacked; the

interest lies in the comic involvements of Private Turvey. Of course, there is a great deal of satire, directed, as in the *fabliau*, chiefly at those in authority. Lieut. Smith, an English instructor before the Army made him a Personnel Selection Officer, writes what he considers a model assessment, in which he describes Turvey as "eccentric and inchoate" and refers him to a psychiatrist; the psychiatrist's diagnosis is caustic: "No neurosis. Intelligence higher than that of some officers I have met." Later on, the psychiatrists get their turn for rough treatment. Turvey, having mistaken his greatcoat for an enemy paratrooper and shot it full of holes, is referred to one of them for a "Roar Shack" test:

"Umhmn, think carefully now, in answering this. Did your father wear an overcoat much?"

Turvey thought. "Every winter. Course everybody did. It was cold."

Though he is too cautious to diagnose "Oedipus Complex" on such evidence, the psychiatrist decides that it is a case of "Possible latent father-rivalry." Here the uneducated private soldier comes off better than the highly-trained specialist; he has more common sense.

But it is impossible to see the whole book in these terms; Turvey is not a Schweik, consistently outwitting those in high position. The Canadian Army has no more idea of how to handle Turvey than the Austrian Army did of how to handle Schweik, but Turvey does not enjoy Schweik's success: all his attempts to get to the Kootenay Highlanders end in frustration. Also, the portrait of Turvey is not kept consistent; he varies in intelligence and sensitivity from chapter to chapter. Sometimes his reactions are more refined than they ought to be:

A van banged past her, drawn by a great speckled horse. Turvey saw that its tail was docked cruelly short, and winced in sympathy.

This is Birney, not Turvey. Also, the Turvey who spent two remarkable weeks in Buffalo is not the person who talks in these terms of going to London:

"I don't really feel aggressive though, Pottsy; it's just, well, you hear all the oldtimers boastin about the swell forty-eights they had in London. And—and golly, I don't even feel I'm in a war yet. About my only fun is horseshoe pitchin. Everythin's so sort of humdrum—not like in the Canadian papers."

A similar inconsistency is to be found in the style. The book opens with Turvey taking an intelligence test and being watched closely by the sergeant in charge:

It was a stare of suspicion; it leapt in a straight beam from the sergeant's highstool, over the hunched and shirted backs of the other recruits, unmistakably and directly to him.

Since the book contains a prefatory apology for its down-to-earth language, the reader does not expect imagistic description like this, and he begins to watch for variations in style. He finds that they are considerable; in fact, an occasional passage sounds as if it had come from another book:

Over the barren saltmarshes sped the truck, under the floating Disney elephants of a balloon barrage and into the winding hubbub of Antwerp. Past multitudes of giraffish old houses they clattered, past enormous churches, past barbaric ruins, some old and weedy, others (like the Rex Cinema, where a whole Saturday matinee of soldiers still lay hidden) bright with newly-shattered brick. Then north into a flat straight highway again. Now over a groaning pontoon bridge subbing for a blasted canal lock; along the ice-choked ditch was a sprinkling of mounds, and one by the roadside held a faded stake on which a hoar-bright billytin clunked mournfully in the Flanders wind.

Obviously Birney is describing his own impression of a certain scene; in the next paragraph, he switches to the present tense for an effect of greater immediacy:

A detour now through the side-lanes of a village. The main street, either by bad luck or some diabolical aiming, was hit a few minutes ago by a V-Two.

The description is graphic and convincing; it comes directly out of Birney's experience; but it has nothing to do with Turvey.

On the other hand, there is probably as much in the book derived from the author's reading as from his own experience. His Mac talks very much like Dickens' Jingle:

"Delectable child. Blonde. Unheard-of combination: lovely gams, adequate income, able to read and write. Be home any time now. Have a ball. Celebrate. Pub-crawl. Take in a show, something. Got a steady up here yet?"

Some other parts of the book follow less worthy models:

The theatre was the most glittering, the tunes the catchiest, the actors the funniest and the leggy ladies the most beautiful in the world. But

more beautiful than even the leading lady were the long lashes and the tip-tilted nose of Peggy whose palm he was now fitfully squeezing as they sat chair by chair in the kingly splendour of a second-storey box.

This is Victorian sentimental fiction, and it is even more out of place than the description of Antwerp. Evidently the author has not decided what kind of book he is writing, and he changes his mind from page to page. *Turvey*, therefore, is not a thorough-going satire, it suffers from the Canadian novelist's usual difficulties with plot, and it shows the usual interference of things read with things imagined or seen.

In 1955 Birney published *Down the Long Table*, a novel sharing almost nothing with *Turvey* except satiric impulse. The rather inept title refers to the table used by a Congressional investigating committee; the hero is prodded into reviewing his past by an unnamed but identifiable Senator:

Like a dentist. The new specialist, Extractor of Political Heresies . . .
Guaranteed painful, fillings probed, old rot exposed.

The patient, Gordon Saunders, was at one time, "before the dead-weight lid of the Thirties lifted at last and revealed the bubbling stew of a war brewing", a member of a Communist organization. Now he is shown as upholding personal integrity against the intellectual and moral conformity which the committee attempts to enforce. His past actions are not so much defended as excused; emphasis is placed on his ludicrous failure as an organizer for a moribund Trotskyist group, and on his naïveté his youthful romanticism, his quixotism. But it is hard to accept Gordon as a Quixote. He tilts at windmills out of perversity rather than idealism. His first Dulcinea is another man's wife, and her death through an attempted abortion a testimony to his irresponsibility. In penance, he becomes still more irresponsible: he has an "anguished conviction that he could atone for his manifold crimes . . . only by . . . whirling, to the end of his strength, in the wildest dance that would have him." His joining of a Communist organization is linked with his pursuit of a second Dulcinea, a fanatical Marxist with a petty bourgeois mind and a childlike attachment to her mother's apron strings; in becoming a "convert to Thelmaism" Gordon is anything but a self-respecting human being. So there is a hollow ring to his assertion that judgment on him can come only from

his "inconsistent but inviolate self". We expect apology; we get self-mockery. In fact, we come to suspect that the author is trying to gloss over his hero's moral failures, and that he is depending on his reader's antipathy to McCarthyism to secure sympathy for a character who does not deserve it.

Nevertheless, the book presents a vivid and accurate picture of some aspect of Canadian life in the Thirties, and for this it deserves more praise than most reviewers have given it. Birney employs newspaper headlines and items in the Dos Passos manner to catch the spirit of the times; often there is an ironic contrast between the view of world conditions expressed in the newspapers and the actuality. "PRICE RISE BRINGING BACK PROSPERITY SAYS RAMSAY MACDONALD"—time mocks this prediction, made in 1932, as it mocks Charles Schwab's statement that "The very slackness of the recent months is piling up an opportunity for work for the coming year." In the course of his experiences, Gordon Saunders is expelled from the Social Problems Club of the University of Toronto as a "capitalist spy" and an "agent of counter-revolutionary Trotskyism", and he witnesses the demise of the Vancouver Branch of the Canadian Section of the Communist League of North America of the International Left Opposition (Bolshevik-Leninists) of the Third International. In between he has got from one city to the other by riding the rods, he has joined the thousands clogging Victory Square in Vancouver—"a dump of human litter, one of the myriad impromptu disposal heaps for a civilization mired in its own waste", and he has taken part in a Red raid on a symbol of society's callous treatment of the unemployed, a relief office. All this is described in realistic terms; but there is a good deal of satire running through it. There is satire of Communist demonstrations on behalf of the jobless, which the jobless have come to recognize as only for the Party's good, not theirs. There is satire of left-wing splinter groups, small handfuls of men firmly convinced that their efforts are bringing revolution near, their numbers dwindling as their leaders find jobs and make peace with the capitalist system. And there is irony in Gordon's story throughout, in his misinterpretations of situations and events, his feeble efforts to help, and his eventual rejection by all his revolutionary friends as a "summer-time" rebel.

In discussing our first novelist, we raised doubts about his writing ability; in the case of our last, Robertson Davies, the writing ability is undoubtedly present, but it is sometimes that of the essayist and sometimes that of the dramatist. For example, here is a passage from his *Tempest-Tost*:

More than is usual in Canada, Salterton's physical appearance reveals its spirit. As well as its two cathedrals it has a handsome Court House (with a deceptive appearance of a dome but not, perhaps a true dome) and one of His Majesty's largest and most forbidding prisons (with an unmistakable dome). And it is the seat of Waverley University. To say that the architecture of Waverley revealed its spirit would be a gross libel upon a centre of learning which has dignity and, in its high moments nobility. The university had the misfortune to do most of its building during that long Victorian period when architects strove like Titans to reverse all laws of seemliness and probability and when what had been done in England was repeated, clumsily and a quarter of a century later, in Canada.⁴

There is a nice satiric touch to this, but it is not that of the twentieth-century novelist; it suggests the leisurely companionability of Thackeray or Trollope. Davies is likely to begin a paragraph with something like "It is a favourite notion of romantic young men . . ." or "The world is full of people who . . ." His novels contain excellent brief essays on the lust for books, the advantages of getting a college degree extramurally, and many other diversified topics. His writing is witty, and full of quotable passages, but he places little value on the economy which most contemporary novelists strive for.

He is not concerned with hurrying on; he would rather stop and talk about a character, and let his story hang fire for a minute or two. In *Tempest-Tost*, he interrupts the narrative for twenty-eight pages to provide a biographical account of Hector Mackilwraith. Even after that, his fondness for the "character" leads him to insert, a few pages farther on, a paragraph pointing out Hector's quiet authority and self-control. He leaves very little to the reader's imagination. In a number of episodes (particularly the reading of parts for the play) he shows that Pearl Vambrace suffers from a domineering father,

⁴ One critic says that the town "is not one readers can pinpoint on the map." We might agree that Salterton is any Ontario town which contains two cathedrals, a university, a military college, and a federal penitentiary.

but he still finds it necessary to write, "Pearl Vambrace lived a life which, to the casual glance, seemed unendurable", and to ensure that our glance will not be casual, follows up the statement with a four-page essay on the subject.

A number of characters have a portion of the Davies wit.

"If it is God's will that I should be pretty, I'll be pretty; if I am to be plain, I shall be plain without complaint. But come what will, I shall never be vulgar."

This is the precocious Freddy, a fourteen-year-old girl. The same ironical manner is employed by her sister Griselda, by her father, by Solly Bridgetower and his mother, by Professor Vambrace, and by Humphrey Cobbler. Sometimes they seem to be speaking for the author himself; when Cobbler talks about Dry Wits and Wet Wits or the effect of clothing on the evolution of the leg, or when Solly talks about sacrificing to the Canadian God, the discussion is quite in the Davies manner and might be included without quotation marks.

The performance of Shakespeare's *Tempest* by a Little Theatre group is an effective device for the exposure of manners. Davies knows his types well, and he has a complete awareness of their motives, from the club president's desire to have a social lioness head the list of patrons to the stage manager's insistence that, come what may, there shall be an unnecessary loudspeaker system. The treatment is broad, often to the point of farce, but the irony is often very good. Hector Mackilwraith, a middle-aged mathematics teacher whose gods are planning and common sense, draws up a list of pros and cons before making any major decisions, such as trying for a part in the play; "HM probably as gd an actor as most of LT crowd" is an entry on one side and "HM teacher—do nothing foolish" on the other. Similarly he draws up a Plan of Conduct to attract the eighteen-year-old Griselda, advising himself to "show still young, good muscles, etc." and questioning, "take off 25 lb., cut pie?" Besides the irony contained in these plans, there is an ironic parallel with an Army officer named Roger Tasset, who is pursuing the same girl: "Roger shared Hector's faith in planning and common sense, and he had applied these principles to his career of seduction." Their stories are carried on in parallel, and they are equally unsuccessful. So Davies

casts an ironic but not unfriendly eye on his characters, exposing their pretensions, allowing their petty motives to bring them into conflict with each other, depicting limited environments which reflect limited personalities, and so on.

The reader tends to think of the book in terms of situation rather than plot. Though some incidents are well handled, Davies has as much trouble with the management of an action as most other Canadian novelists. He takes up one group of his characters, and drops the rest. He neglects his production of the *Tempest* for pages on end. At page 170, he is still preparing the ground, still providing background information about important characters. Since everything is elaborated and made obvious, the movement is slow, and the plot cannot be said to have a rhythm or tempo at all. Finally, he has not hit upon a suitable device to bring things into focus and restore a balance; Hector's attempted suicide because of his passion for Griselda is completely unbelievable and out of place in this novel.

There are other things out of place. Into the old-worldly manner modern frankness intrudes ungraciously and jarringly:

She had, indeed, a splendid figure, but the beholder was rarely permitted to see its beauties at rest. If she was not swinging one foot she was tossing back her hair; she arched her neck and heaved up her rich bosom most fetchingly, but too often; . . . when she laughed, which was often, her posteriors gave a just-perceptible upward leap, in sympathy . . . Her energy was delightful for five minutes, and exhausting after ten. As the committee came through the door, she laughed at a remark which Roger had made. It was a carrying laugh, and through her jersey dress her gluteals could be seen to contract suddenly, and slowly relax again.

The sentence structure is almost as balanced as Gibbon's; the clinical approach and the close realistic description are in the manner of Aldous Huxley; and the two styles cannot be brought into harmony. The modernistic elements seem the result of a gratuitous desire to shock; Davies is attempting to secure up-to-dateness by imitation of the methods of a successful contemporary.

In *Leaven of Malice*, much the same merits and defects are exhibited. The book begins with an interesting account of a day in the life of a newspaper editor. Of course the beginnings of the plot are

here, but the main interest lies elsewhere; this is Davies the essayist or diarist rather than Davies the novelist. When the theme emerges, it turns out to be another comic mechanism: the false announcement of an engagement between Solly Bridgetower and Pearl Vambrace, whose families have been feuding for years, serves to illuminate the traditional rivalries and petty jealousies in their community. Once again, Davies deals with these relationships in a leisurely manner, with perhaps less wit and fewer quotable epigrams, but with the same discursive use of the "character" and the same freedom to insert short essays on assorted topics—"Who reads a newspaper?" takes six pages to answer—whenever he wants.

There are many good comic scenes in this book. One shows Professor Vambrace, dressed like a stage detective, stalking Gloster Ridley, the newspaper editor, in search of information about what he considers a plot against his good name. Another shows Norm Yarrow, who, though he is a psychologist, is "just an ordinary guy", and his wife Dutchy, who is similarly uneducated and oriented, offering ill-timed congratulations to the supposedly engaged couple, and trying to bring "Wheel" to a sedate Waverley University faculty group. But perhaps the best bit of comedy is that in which Norm, trying to convince Professor Vambrace (whose subject is classics) that he has an Oedipus Complex, finds out that the Oedipus Complex is much more complicated than he has ever suspected.

Humphrey Cobbler, the bibulous Cathedral organist, is much more prominent in this book than in *Tempest-Tost*. His function is almost invariably to bring the light of intellect to bear upon his environment and to criticize its stodginess. In his attacks on the respectable and the conventional, he seems to be speaking for the author himself, and as in the previous book he is given a large share of the Davies irony.

As in *Tempest-Tost*, there are passages which seem out of keeping with the general tenor of the style; because the style is less lofty and remote, the expressions are not so grating here, but Davies' motive still seems to be to use naughty words as Huxley does. Gloster Ridley reflects as he looks at a newspaper picture, "If a new Sweater Girl every month, why not an Udders Day, for the suitable honouring of

all mammals?" Davies makes a good deal of a comparison between a newspaper and a barber's chair, which must fit all buttocks; like Gumbriel's Patent Small Clothes in *Antic Hay*, the barber's chair device is worked to death. For the most part, however, it is not so much a question of clinical description as of harshly realistic expressions which might go with a baroque or metaphysical style but are out of place in a classical style. "She was of classic features (that is to say, horse-faced)" is out of keeping with what comes before and after it.

The fact that down-to-earth expressions seem out of place is suggestive. An accurate description of Davies' "Salterton" today would reflect the break-up of a stable order; it has felt the impact of industrialism since the war, as has every Ontario city. But, though Davies supposedly is dealing with the post-war period, the new tensions and disruptions are not shown in his novels. Actually he is not writing of the present but of the past. He has found a cathedral city which he can treat like Barchester, and he proceeds to do so. His setting is as static as Leacock's Mariposa, a community, as Desmond Pacey observes, "in which the noises of the contemporary industrial era are heard only as a faint and distant murmur."

None of these four writers seems to possess either a satisfactory standpoint or a satisfactory technique for attacking the "unbridled acquisitiveness and arrogant commercialism"⁵ of our times, as Leacock attacked his. Three of the four look backward in time, and the only one who really deals with the contemporary situation is the one who fails most signally. Apparently the best satiric novelist we have is a nineteenth-century writer who, when he attempts to adapt himself to the twentieth century, shows himself ill at ease. We are still waiting for our Sinclair Lewis; the quiet humour of Davies is not enough to sweep the nation, to make the whole of Canada aware of a satiric portrayal whose fairness may be disputed, but which at least must be looked at and discussed.

⁵ Desmond Pacey, *Creative Writing in Canada*, Toronto, 1952, p. 105.

Criticism

— Its Place in Canada's Future —

by

H. R. PERCY

"How," asks Mr. Percy, "in a country like Canada, where distinct national culture is in its infancy and masterpieces are proportionately few, is the critic to justify his existence?" Here are some illuminating observations on this question.

SOME time ago a "panel of experts" on the C.B.C. was asked: "Are our critics fulfilling their proper function?" On the question at issue they came near to unanimity: they thought not, and they were emphatic. But in their failure to define that function their unanimity was complete.

They were not to blame, except, perhaps (inevitable as it was), in attempting the definition at all; for it is not a matter to be dismissed in a brief impromptu discussion over which hovers the spectre of a time-limit. Volumes surround the subject, controversial and inconclusive. Artists are at variance. Critics themselves cannot agree. But the error into which our Panel lapsed was the very common one of confusing the critic with the reviewer: the man who "relates the adventures of his soul amongst masterpieces" with the man who scribbles hasty notes about new books, pictures, films or plays to turn an honest but imperative dollar.

Let me hasten to forestall any charge of highbrow snobbery in this. Reviewing is not, as Wordsworth in a moment of bitterness asserted "an inglorious employment"; nor, performed with integrity and good conscience, is it the parasitic pursuit some artists would have it to be. Without the services of the reviewer, the busy man would be entirely at the mercy of the blurb-writer, the publicity-stunter, the superlative-slinger. The ultimate choice must of course rest always with the individual, but if his sanity is to be preserved (or at least prolonged), there must be set between him and the heterogeneous

spate of art either a filter, with all the implicit perils of censorship, or a reliable indicator; a litmus by means of which he may know, with a minimum of discomfort, his meat from his poison. The reviewer is such an indicator: no more. He is not, as many regard him and as often he tends to regard himself, a self-appointed dictator of taste. Nor is he the preceptor of genius. His acquaintance with his subject—by which I mean the work under his immediate consideration—is too fleeting to permit that process of assimilation without which there can be no creative response. For criticism at its best is as truly creative as the art by which it is inspired. By this exacting criterion reviewing is not, in any but the most rare and accidental cases, criticism, any more than the average news story is literature.

To what purpose, then, does the good critic relate the adventures of his soul amongst masterpieces? And how, in a country like Canada, where distinct national culture is in its infancy and masterpieces are proportionately few, is he to justify his existence? Is he to sit patiently, his soul athirst for adventure, and await the coming of great pictures and immortal books? Or may he perhaps, by giving confident voice to what C. E. Montague called his "private ecstasy", afford these hoped-for masterpieces a little pre-natal care; or, by engendering a state of expectancy in the hearts of all Canadians, provide a home against their coming?

True criticism involves far more than the post-mortem examination of the work of others. Its chief responsibility is the maintenance of an atmosphere of taste: not to inculcate standards, but to foster a climate in which standards conceivably may flourish. It has been said that "the work of art emerges within a field of critical perceptions". Whence come these perceptions under the guidance of which the artist shapes and perfects his work, and by which the public responds to it and appreciates it? Intuition, you may truthfully say. "What you are destined to find in *Faust*," says Burckhart, "that you will find by intuition." But even intuition must acknowledge an ancestry, must be implanted by some evolutionary force from without. Just as a reader's response to the work of a poet is conditioned by the extent of their common experience; every image, every poetic effect being but an allusion to the fund of shared experience lying dormant and chaotic

at the bottoms of their mental gardens, causing profundities of emotion to pass between them as by some supernatural *rapport*: so pass from mind to discerning mind those fragments of critical truth, those "perceptions" which so often are indefensible in logic. In passing through the wholesome atmosphere of good criticism we cannot avoid orientation toward the sound tenets upon which it was based. Criticism should be pleasurable both in the writing and in the reading. Our taste should benefit from it as our bodies benefit from the pleasurable warmth of the sun. A critical essay on Botticelli, or the Brontës, may not seem very relevant to Mr. Maple of Toronto when published in the periodical which yesterday spurned his poem "Potlatch of the Gods." But if such a work contributes, by the contagion of its author's "private ecstasy", a mite towards a national consciousness of what is acceptable as art, it has done a greater service to Mr. Maple and the nation than either of them is likely to appreciate.

The critic should stand in relation to art as the artist stands in relation to life. Art has been defined in many ways, but the concept of it as a criticism of life is as valid as any. And from this concept, if we have the least awareness of what constitutes art, we can glimpse the ideal nature of criticism. In what sense, then, does the artist criticize life? His work is mainly a questing, an exploration. He approaches life with the delicate antennae of his enthusiasm, seeking by their sympathetic vibrations to capture something not only of its quality, but of the quality of the sensations it evokes within himself. His enthusiasm is as vital as its object. The impact of the two is magical, is art. What that impact produces is unique. Unique, yet so very close to common experience the glowing thrill of its truth reaches the hearts of all men.

Similarly with the critic. He should be moved to his criticism by what Emerson called the "spirit and splendour" of his subject. If there is neither spirit nor splendour he is wasting his own and his reader's time. Far better that he should occupy himself with dreams of splendours to come, for such dreams broadcast the seed of their own fulfilment. This does not mean that the critic should confine himself to those things which he can praise, although inevitably his finest work will reflect his highest enjoyment. He will be equally at his ease with

that which he can enthusiastically hate. What he shuns is mediocrity, for any attempt to criticize the mediocre results in provincialism and cant. The pernicious he will attack with all the powers of his eloquence, but the merely bad he will strike at by creating a militant awareness of the good. Criticism, like art, is prompted by enthusiasm for an Idea. The critic, like the artist, has an all-powerful urge to share and perpetuate his discovery. The only difference between them is that the one criticizes life for the enrichment of life, while the other criticizes art for the enrichment of art.

All those services which society expects of the critic he performs because he is a good critic, but he is not a good critic because he performs them. He brings recognition to neglected talent and rediscovers forgotten worthies; he shields the feeble flames of culture through periods of indifference or hostility; he detects amid a chaos of "movements" and "tendencies" the main trends of artistic development in his age: he may even, by the subtle gradations of his fervour, furnish misty indications of an "order of merit" among artists and their works, but these and many more of his accomplishments are no more than happy incidentals to his grand design, just as in the artistic achievement of Dickens social reform was but an incidental virtue. His grand design is to luxuriate in, to investigate, and if possible to justify the mysterious response of his spirit to a work of art. This he will do without fear of being wrong. Indeed, he cannot be wrong, if only he will be genuine. In science, if two opinions are expressed, one at least of them is wrong. But when Ruskin and Pater match opinions on a work of Botticelli there results a stimulating diversity of response. Who would cast the first stone at such antipodes of excellence? Truth wears often more than one aspect.

According to Sir Herbert Read, "Criticism is a process of crystallization, of the discovery and elaboration of general concepts" Very true, but it is not necessarily a conscious process. Crystallization, like the growth of coral, proceeds according to a natural law. Precipitation over a long period tends toward grace and symmetry, but I cannot believe that the coral insect, in the quiet ecstasy of submission to its destiny, has any studied awareness of the towering reef to come. It knows by a deep prompting of its being that it adds to something

noble, senses a rightness in what it does, but its prime concern is to satisfy a need. Sir Herbert Read, in his admirable essay on Henry James, has a vigilant eye on "general concepts", but the inspiring force and consequently the dominant impression is enthusiasm for the genius of Henry James; which by virtue of its greatness could not fail to fall into the pattern of literary evolution.

The peril lies, of course, not in tracing the pattern of the past, but in attempting to dictate the pattern of the future. The future can be great only so far as it is founded upon our appreciation of the past. In dealing with the functions of the critic it is well to tread softly, as we do when the functions of the artist are in question. Let us ascribe to him no 'duties', lest by such an imposition his criticism be trammelled and debased. We may say with some degree of impunity that it is a function of birds to sing, but any suggestion that it is their duty to sing is likely to meet with response only from the parrot and his sedulous kind.

There is a danger in our national exuberance. A danger that in our eagerness to hear Canadian art extolled we may give ear to the parrot-cries while birds of a more melodious feather languish and die; for the sycophantic screech of the parrot is sweeter in the ear of vanity than all the ecstasies of the nightingale. I suspect that what that questioner desired of our radio Panel (and what, despite all their flounderings, thank God he did not get) was an injunction upon the critics of this country to confine their attention to works produced in Canada, regardless alike of their merit and of the enervating effect of such biased criticism upon the arts which it seeks to stimulate. Criticism must be enslaved to the service of no cause, however admirable, but the cause of art. It should be divorced from any motive but that of transmitting, undiminished and undistorted, the impact of its author's discoveries and experiences in the world of art, recorded while he is, so to speak, in a state of aesthetic grace. Only by truly serving this true cause can it incidentally promote others, as for example, the cause of Canadian art as opposed to the cause of Art. The dangers of such would-be coercive criticism are illustrated by Bernard Shaw, who says of his earlier dramatic criticisms ". . . they must be construed in the light of the fact that all through I was ac-

cusing my opponents of failure because they were not doing what I wanted, whereas they were often succeeding brilliantly in doing what they themselves wanted."

In Britain just now a controversy rumbles around the question of the extent to which a writer's work should grapple with the issues of his time; the extent to which literature should become "*littérature engagée*". One aspect of this controversy is the problem of whether condemnation of a writer's apparent detachment from current issues falls within the scope of valid criticism. Almost without exception responsible writers revolt against the suggestion of such a critical mandate. Causes, unless they are in themselves the inspiring force, unless they burst of their own accord upon the creative imagination of the artist, can never be more than squalid wagons to the star of genius. Political rage, economic chaos, terror of nuclear war may release for some men the spate of poetic eloquence; for others the death of all sensibility attends the contemplation of these things. Even in the work of these latter the same influences will lie implicit. But it is not the prime concern of the critic to seek them, and certainly not his to impugn their absence. The critic dare not lay down terms of this sort for the award of his approbation, since his approbation is the sole divining rod by means of which, in the absence of conventional virtues, he may sense the legitimacy of new ventures.

I am aware of the opposite danger: the tendency to dismiss things Canadian with a shrug of apology, as if their very origin debarred them from serious consideration, as if we had not in our hearts a burning conviction of a great cultural destiny that will shed its light down the centuries to come. But let us do our critics the justice of believing them to have outgrown such adolescent self-mistrust.

"We must be prepared," says Sir Herbert Read, "for literature (and, presumably, any other art) refusing to fit into our critical categories." I would go further and point to the peril—even deny the existence—of such categories. The critic should no more seek to categorize the work of the artist, which in a limited sense is the territory of the reviewer, than the artist should seek to categorize the work of God, which is the territory of science. But then Sir Herbert Read has a commodity labelled "Scientific Criticism" to sell. "Criti-

cism," he says, "must find its general basis in a science of mankind." This should mean, to be perfectly accurate, that no critic is armed for battle until he has made an exhaustive study of psychology; when in fact, construed in the light of its author's modifying asides and his own admirable critical works, it means that the critic may sometimes get more directly to the heart of the matter with such an equipment. And if directness is the only virtue the point is conceded. But the same equipment is equally valuable to the literary artist: must we then prepare for "scientific literature"? There is much to be gained by the "psychological approach" to the mysteries of artistic creation, but why must the psychological cuckoo lay its eggs in criticism's nest? Psychoanalysis attains no nearer to the rare spirit of criticism than a sex-manual captures the lyric fervour of human love. The responsive soul of the critic is as vital to a masterpiece of criticism as that of the artist with whom it finds accord. What manner of science is this, in which the results of analysis depend upon, and are enriched by, the personality of the analyst? I have noted that Sir Herbert is at his best when he is at his least scientific: and what more magnificent capitulation could he make than this: "It is, finally, a question of courage—of throwing into the attempt for truth not only intelligence, spirit, faith, but also feeling, emotion, self."

It begins to emerge from all this that the function of the critic is to foster ideas about art; to arouse and maintain in the people a state of curiosity and intellectual unrest; to be the leaven in his country's rise to greatness. It matters nothing where his ideas have their origin, how far afield he goes or how far back in time. If they are true ideas, with a significance for his age, they will somewhere take root and flourish.

Criticism is as diverse as art itself. There is room alike for the erudite and the merely intuitive, just as in poetry there is room for a Milton and a W. H. Davies. Learning, the critic's greatest asset, can also be his greatest danger. Obviously it is desirable that he should be familiar with past achievements, and be equipped thereby with standards that will enable him to recognise untutored genius and detect the spuriously accomplished. But this does not mean that he must surround himself like a porcupine with barbs of prejudice. He must

"Drink deep, or taste not the Pierian Spring," that he may remain free of preconceived notions and absolute in his judgments; for the mark of a great critic is above all the perception of greatness in unfamiliar forms.

Canada has entered an era of industrial growth and scientific development which has few equals in world history. In the remaining years of this century she will see changes beyond our imagining. To me it is inconceivable that this rapid growth will not be accompanied by as profound a cultural renaissance. That prince of critics, Matthew Arnold, maintained that such periods of expansion are the most fertile producers of creative art and literature. "For the creation of a master-work of literature," Arnold says "two powers must concur, the power of the man and the power of the moment, and the man is not enough without the moment." Canada's moment could not be more patently at hand.

It rests with our critics to exploit this moment to the full, to awaken and stimulate that national susceptibility to ideas which alone can call forth our latent genius. Their task is to prepare the way for great art by making the people *want* great art, and theirs to acclaim it when it comes. Theirs, too, to cherish it in its infancy; to guard it from the assaults of the bigotted, from the corrupting influences of the partisan and the sectarian, and from the excessive conservatism of producers, promoters, circulation managers, and all others who make art their business.

The critic is concerned with every aspect of the national life, for out of that life will come the art which is its essence and its justification. But he is concerned only on the plane of principle. Above its squabbles and its failures he must retain always a clear conception of the Ideal: not that he may be exacting in his judgments, but that his perspective may be true and unvarying, unblurred by the mists of sentiment. There is no place in criticism for sentiment—not even national sentiment. Canadian art and literature must be prepared to stand comparison with those of all nations and of all time, and criticism must aspire to nothing else.

THE NEW BOOKS

Organized Philanthropy

COMMUNITY CHEST, A CASE STUDY IN PHILANTHROPY. By John R. Seeley, B. H. Junker, R. W. Jones Jr. and Associates. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1957. Pp. 596. \$7.50.

In the long span of social history the Community Chest movement is a recent phenomenon. Although the threads may be traced back beyond the creation of Charity Organization Societies in the United Kingdom and the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century, these earlier attempts at the co-ordination of local social services rarely included a system of federated fundraising. The first Community Chest was founded in Cleveland as recently as 1913. World War I gave the Chest movement a considerable impetus and the number of such organizations increased substantially in the postwar decade. The first federations were often of a sectarian nature: Councils of Catholic Charities, Federations of Jewish Philanthropies, and the like. The Community Chest brought these sectarian federations together.

World War II and the years since have witnessed the magnificent flowering of federated fundraising all over North America. By this time, however, many new health and welfare organizations had been created outside the Chest structure. As well, several older and well-known agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army had never joined the Community Chest in many communities. This was particularly so in Canada. Thus the slogan of one campaign for funds for 30 or 40 or 60 or 70 agencies was a mere fiction; in fact, there were major campaigns for funds in most large cities every month (Chart 10). The success or failure of these various campaigns was interrelated. In 1953, at least half of the major federated fundraising campaigns failed to achieve their monetary goals (Table XVII, p. 148). By the 1950's a newer concept of a United Community Fund conducting a United Appeal for funds on behalf of the former Community Chest members and the major outside organiza-

tions—both the newer and the older ones—had emerged (p. 153-4). In the first year or two of the United Appeals the campaigns in many cities have been "successful", that is, the stated monetary goals of the campaigns have been achieved, although the rate of failure remains high. Whether the process of unification will solve the problem of financing local health, welfare and communal services in the long run remains to be seen.

Community Chest is thus an extremely important book for many people in the United States and Canada to-day. In particular there are two groups for whom this case study in philanthropy has special meaning. There are the many thousands of citizens who take substantial responsibility each year to assist in raising funds in the various campaigns, whether these be called Community Chests, United Appeals or Welfare Federations. In Canada there were 77 such campaigns in the fall of 1956 and the spring of 1957 to raise funds for the calendar year 1957. The sum of \$23,107,000 was raised. In the United States there were nearly 2,000 campaigns (Chart 5).

The second group which is vitally concerned consists of the members of the social work profession. Although the number of welfare positions in the governmental programmes far outnumbers those in non-governmental agencies, the professionally trained social workers are heavily concentrated in private rather than public health and welfare agencies. These persons are for the most part dependent upon the annual Chest or United Appeal campaign for funds. They have typically maintained a low or modest standard of living and although they are in very short supply in these years of intense competition for young entrants to the professions, they have made only moderate gains in real income. The vagaries and uncertainties of the Community Chest are, in large measure, responsible. Although the top lay readers continue to insist that social welfare is not the exclusive property of social workers, the low paid and low status professionally trained Master of Social Work will continue to

wonder whether social work is for social workers. Seeley's book will provide them with little solace.

John R. Seeley, the principal author, is a distinguished Canadian sociologist (the distinction is not precisely clear to this reviewer) who has the impressive capacity to turn each project in which he participates into a major exploration of a current socio-economic or socio-psychological problem of tremendous significance. Thus in 1950-53, Seeley and associates were embarked upon a study of mental health, particularly among children in a suburb of Toronto. The result was a major sociological treatise on *Crestwood Heights*, a North American suburb.

More recently, Seeley and colleagues on the staff of Community Surveys Inc., of Indianapolis, were asked to explore the reasons behind the unsuccessful fundraising campaigns of the Community Chest of that city. The result, after three years of study, is a comprehensive analysis of one major aspect of philanthropy in North America—with due attention to Indianapolis which was, after all, the sponsor's interest—which is rather heavy going even for the best intentioned reader. The book consists of 436 rather large pages, followed by 46 charts and 105 pages of Notes, plus an index. In the text proper there are nearly 90 tables. To return to an earlier comment, this is a book of great importance for many people and yet one wonders whether more than a handful will be able to persist in their reading to grasp its full significance. This reviewer would not pretend for a moment that he has read it completely, nor would he recommend that others attempt a full reading. *Community Chest* is obviously the product of a half dozen authors and it seems a pity that one author was not assigned the task of writing a neater, tighter and more comprehensible report in say, 300 pages.

Perhaps the major fault is that the book is designed to serve two masters. On the one hand, the authors were clearly bored, irritated and cynical about Indianapolis, its people and its culture. They were seeking principles and generalizations and few avenues of research were left unexplored. There are several references to Study 47 and Study 68. (It is understood that there were some 100 or so sub-studies). On

the other hand, there were the sponsors, distinguished business firms and foundations in Indianapolis. They were entitled to some sort of a report on their dismal city and this is precisely what they get. There are three Chapters in Part II, entitled "The Context", which deal with such erudite questions as the origin of the term "Hoosier"; and lip service is paid in some of the other chapters to the fact that Indianapolis was paying the shot. Otherwise this is a study of the folklore of a specialized type of philanthropy in North America, more precisely of federated fundraising for private social, health and welfare agencies.

The perseverant and selective reader will, nevertheless, find this report a veritable mine of information and insights into the process. Some interesting examples of these insights are:

- the discussion of the views held by various persons and groups concerning the nature of the "philanthropic enterprise" known as Community Chest or United Fund (p. 31-2);

- the nature of the changing philanthropy (p. 36-7);

- the significance for federated fundraising of heterogeneity in the business and social worlds (p. 72-3);

- the aims and purposes of a mass fundraising organization (p. 107-8);

- the central value-conflicts of the "per-capita minded" and the "participation minded" members of the community (p. 109 et seq.);

- the concept of 'need' (p. 124 et seq.);

- the importance of the Chest or Fund for the "Corporate Citizen" and the social status of the corporation's management (p. 162-3);

- the uncertain relationship between fundraisers and the so-called "welfare community" (p. 163-6).

In Chapter 13, "What Might be Done: Further Unification", Seeley and Associates clash head-on with the newly emerging power élites who have created the United Community Funds in the United States and Canada. The major arguments in favour of United Funds are identified and one by one serious question is raised concerning the evidence available to support any of them; equally devastating is the examination in

the middle portion of the chapter of the arguments raised by opponents of United Funds and further unification. The reviewer understands that there is a great deal of antagonism towards the book in fundraising circles in both countries. The following extract from an *Executive Newsletter* issued by United Community Funds and Councils of America, New York, on August 26, 1957, may be of interest:

Its broad approach, complex form of presentation and obvious lack of first-hand knowledge of the field on the part of the surveyors combine to make the work ponderous and of doubtful practical value. Unfortunately United Fund, Chest and Council executives will not find in this publication a working tool for their day-to-day activities . . . Neither the proponents nor the opponents of federation will find comfort in the study report as practically all present-day fund raising and planning practices are taken to task because of lack of what the authors will accept as absolute proof of their effectiveness or social desirability . . . In Indianapolis the fact that a study was being made is credited with stimulating leadership to take a look at the failing Chest and to do something about it. What they have done is to organize a United Fund, which the study definitely does not recommend.

An appropriate epilogue for a review of this controversial study was afforded at a scheduled "victory luncheon" in Toronto where the United Fund fell more than one million dollars short of its goal at the close of the campaign on October 31st. The President of the Fund was reported in these words (*Globe and Mail*, November 1, 1957).

"They (businessmen who have not given to the United Appeal) will become moral outcasts of this great metropolitan community. In their own vindictiveness, their businesses are going to suffer . . . If I were running a business and were approached by an organization as formidable, with members as influential, as this one, I would think long and hard before I ran counter to their declared wishes."

This is what Seeley's book is all about and none of the authors could have expressed their reservations any more eloquently. Surely when charitable giving becomes mere taxation, the givers are entitled to the representation inherent in public assumption of responsibility for the social services.

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Personalities and Warfare

THE TURN OF THE TIDE 1939-1943: a study based on the diaries and autobiographical notes of Field Marshal The Viscount Alanbrooke. By Arthur Bryant. London: Collins. In Canada: Wm. Collins & Sons and Co. Canada Ltd. 1957. Pp. 766. \$6.00.

A personal diary as a source book of history has both strong and weak points. Its very immediacy reveals more accurately the mind and motives of the writer than do memoirs, prepared after time and events have had an opportunity of beclouding the memory with the virtues of historical perspective. At the same time a diary is an impulsive thing; it must, in consequence, lack fair balance and honest judgment. This book is both a diary and a memoir, and a comment upon both. That is to say, it contains a number of extracts from the war-time diaries of Field Marshal, Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1941-46, together with autobiographical notes written by the Field Marshal after his retirement, strung together by a historical narrative prepared by Sir Arthur Bryant. It covers the period between the outbreak of war in 1939 and the Quebec Conference in the autumn of 1943. A second volume will complete the story between 1943 and the conclusion of hostilities in 1945. Owing to the nature of the book the reader should be careful to distinguish between its three component parts; for all are not of equal value. Bryant is not always the careful and meticulous historian that he should be, and Lord Alanbrooke's notes do not always agree with other historical

sources. The excerpts from the diaries are undoubtedly the best part of this volume; and one cannot help but wish that the publication of the diaries *in extenso* had been possible at the present time.

Any first hand account of the high level direction of the war, particularly one written by a man who not only fought through the dreadful days of 1940, but who, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the confidant of Prime Minister Churchill, took part in the conferences at Moscow, Casablanca, Washington and Quebec, where the great design of victory was hammered out, cannot but be of great value to all those interested in the story of the war, whether they be casual or serious historians. All the more so because Lord Alanbrooke, in the security of his personal diary, was prepared to record his views about the personalities of the people involved as well as the details of the problems with which they were called upon to deal.

One point which seems to emerge from a reading of this book is that, despite the common purpose of defeating Nazi Germany, the British, the Americans and the Russians, were fighting, not one, but three separate wars. Each had their own political motives which determined the nature of their military strategy. There is, as Clausewitz always emphasized, an intimate alliance between politics and strategy; and the difficulties encountered, particularly by Great Britain and the United States (for the Russians never made any pretence at fighting the same war as their allies), in arriving at agreement upon the essentials of grand strategy, sprang inevitably from fundamental disagreement over political motives. Lord Alanbrooke's diary and his notes bring out the intensity of the struggle between the British and Americans over the British insistence upon the conquest of North Africa, the re-opening of the Mediterranean, and the elimination of Italy as an active ally of the German Reich. The Americans, on the other hand, even as early as 1942, wanted to push ahead with a cross-channel invasion of France, disregarding the Mediterranean (although Admiral King and the naval group always had their eyes glued upon Japan as the principal enemy to be defeated). Both Alanbrooke's diary and notes show the irrita-

tion of the British C.I.G.S. at what he regarded as American "stupidity", without revealing any understanding of the factors underlying the American distrust of what they felt was the subservience of strategy to British imperial policy. And Alanbrooke's irritation could hardly have been mollified by the fact that he, an experienced, British, fighting soldier, who had been promised command of the cross-channel invading force, was compelled to give way, at Roosevelt's insistence, to the inexperienced, American, Eisenhower, of whom he had written "I had little confidence in his having the ability to handle the military situation confronting him . . . he learned a lot during the war, but tactics, strategy and command were never his strong points." Convinced that they had been "outwitted" by the British in the arguments over North Africa and Italy, the Americans approached the Quebec Conference with a fixed determination not to yield. "We must go into this argument in the spirit of winning," wrote General Marshall. Once having convinced Roosevelt, Marshall had little to fear; for the President's mind had been made up, none could change it. Certainly not Churchill, who, when playing soldier, could hardly ever keep to any fixed strategic aim. Roosevelt assumed the initiative at Quebec and Churchill, for the moment obsessed with South East Asia and plans for seizing northern Sumatra, was quite willing to trade Alanbrooke for Mountbatten.

Alanbrooke's pen sketches of men like Stalin, Smuts, and Roosevelt are very interesting. But most enlightening is that of Winston Churchill. It is as revealing of character as the famous portrait by Sutherland. With all his drive, initiative, and genius, Churchill never could forget that he was the descendant of his famous ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, and was forever dabbling in strategy to the dismay and consternation of his military chiefs. "Planned strategy" as Lord Alanbrooke wrote, "was not his strong card. He preferred to work by intuition and by impulse . . . He was never good at looking at all the implications of any course he favoured. In fact, he frequently refused to look at them." Fortunately for Great Britain, Churchill was not, like that other

intuitive strategist, Adolf Hitler, above subordinating his prophetic visions to the realities of the military situation.

For the Canadian interested in the part played by the troops of his own country, Lord Alanbrooke's account will be something of a disappointment. There is but the barest sketch of the ill-fated Brittany redoubt scheme; an inadequate account of the planning for Dieppe; a mildly inaccurate statement of the Churchillian scheme for a landing by the Canadians in northern Norway to clear the way for the Murmansk convoys (*Jupiter*); and nothing at all about an equally impracticable scheme for the Canadian seizure of the Canary Islands (*Tonic*). One may wonder if Bryant will, in the next volume, throw light upon Alanbrooke's role in bringing about the resignation of General McNaughton as the Canadian commander-in-chief.

Nevertheless there is lots of valuable material in this book for the general reader and the historian. It should be read alongside the American versions of the war story by Eisenhower, Stimson, Leahy, Butcher, and others. And alongside that by Sir Winston Churchill too. For Churchill, even more than the Americans, has preferred, as he confided to General Eisenhower, to correct his mistakes and bury his errors in volumes of memoirs rather than bare them in a published diary.

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Soviet Thought

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN RUSSIAN AND SOVIET THOUGHT. Edited with an Introduction by Ernest I. Simmons. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Co. Ltd. 1955. Pp. xii + 563. \$9.00.

THE RUSSIAN MARXISTS AND THE ORIGINS OF BOLSHEVISM. By Leopold H. Haimson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Co. Ltd. 1955. Pp. x + 246. \$7.25.

To what extent has Soviet communism been influenced by each of its parents—the

stern philosophy of Papa Marx and the autocratic traditions of Mother Russia? This question has long fascinated students of Russia and of political philosophy. But now, when the influence of Marxism largely as preached by the rulers in the Kremlin is growing in many parts of the world, this question concerns not only specialists but anyone who values the principles of the liberal democracy. Equally important is the related question as to what it was in Marxism which captured the imagination of those members of the Russian intelligentsia who made the 1917 Revolution.

The collection of papers edited by E. J. Simmons, and L. H. Haimson's monograph are both useful aids to an understanding of why Marxism was and is being shaped into the particular doctrines promulgated by the Soviet leaders and theoreticians. *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought* contains studies prepared by forty-one experts for a conference held in the United States in 1954. Six general themes were explored by the members of the conference: 1) Realism and Utopia in Russian Economic Thought; 2) Authoritarianism and Democracy; 3) Collectivism and Individualism; 4) Rationality and non-rationality; 5) Literature, State and Society, and 6) Russia and the Community of Nations (Messianic Views and Theory of Action).

A venture drawing on so large a number of experts dealing with a broad variety of topics will inevitably achieve unequal results. Of the many first-class papers in the book I was most favourably impressed with Professor Merle Fainsod's "Review" of the section on Authoritarianism and Democracy, with Isaiah Berlin's comparison of the ideas of "Herzen and Bakunin on Individual Liberty", and with Adam Ulam's study of "Stalin and the Theory of Totalitarianism". Some papers, and even whole sections, while excellent as such, fail to deal adequately with the task set by the planners of the conference, namely to emphasize "continuity and change". Professor Fainsod offers a number of illuminating comments which may explain why some members of the Symposium cautiously refused to meet the challenge provided by the theme of the conference:

"The search for patterns of change and continuity in Russian and Soviet

political thought has its own special pitfalls. It is always tempting to fasten on the victorious creed of the movement and to view it as the inexorable expression of deep-seated national needs and aspirations. Yet the march of events plays tricks on the best of us, and the dominant intellectual fashions of one generation or century become the cast-offs of the next. For the Communist the only Russian intellectual history which matters is that which can be fitted into the role of a prologue to the triumph of Bolshevism. Yet, even the Communist finds himself compelled to reinterpret the past, to reclaim what he has discarded, and to discard what he has reclaimed, as changing circumstances present new problems and new challenges. . . . We are the unavoidable victims of our times span, and it behooves us to be modest in rendering judgments which future events may belie." (p. 172)

While some totalitarian aspects of the Soviet regime suggest continuity of Tsarist practices, many features of Tsarist Russia were, of course, totally rejected by the present regime. There were liberal tendencies in Russia before 1917, as well as absolutist ones. Had the Nazis conquered Britain in 1941, and had Sir Oswald Mosley become Britain's ruler, scholars would perhaps later have given a new interpretation of the British political tradition. The creative ingenuity some historians display in the interpretation of past events could no doubt be made to show that the forces which produced James I, Charles I, Cromwell, Thomas Hobbes and that great expatriate, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, point to dominant and only temporarily eclipsed misanthropic and totalitarian elements in the British *Weltanschauung*. This example is, of course, a fanciful and naughty exaggeration. It drives home the point, however, made by Professor Fainsod about the dangers of seeing continuities in historical processes where none may in fact exist. He suggests, then, that "... resemblances do not always imply continuities" and adds a related warning: "... profound changes may be initiated under the cover of systems of rule which appear superficially similar." (p. 173).

The quotation from Macbeth selected by Mr. Haimson for the title page of his book

indicates that he too is concerned with the problems of continuity and change: "If you can look into the seeds of time, and say which grain will grow and which will not . . .". Mr. Haimson's book is one of the very excellent series of studies published by the Russian Research Center at Harvard. It indirectly deals with the problem of how certain features of pre-revolutionary Russia were carried into the Bolshevik era and what changes Lenin and his colleagues had to make in both Marxism and in the ideas of Russian intellectuals before they could fashion the instrument necessary for the successful revolution—the Bolshevik party. *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* is, in the author's own words "in part an interpretive essay on the evolution of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia, a unique social formation in the intellectual history of Europe; it is more largely a study of the reception that Marxist ideology encountered, and of the transformations that it underwent, in the hands of this estranged group of Russia's nineteenth-century society. It is partly an analysis of the emergence of Bolshevism and Menshevism, the two opposing interpretations of Marxist doctrine—and Russian reality—around which most of the Russian Marxists ultimately coalesced; and partly an analysis of the early development of Plekhanov, Akselrod, Martov, and Lenin, the four figures who were chiefly responsible for the delineation of these two conflicting interpretations . . ." (p. v). This, then, is an analysis of the ideological struggles of an important section of the late nineteenth century Russian intelligentsia up to the outbreak of the 1905 Revolution. It is particularly useful because of the excellence with which it relates the multitude of personal experiences and emotions of the chief actors to the historical forces which provide the setting for the drama of Russia in revolution.

The member of the Russian intelligentsia in the nineteenth century found himself in a state of profound intellectual crisis. Largely alienated from the other classes in society, he was searching in the broody manner Chekhov has immortalized, for a sense of purpose in a society undergoing social change. His soul-searching was made more agonizing by the knowledge that developments in Russia were increasingly out of

step with those in the rest of the civilized world. Was he doomed, like the hero of Goncharov's *Oblomov*, to remain "the superfluous man", or was he, too "On the Eve" like Turgenev's Insarov? Professor Haimson sees the choice confronting the Russian *intelligent*, as he calls him, as that between "spontaneity" and "consciousness".

While the meaning of these terms, as used by Mr. Haimson, is not always clear, the latter category, "consciousness", seems to refer to a rational understanding of the world, rational understanding which would become a base for action. "Spontaneity", on the other hand, appears to resemble emotional sympathy with the forces shaping society more than it does a rational understanding of them. It is passive, permitting the unguided "spontaneous" development by historical processes. "Consciousness" was likely to appeal to the westernizers, the rationalists; "Spontaneity" to the Slophophils, the mystics. Applied to the social, economic and political problems, these categories raised the question for the Russian intellectual, of how his actions should be related to the great changes taking place about him. Was he to remain aloof from the battles of the day, allowing the middle class, the peasants and the growing number of industrial workers to behave as they pleased? Was he to join political factions and foment revolution or teach the villagers to return to the traditional community life their forefathers had allegedly enjoyed? Was he, in short, to allow himself and others to respond "spontaneously" to environmental forces or was he to find a rational explanation of what was going on which would permit "conscious" intervention and control? These were the questions posed by Russia's social, political and economic difficulties. *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* retraces the arguments about these and other questions waged by the various groups and coteries in pre-revolutionary Russia, leading to the split between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks over the most desirable nature of the Socialist Party. This struggle also represents for Professor Haimson the historic dilemma confronting the Russian intellectual. Lenin's demands for a tightly organized, centralized party is viewed as the result of his inability to rely on the "spontaneous" qualities of the workers and peasants.

Professor Haimson's most interesting thesis, however, is that Marxism's success in late nineteenth century Russia is attributable to that philosophy's ability to appeal to both the "spontaneous" and "conscious" elements in contemporary thought. In providing both what seemed a rational analysis of historical processes and a clear programme for action it joined two streams of Russia's thought, thereby appealing to diverse groups among the intelligentsia and, more important perhaps, to warring tendencies within particular individuals. This impressive and persuasive thesis raises two questions which, while fascinating, do not fall within the scope of the author's work: Why did some able Russian intellectuals *not* succumb to this double-pronged appeal of Marxism? Secondly, are some of the qualities which, Mr. Haimson claims, made Marxism attractive among the intelligentsia in Russia also effective among the educated present-day leaders in Africa and Asia? While they do not, of course, deal specifically with this problem, and while they of necessity can only help partially, both Mr. Haimson's book and Mr. Simmons' are of interest to those who would like to understand better the fascination exercised by Marxism in countries exposed to West European influences and which are undergoing rapid industrialization.

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A Sad War-Time Interlude

VICHY POLITICAL DILEMMA. By Paul Farmer. New York: Columbia University Press. 1955. Pp. 376. \$5.50.

This is a careful unbiased piece of scholarship by an American historian which will probably be one of the standard works in English on this sad war-time interlude in French history. Mr. Farmer recognizes the roots of Vichy deep in France's past and his account of this background is sound and enlightening. He is quick to reject the many conspiracy theories so prevalent in France, which served to spare the nation its guilt and push the blame on some myster-

ious band of plotters, such as the Synarchy, or the *Cagoule*. Rather he sees it growing out of the muddy waters of French pre-war politics where Right and Left allowed the bitterness of their divisions to destroy the unity of the nation. Vichy represents the victory of the Right (both Fascist and Clerical-Conservative) occasioned by military defeat and a resultant disenchantment with republican institutions.

The events following the outbreak of war in 1939 are chronicled in some detail, but Mr. Farmer keeps himself so far above the maelstrom, and makes such an effort to avoid passing judgment that much of the drama is lost. This irritating detachment is the source of almost all the book's shortcomings. It leads Mr. Farmer to chronicle dispassionately some of the most outrageous acts, such as Pucheu's handing over fifty French hostages to the Germans for execution. On this he comments: "... no one foresaw that the campaign of terrorism would continue and develop into the dimensions of a partisan war, and that German demands for hostages would increase in proportion." And about direct action by the resistance in killing collaborators after France's liberation, he writes: "it makes possible the punishment of culpable persons who would escape their deserved doom if they could only have recourse to the legalistic manoeuvres possible in a courtroom".

This attitude of detachment allows the story of the inexorable consequences of compromising with the enemies of the nation to be blurred. It is not hard to understand how honourable men might have felt that even a helpless French government like Vichy was preferable to direct rule by Hitler's *Gauleiter*. However, Mr. Farmer works this theme so hard that the compromises involved are glossed over and patent injustice is done to the Gaullists and the Resistance. He seems to think that the French surrender, apart from taking the French army out of action, did no great harm to the Allied cause. He nowhere shows what might have been accomplished by a French government in exile: continued action by the French navy, especially its escort vessels, the services of the French merchant fleet, the demonstration of French worthiness to the Americans that might have

enlisted greater aid more quickly from that source.

However, much more important was the fact that Vichy, while trying to protect French interests by playing along with Hitler, was dividing the French nation as it had never been divided since the Revolution. The anarchy of 1944, in which Frenchmen killed one another in truly desperate hatred has to be charged up to the decision to change sides and collaborate with the Nazis. Mr. Farmer tells this story, but refuses to come to the conclusion that the evidence suggests. The result is that the story appears dull and inconsequential. To him, all actions are plausible; but few are either admirable or contemptible.

Mr. Farmer, as an American, has a certain advantage. He is saved the bias of actual involvement, and his treatment can be reasonably impartial. While he overworks this in his laboured refusal to judge, he shows a surprising lack of understanding and knowledge of the British position. To a Canadian, it comes as a shock to read about the North African, Sicilian and Italian campaigns as all-American shows. Also, his sentence about the post-war British position is curious: "As it happened, Britain chose to hold somewhat aloof [from the American-led nations organizing to resist Russia], preferring to stake her fortune upon the association of peoples once known as the British Empire, then as the Commonwealth, and ultimately, as the "sterling bloc." This sort of *gaffe* is particularly regrettable in a reliable book such as this because it leads one to question what is, otherwise, sound scholarship.

The book is at its best in showing the characters of the leading men involved. The pathetic Pétain seeking to make himself a martyr for France, the bristling Weygand defending the honour of the army by refusing to surrender in the field, yet pleading for an armistice, the lonely and sound-thinking Renaud coming up with the right answers but lacking the strength to insist upon them, the shifty Laval convinced of his powers to swindle the Germans, yet leading France deeper in the mire of collaboration—all these are depicted clearly and with fairness, and an overdose of charity.

The book has an excellent essay on the sources used, but it is regrettable that there are no footnotes to document the author's assertions.

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A Collective Tragedy

EUROPEAN REFUGEES: 1939-52: A STUDY IN FORCED POPULATION MOVEMENT. By Malcolm J. Proudfoot. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. 1956. Pp. 542. \$6.50.

Speaking the language of symbols some mystics would describe Hell as a sphere of echoless silence, impenetrable darkness, and freezing chill rather than one of agonized howls and flaming heat. In other words, it is possible to conceive of Damnation as an existential state of total insensibility rather than as exogenous torment.

If it be thus identified with spiritual emptiness Damnation, so far from being regarded as the penalty for wicked deeds, must be defined as an incurable state of moral depravity, the characteristic symptom of which is known to be a total lack of emotional response. Another corollary of the foregoing proposition concerns the consequences of that metaphysical catastrophe which Christian theology refers to as Original Sin. It can be argued that the corruption of human nature which has resulted from that catastrophe reveals itself most clearly in man's woefully limited capacity for commiseration. His notorious inability to visualize large aggregates has its moral counterpart in man's callous attitude towards collective tragedies. Incapable of reducing the integer of suffering to a series of individual cases we remain curiously unconcerned before reports of great disasters. Thus, while the death of ten persons in a mining accident evokes general sympathy, our reaction to the news of a catastrophic flood involving the loss of ten thousand lives partakes of the mild interest with which we receive a statistical

statement. Our imaginative faculty is too defective to penetrate the veil of anonymity. That is why the Powers of Evil can avail themselves as much of man's callousness as of his iniquity: the human race continues to inflict upon itself woes the very magnitude of which prevents it from realizing the enormity of its guilt.

To be sure, the press, radio, and television, through skilful selection and dramatic presentation of individual tragedies, may succeed in momentarily arousing a vague sense of responsibility for the victims of war and other collective visitations. At the same time, by habituating readers, listeners, or viewers to pre-digested information, the mass media of communication probably cause man's spontaneous responses to atrophy. In the long run, sober accounts like the one presented by the author of this volume may be a more effective means of moral arousal than "stories" which do not require, indeed do not leave room for, the exercise of our imagination.

An officer in the Refugee and Displaced Persons Section of SHAEF, and later on attached in a similar function to the Civil Affairs Division of the American War Department, the late Prof. Proudfoot was very well qualified to give an authoritative account of the forced movements of European civilians during and after the Second World War, and to discuss the methods adopted by the military authorities, UNRRA, and, after 1946, the International Refugee Organization in an attempt to solve the host of problems created by the existence in Europe of many millions of uprooted people.

Fortunately, the complexity and magnitude of the refugee problem was recognized from the very start by the experts on Eisenhower's staff. They knew that, having regained their freedom, those masses of fugitives, forced workers, inmates of concentration camps, civilian internees, and other displaced persons could not be left to their own devices. Unless their movements were effectively controlled and their basic requirements looked after by the victorious Allies these people—infected with vermin, hungry, and vengeful—could be expected to spread epidemic diseases, and to resort to violence in search of food,

shelter and transportation. It was a matter of simple prudence for the military authorities to assume responsibility for these victims of war and tyranny.

While the first phase of refugee operations was thus focussed on the provision of sanitary and welfare services, a final solution of the refugee problem involved the repatriation or resettlement of millions of displaced persons. However, these movements had hardly got under way when the mass flight and expulsion from various parts of central and eastern Europe of some 12½ million German nationals and ethnic Germans created new intractable problems. The work of rehabilitation of displaced persons was, moreover, rendered vastly more difficult by the growing friction between Soviet Russia and the West, as well as by the refusal, for weighty political reasons, of many refugees to return to their places of origin. The British policy of limiting Jewish immigration into Palestine and the unwillingness of most of the other governments to admit immigrants except on a highly selective basis did not help matters either. Knowing these adverse circumstances one is not surprised to learn that there should have existed, as late as 1 June 1949, a residuum of about 175,000 persons who had not been resettled.

A prosaic report, studded with facts and figures, Prof. Proudfoot's book has no more in common with the Aeneid than had the wretched refugees of the nineteen-thirties and forties with the glorious hero of Vergil's epic. Yet Aeneas, too, the mythical progenitor of the Roman race and the ancestor of the Julian dynasty, was a "displaced person"—"*fato profugus*"; so was Pope Gregory VII, whose last words epitomize all the bitterness felt by a man dying in exile; so were Dante Alighieri, Calvin, Voltaire. The fugitive, alas! is one of History's archetypes.

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Viking in Orkney

THE ULTIMATE VIKING. By Eric Linklater. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd. In Canada: Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd. 1955. Pp. 296. \$4.00.

This book may be regarded as a literary *tour-de-force* not easily fitting into any of the usual literary categories. Its basis is history, but history interpreted in a highly subjective manner, interspersed with passages of exquisite description and telling of tales. Its scope may be gleaned from the admirable jacket summary which, if not from the author's own pen, has certainly been infected by his style.

"The last of the great Vikings was Sweyn Asleifsson, who lived in Orkney and was killed in Dublin in 1171: a few years after a university had been founded in Oxford. Sweyn's life was compact of high adventure, reckless policy, and wilful drama; but its historical interest lies in the fact that he outlived his time and was a bridge between two worlds: the Dark Ages with their heathen heroism, and the Middle Ages with their crusades and the building of the oldest of our cathedrals.

In *The Ultimate Viking* Sweyn's life is told as a key to the mystery of pagan heroism; and Eric Linklater argues that the great figures of the Viking era can only be understood by realising that they obeyed neither moral, political, nor economic rules, but acknowledged an aesthetic code: that they saw life itself—heroic life—as a work of art.

Briefly he sketches the history of Orkney from its discovery in neolithic times, and the lives of its great Earls . . . On that little mound of history he exhibits Sweyn the last Viking, and then turns to the great Icelandic sagas . . . and recreates a world sublimely indifferent to danger, hardship, and the commonness of common sense: a world in which deeds were their own reward. . . ."

So much for the theme, which was no doubt prompted by two of Mr. Linklater's most abiding enthusiasms—his love of Orkney, the homeland of his fathers, and his admiration for the great old sagas of the north. Both these subjects have often been dealt with previously and have little in-

herent connection. But in this book he has linked them together by means of an entirely novel theory as to the springs of action moving men of old, not only in Orkney, but in Iceland and the pagan north in general.

This theory may be found explicitly enunciated again on p. 8. "The Norsemen of the heroic age were ostentatious and greedy of fame. . . . They were unabashed by social obligation, undeterred by moral prohibition, and they could be quite contemptuous of economic advantage and the safety of their skins. But they saw clearly a difference between right and wrong, and the difference was aesthetic. If what they did became a story that would please the ear, then it was right and beautiful. . . ."

Now of the four possible deterrents mentioned in the second sentence above, the first two at least can be discounted forthwith. The duty of standing by one's family and kinsmen, and of avenging any affront or injury suffered by them, was regarded as a most imperative moral obligation, however much at times it might go against the grain, as it did for example in the case of Flosi in the Njal Saga. And though to us their moral code might seem at times barbaric, as to its potency there can be no manner of doubt. And though it is a pleasing enough artistic fancy that the form of action followed by an old Norseman of the heroic age was consciously dictated by his aesthetic sense of what would be a *beau geste*, or make a tale worth telling in days to come—such a theory requires more than the normal modicum of salt to make it palatable.

It is interesting however to note how this theory at once recalls that brilliant essay of R. L. Stevenson on *The English Admirals*, in which he sought to account for the doughty deeds and memorable words associated with their memory. But his conclusion was much more prosaic. ". . . the fact is, fame may be a forethought and an afterthought, but it is too abstract an idea to move people greatly in moments of swift and momentous decision. It is from something more immediate, some determination of blood to the head, some trick of the fancy, that the breach is stormed or the bold word spoken." As to

which author is right the reader is left to judge.

Apart however from the theory, and perhaps, as hinted above, some slight creaking of the joints in its assembly, *The Ultimate Viking* must command unstinted admiration. As in all Mr. Linklater's work the sweep and verve of the narrative carries one on irresistibly, and this might well be prescribed as a text-book on style for high school or university students. For as a literary stylist Mr. Linklater has few, if any, superiors writing in English to-day. And it is not only the great range and easy control of his vocabulary that are so remarkable, but his selection of the *mot propre* is vastly enhanced by constant flashes of imaginative insight in the similitudes adopted.

Nor has the stirring history of Orkney ever been so succinctly and graphically narrated as in Part I of this book, and it is difficult to overpraise the masterly manner in which, in Part II, he has set forth again and underlined the tense dramatic situations of the Icelandic saga world. The reader's taste must inevitably be whetted for closer acquaintance with those old masterpieces, with the unknown authors of which Mr. Linklater may justly claim kinship, not only by reason of his own Norse descent, but through his similar mastery of the same craft.

H. MARWICK

KIRKWALL, ORKNEY

Experiment in Communism

KIBBUTZ: VENTURE IN UTOPIA. By Melford E. Spiro. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders. 1956. Pp. xii + 266. \$5.95.

While numerous accounts have been written on kibbutz or collective settlement life before and since the founding of the State of Israel, any new treatment of or experience with this unique mode of living is particularly welcomed at a time when Israeli developments are still so much in the news. Of added interest is the fact that this study has been made during a period when the entire kibbutz movement was—and is still—undergoing a crisis. Writing with the trained observation of the anthropologist, Mr. Spiro relates very realistically

the experience of his wife and himself as members of a well-known and long established kibbutz during their eleven months' residence in 1954-55. Identified as 'Kiryat Yedidim'—an anonymity preferred by the author—the kibbutz under examination is one of over two hundred which together claim a total population of about 76,000 members in modern day Israel.

To write adequately and understandingly about the chaverim or members of a kibbutz one must live their daily life and routine as the author has managed to do. He therefore has presented a most vivid interpretation of the communal, moral, political and economic aspects of this "primitivistic movement" which involved some ninety Europeans or chalutzim still in their late 'teens when they migrated to Palestine in 1920. Having selected a specific settlement which has grown to several hundred chaverim occupying an area of 11,000 dunam (a dunam being equal to approximately one-quarter of an acre), we are thus brought face-to-face with a community which holds some Soviet-like, non-religious and socialist beliefs—or a class-conscious proletariat par excellence. Now a generation older and unlike members of other kibbutzim who adhere just as rigidly to anti-Soviet and/or orthodox religious beliefs, they all have in common their years of hard life and privation, conflict and tensions—briefly, constant and varied crises from day to day.

Perhaps the most important single ideal of the kibbutz culture is that based on the moral value of labour: labour viewed as an end in itself. On that basis, the kibbutz seeks to build an idealistic group society in which all are equal, in which the individual does not have to wrest his happiness from society in the daily battle of existence, in which the value of the individual does not depend upon material success—a society in which democracy may be said to achieve absolute consummation. Everyone regardless of his or her work enjoys the same privileges and responsibilities; men and women are co-equals in the economic life of the kibbutz. The concept of 'hakkara' or awareness of one's moral responsibilities to the welfare of the kibbutz in all respects is the compelling force which explains the individual contribution made on the honour

system by each member of the kibbutz. Just as work assignments provide them with the most important physical outlet, so do the 'politics' of the kibbutz account for the most important psychological outlet of the members.

Of interest to westerners has been the disappearance of most of the characteristics and functions of the traditional family. A man and woman do not always get married at 'Kiryat Yedidim', rather do they form a "pair" (zug): the explanation in this case being that the individual tie is supposed to be with the entire community and not one creating a private life. However, there has been a steady increase in the public recognition and admission of the 'couple' relationship. Children are reared in dormitories and spend a limited time with their parents when the latter are free from their allotted and rotated work routine. Thus, though the family does not exist in a structural-functional sense it does continue in a psychological sense. It is to be noted that while divorce was relatively frequent in the past it has of late become much less so. Sexual promiscuity is viewed with suspicion and extramarital affairs though not censured are no longer approved. In this connection, kibbutz life is regarded as requiring high social and moral qualities and not everyone therefore may qualify. (In some kibbutzim, for example, new membership is on a probationary basis of a year usually.)

One of the most significant chapters of Mr. Spiro's monograph is that dealing with the 'crisis psychology' indicating the changed attitude in Israel towards the kibbutz movement. In the words of the author, the situation is frankly stated: "In the past, when the country was still in a primitive, pioneering state, the kibbutzim were viewed with great respect by the rest of the country; and to be a chaver kibbutz was to be a national hero. For the chaver was the very symbol of the chalutz, the pioneer, the prototype of the New Jew. It was he who colonized the most dangerous parts of the country, who protected the borders from Arab marauders, who drained the swamps, and who made the deserts fertile. Hence, wherever he went he was honored. But this picture has changed since Independence. On the one hand, the earliest immi-

grants are tired of pioneering, of fighting, and of sacrifice. Their only desire is to return to a normal existence, and pioneering heroes are no longer important symbols. For the recent great wave of oriental immigration, on the other hand, the kibbutzim are of no significance, for these immigrants possess no cultural values that would assign importance to kibbutz life or to kibbutz ideals. At best, therefore, the kibbutzim are viewed with indifference."

Other trends are similarly contributing to a crisis within the movement. For example, the increasing desire in the kibbutz, to acquire private property (originally books and fountain pens but now extending to radios and refrigerators); the desire for privacy as distinct from group living and for more of the comforts of life (preferring their private quarters to the communal dining room or the construction of private showers attached to their quarters); the reluctance to accept official responsibilities within the kibbutz division of labour; the vague sense of disillusionment displayed by the chaverim of their achievements over the years; the problem of the woman which, it is claimed, because of their frustration in so many roles—maternal, sexual and economic—is responsible for much of the tension in the kibbutz; and finally, the uncertainties as to whether the character of the sabras or native-born Israelis is such as to be entirely consistent with the perpetuation of the kibbutz culture.

Fortunately, Mr. Spiro's next and greater contribution will deal with this latter group—the children of the vattikim or veteran pioneers who have been born and reared at 'Kiryat Yedidim'. An evaluation of the socialization and the personality development of this sabra-group will, it is hoped, explore new ground and answer many pertinent queries. For the present, one must fully agree with one of the author's main conclusions that 'Kiryat Yedidim' is a community whose worldly sophistication is much higher than that of the average rural community, and whose intellectual interests are much above those of the average Western community—rural or urban.

PHILIP STUCHEN

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Trade Union History

THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL TRADE UNION. By Lloyd Ulman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited, 1955. Pp. xix + 639. \$12.35.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT AND THE UNIONS. By Milton J. Nadworny. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders and Company Limited, 1955. Pp. vi + 187. \$4.95.

The author of *The Rise of the National Trade Union* confronts his readers with a rather formidable task in its six hundred well-filled pages. And he may surprise some readers too when they realize that he deals only with national unions as they appeared in the period 1850 to 1900. But he is interested in explaining why trade unionism in America is what it is, and so he concentrates his attention on the formative years.

The author does a thorough job of explaining how he sees the environment in which American unions found themselves forcing them to adopt the principles of business unionism. He explains further how the adoption of business unionism as a policy, in turn, affected the relations of the national union with the local union and with the national federation, the A. F. of L., and ultimately put the national union in the dominant position in the structure of organized labour in America.

The author concludes with a critical examination of Commons' theory of trade unionism and of Perlman's theory. He proposes that these theories both fail to provide adequate explanations of American trade unionism.

The second volume under review is, as its subtitle states, an historical analysis of the relations between the scientific management group and organized labour between 1900 and 1932. It notes the origin and the development of Frederick Taylor's "scientific management" programme; Taylor's outspoken opposition to trade unionism as an institution that he thought had no function in a situation where scientific management is practised; organized labour's equally strong opposition to Taylor and to his system.

Then the study traces the changes in the personnel and in the attitudes of the two groups, the changes in the environment in which they worked and it describes the gradual development of new relations between them.

The author concludes that scientific management "decisively shaped the course and development of industrial management programs, and also exerted a direct influence on the evolution of American trade union policies."

This little book is a very readable, concise and informative summary of the results of the author's extensive study of his subject.

C. H. CURTIS

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

Historians on History

HISTORY IN A CHANGING WORLD.
By Geoffrey Barraclough. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. In Canada: Burns and MacEachern. 1956. Pp. viii + 246. \$5.00.

History in a Changing World is a collection of fifteen essays of uneven level. The introductory essay—*The Historian in a Changing World*—seems to have been written for the purposes of the present publication. The others address themselves to English public school boys, to radio audiences, to University audiences, and to various other persons. The only unifying thread is supplied by the author's ideas about history, which keep recurring, and by the general subject matter, which is mostly European.

Mr. Barraclough, Toynbee's successor in International History at London has many interesting things to say, though it is difficult to understand why Toynbee himself should proclaim that "here are sticks enough of dynamite to blow nineteenth century Western historicism to smithereens. . . ." The dynamite is rather damp: it does not go off with a loud bang, and what is more, plenty of other people over the years have been engaged in the same destructive task. I first had my own attention forcefully called to the inadequacies of the 19th

century method by a talk of the late Charles A. Beard given at Harvard about 1928, and he was not the first whose faith was weak. Since then the work of demolition, not always conducted with too much wisdom, has gone steadily on.

Mr. Barraclough rightly contends that the 19th century effort to reconstruct the past in all its reality was vain: too much had perished. In fact, in a sense there never has been a past, for at no time in history could agreement be secured on the nature of the living moment, let alone time gone by. Are there then as many pasts as there are people busy reconstructing them? If so, every man is his own historian and instead of something like a science, we go back to old conceptions of "moral lessons", "great deeds" and even mere collections of curiosities. Yet 19th century methods, if they could have been proved valid, would have rivetted on life a grim determinism, for they were inspired by the faith that the present proceeds inexorably from the past, and that men can discover "the laws" which govern the process. Today the historians know they cannot attain reality and the physicists have bumped into their "uncertainty" principles, so that from these two very different approaches, the ultimate nature of reality seems as elusive as ever.

Mr. Barraclough is concerned to find adequate reason for writing history. If you cannot work out its "laws" (a process which seems to present no difficulties to Toynbee), and yet must not, for ulterior motives, merely toy with the evidence, what can you do? "Seek the relevant", says Mr. Barraclough. "Remember that the past, in the sense that it can be recovered, is always dead, but that present and past do form a continuum of some sort and that in this way the past may help to explain the living present, and presumably fit in with the future, too."

Finding the relevant is no easy task: its success depends upon what people think is relevant, and this is as various as people, their creeds and group emotions. So round the mulberry bush we go again. There is no end to the discussion, whether in science or in history.

Barraclough pleads for a history not of nations, institutions or peoples but of man, a universal history. His own field is mediae-

val Germany and while he insists that his book is a work of popularization, his pages are loaded with footnote references to German works. Apart from giving some impression of the pride of learning, the references he uses demonstrate something else, something of which he seems partly conscious: that is, the insularity of British scholarship. Even this mediaeval German specialist finds it hard to get away from this impression that the centre of reference, in history as in other matters, has been in the British Isles. But what riches open to the scholar once he can cast off these traditional restraints! Part of the author's task, of course, is to secure this end, for he rightly realizes that "history" is no longer merely the history of Great Britain and western Europe. Hence his interest in Byzantium and in modern Russia. One essay even goes so far as to deal with America. In that essay, Mr. Barraclough discovers Columbus, the American frontier and Professor Webb of the University of Texas, interesting discoveries all, but hardly "news" to those of us in this continent who have long shaped our courses by other than purely European charts.

A last reflection on this book would be that it is only the fortunate persons who live at what is still the fountain-head of English-language scholarship, Great Britain, who could get such a book as this published. A Canadian publisher would have told the author at once that he would have to recast essays already published into a new whole, with greater unity of content. But then any such author writing in Canada would have had no circulation beyond the compartmentalized area within which his fate confines him. The lot of writers in small countries is hard, that of those in the metropolitan centres sometimes seems too easy.

A. R. M. LOWER

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

History of Canadian Education

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION IN CANADA. By Charles E. Phillips. Toronto: W. J. Gage and Company Limited. 1957. Pp. xiii + 626. \$6.50.

In writing this book Dr. Phillips undertook a very difficult task. Education being a provincial matter with the Dominion Government also involved, eleven histories of education had to be written and, as far as possible, brought into relationship. The book is printed on over 600 oversize pages in double columns, probably equal to 1,000 pages of an ordinary book. The author has dealt with aspects of education from the time of Champlain to the present day, and it would be difficult to think of a subject connected with elementary and secondary education under public control which he has omitted. In such a large enterprise one would not expect perfection, and the latter half of the book is rather more readable than the first.

In the first half, in an effort to deal with education in Canada as a whole as far as possible, the writer skips about from province to province and from one year to another; this reader, at any rate, found the procedure somewhat confusing. A large portion of the book is based on theses presented for degrees in education. The choice of material from these theses rests, of course, with the author. The difficulty encountered has, it appears, been chiefly one of compression, and on the whole one feels that too much detail has been included: it is difficult to see the wood for the trees. Is it necessary or of much interest, for example, for the varying vacation periods in Prince Edward Island (p. 243) from 1839 to 1861 to be set down in detail?

It would be generally agreed that education must be considered in the community's social and political setting. Dr. Phillips' solution has been to prefix fairly brief social and political histories of the ten provinces for the periods with which he deals. Of necessity he has leaned heavily on published histories of Canada, and he has chosen to take the point of view of Professors Lower and Underhill: the citizens of this continent are a superior breed; here, untram-

melled by the customs and traditions of older lands, we are forming a society superior in every way to that of the older countries from which our ancestors escaped. *Colony to Nation* appears to be the chief source of historical facts. A political historian has every right to his own point of view; it is, however, debatable whether a writer of educational history can justifiably accept such an extreme point of view as the background to his history of education.

With regard to historical facts, one or two examples of errors may be pointed out. The 1816 Common School Act, says Dr. Phillips, "was passed by the Legislative Council with some reluctance in return for non-interference by the assembly with the grammar schools" (p. 112). Actually the Bill was Strachan's, then a member of the Executive Council. Whether there was reluctance on the part of the Legislative Council to its being passed is difficult to determine, as the Journals of the Council for this year have been lost. In the Journals of the Assembly we find that the bill was considered in the lower house for nearly a month, sent to the Council and returned to the Assembly next day having been "passed without any amendment". It would be interesting to know where the story of a "deal" originated. On page 98 we find it stated that "By 1800 the population of Upper Canada numbered about 70,000, of whom about half were of Loyalist stock." According to the *Census of Canada* (1870) the population a quarter of a century later, in 1824 (the first census given), was 70,549. With regard to the number of Loyalists Dr. J. J. Talman has estimated that the total in Upper Canada was about 6,000.

At the beginning of the last century the leaders of the Church of England in Canada undoubtedly believed that education should be directed by the Church. "Without knowing God", said John Strachan, "all knowledge is vain." This belief is regarded by Dr. Phillips as reprehensible: a camouflage to hide political ends. Religious education was to have been a means by which the people were to be kept in their place. The grammar schools, often taught by Anglican parsons, and with fees beyond the ability of any but the gentry to pay, were also an

Anglican preserve. The Church of England he refers to (p. 305) as "the church of the aristocracy". The Roman Catholics also believed that education should be directed by their Church. Curiously enough, though the Church of England is to be condemned for holding such a belief, in the case of Roman Catholics it is almost praiseworthy that they should refuse to allow their children to attend schools in which the tenets of their faith were not taught. It is probable that less than justice has been done to a leader such as Strachan who, as noted above, appears to have been responsible for the first Common School Act and believed that any boy of ability, from whatever walk of life he came, should have the opportunity of rising in the world.

The above criticisms refer to the general setting of the story of education up to about 1840, and are not meant to decry the enormous amount of accurate information about schools, teachers, educational leaders, and other facets of education, which is to be found in these pages and would be difficult to find elsewhere.

The latter part of this volume, particularly Part 4, "Educational Thought and Practice", is probably more interesting to the general reader. Here are described the various influences which have affected teaching and the whole conception of education. Among the educational theorists John Dewey became "the outstanding exponent of education in democratic society." The chapter headings of Part 4 will give an idea of the subjects dealt with: "Changing attitudes", "New educational thought", "Curriculum and methods", "Subjects of the curriculum", "Standards and examinations", "Discipline and ethics", "The teacher", and "Teacher education". Each chapter contains many subdivisions which provide a detailed consideration of the development of education. It must also be said that the story of the development is made interesting and the many quotations are apposite.

The history ends with the schools of today. According to Dr. Phillips the development of education in Canada is a story of, on the whole, continual progress. It is unnecessary to say that not everyone

will agree with this view. For a detailed description of the development of education as seen by those who are now directing education in Canada, however, this volume is to be highly recommended.

G. W. SPRAGGE

ARCHIVIST OF ONTARIO

Ryerson: An Intimate View

MY DEAREST SOPHIE: LETTERS FROM EGERTON RYERSON TO HIS DAUGHTER. Edited by C. B. Sissons. Toronto: Ryerson Press. 1955. Pp. xxxvi + 350. \$5.00.

The discovery at London, Ontario, in 1953 of a large number of personal letters from Egerton Ryerson to his daughter, Sophia Harris, has opened a new window into the life of one of the leading figures in Canadian history and into the social life of a middle class family in mid-Victorian Canada. Under the appropriately intimate title, *My Dearest Sophie*, a selection of these letters has been edited by C. B. Sissons, author of the definitive biography of Ryerson (*Egerton Ryerson: His Life and Letters*, 2v., Toronto, Clarke, Irwin, 1937, 1947).

These new letters, spanning a generation of time, from 1859 to 1881, provide a revealing account of Ryerson's trials and tribulations, both public and private, as head of the provincial Department of Education and as head of a growing family. Through Ryerson's eyes the reader sees him enmeshed in the web of politics, worried by the education, career and marriage of his occasionally indolent son, harassed by Sophia's temporary separation from her husband, and driven almost to separation from his own wife by her nagging and niggardliness—this last a social catastrophe for any mid-Victorian but doubly so for a leading and respected Methodist clergyman. With Ryerson the reader shares vicariously the delights of duck-hunting around Ryerson's island retreat in Lake Erie and the carefree experience of a winter in England devoted to research and writing. In

these letters a new Ryerson is revealed—the inner man and his feelings are laid bare in contrast to the almost impersonal exterior of the efficient civil servant and preacher.

Through the letters we also get an intimate view of many-sided life in the Toronto of Ryerson's later years, where an all-round horse was as much a necessity as the family automobile of today, where winter's sleighing parties were succeeded by summer's garden parties, and where Methodist youths struggled against the social pressures of dancing and drinking. If mid-Victorian life has an aura of superficiality and artificiality to the twentieth century reader, it was nonetheless very real and very earnest to mid-Victorians.

The editor has provided a succinct and penetrating introduction which delineates the characters of the persons met in the letters, explains the background of various events and crises, and incidentally supplies an admirable thumbnail biography of Ryerson himself. The volume is a handsome production in format, typography, and binding, embellished with excellent photographs of the Ryerson family and their immediate circle of relatives and friends.

JOHN S. MOIR

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

Administration of Canadian Tariff

TARIFF PROCEDURES AND TRADE BARRIERS: A STUDY OF INDIRECT PROTECTION IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. By G. A. Elliott. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege; Oxford University Press. 1955. Pp. ix + 293. \$7.50.

"Is an ash-tray, combined with a music box, an ash-tray or a music box or neither?" Only a philosopher or a customs appraiser could be expected to worry long with a problem of this sort. Professor Elliott's book has little to do with philosophy (apart from an underlying concern with freedom and justice applied in international trade), but it has a great deal to

do with the administration of the Canadian and American customs tariffs. Particularly, Professor Elliott deals with the way in which uncertainties and complexities in the process of determining the amount of duty discourage the shipment of goods across our frontiers. The musical ash-tray is simply one of countless illustrations which Professor Elliott uses in showing how uncertain and intricate the processes of customs administration can be.

The author deserves full marks for a painstaking survey of an important field, the indirect or incidental protection afforded to domestic industry by administration of the tariff law. At the beginning he quotes Benjamin Leveit: "Let me write the Administrative Act and I care not who writes the rates of duty." The book largely substantiates the truth of the quotation. First, Professor Elliott compares the structure of the Canadian and American tariffs, and then discusses procedures for clearing goods through customs, the burdensome nature of lengthy administrative review or litigation involving disputes over classification or valuation of goods. Where these processes tend to hamper trade, the author is alert to point up ways in which either Canadian or American administration could be made more expeditious and fair.

For example, the author points to the hardship caused to importers by the prospect of being required unexpectedly to pay additional duties even after the imported goods have been sold. He accordingly recommends that the Department of National Revenue be prohibited from demanding that entries of goods be amended after a specified time has elapsed. (page 50)

Clearly, the author prefers relatively straightforward administration of a simple tariff schedule to ingenious protectionism which exploits the complicated and uncertain features of a modern industrial nation's tariff. He is an enemy of concealed protection, and his book is not intended as a primer for protectionists who wish to keep goods out by stealth. Yet this is a useful reference work, whatever the reader's views on protectionism may be.

Now three years old, the material in Professor Elliott's book is still of great

value. The book is a definitive work for the period it covers, and the bibliography, while not over-long, is helpful. The material is assembled in a clear and logical way, though one might ask for a more meticulous proof-reading to eliminate a few typographical errors. Certain recent developments, notably the American Customs Simplification Act of 1956 and the review of the Canadian primary iron and steel tariff, are omitted of necessity, but these omissions do not make this study any less useful to anyone who wishes to have a full understanding of the relationship, past and present, between customs administration and protection of Canadian industry.

DONALD ELDON

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Early Days of Our Tenth Province

LIFE AND LABOUR IN NEWFOUNDLAND. By C. R. Fay. Based on Lectures delivered at the Memorial University of Newfoundland. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1956. Pp. vii + 254. \$5.00.

This is Professor Fay at his story-telling best. It is not difficult to see him stretched out in an easy chair in his Cambridge study, reminiscing about the places he has seen, the people he has met, inviting us to share in the fun of exploring a badly neglected area of Imperial history. He writes as he speaks, caring little for the organization or planning of his narrative, stopping to tell a good story, pushing on to reveal to us the scattered records he has consulted, a happy and benevolent guide who conceals well the toughness that comes of his North Country background. And he writes with love of 'two coastal regions so far apart and seemingly so unconnected', the West Country of England and the West Coast of Newfoundland. Few are as well qualified as Fay to treat these as a single unit; steeped in the history of his own land, knowing at first-hand of the developments across the Atlantic, he provides us with an account solidly based on wide-ranging empirical knowledge.

He takes us first to South Devon and the New Records, 'the No. 1 of Newfoundland material available in English', and now available in microfilm at Ottawa and St. John's. He introduces us to Job's, and Bowerings', leading houses in St. John's and follows this with a brief and brilliant chapter on the trade and fishery of Newfoundland which informs as it entertains, and lets us know too of his affection for Dr. Innis, close friend of Toronto days who concealed his art as well as Fay does his. Then on to the Master Builders who played so prominent a part in 'the silent growth of the Second Empire'—James Cook, George Cartwright, David Buchan, William Cormack—and to those architects of law and order, Chief Justice Reeves and Dr. Wm. Carson. Some of the flavour of Fay's narrative may be caught from the following quotation,

It is fascinating to watch the web of history, as it comes off the loom of events. Personalities interact and combine to make a pattern; circumstances, apparently unrelated, in fact concur. Mary March and Surrogate Courts. Reformer Carson and Nancy's skull. Tragedy at the river bank, fire relief in St. John's. Iron tips for the arrow heads, hot cocoa for the crew. Exploring the hinterland or distant inlet, only to see the last Beothic and the last Great Auk. Heroism and the will to save failing nobly before gunpowder and the power to kill. (p. 104)

A lively account of the Island's transition from Fishery to Colony serves as background for a review of the aspirations and frustrations of the merchants of St. John's as revealed in the memorials of grievances forwarded by the town's Chamber of Commerce to London. Frequent ordeals by fire, so carefully recorded in the annals of London insurance companies, then occupy Fay's attention in a chapter which tells us much about life in a centre which 'has been burnt more often than any capital city in the world'. In the closing chapters we pay a visit to Grand Falls and Corner Brook, to Wabana and Labrador, regions whose future, our enthusiastic guide assures us, is unlimited. And perhaps it is. The principal statutes relating to Newfoundland

and extracts from various treaties are set out in two appendices, and there is an adequate index. This small volume, it is safe to say, will leave many of its readers with the conviction that more history should be written this way—Fay's way.

W. T. EASTERBROOK

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

Municipal Problems

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ALBERTA.

By E. J. Hanson. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1956. Pp. xi + 145. \$2.50.

This modest and readable volume is a most welcome addition to the growing literature on Canadian local government, and it deserves to be more widely read than the restricted topic might indicate. That local government as a subject is neglected more because of indifferent presentation and lack of understanding than lack of importance is here well shown. Even the complexities and contradictions of provincial grants are made comprehensible, without great effort on the part of the reader.

Some of the basic problems of local government, which tend to become overlooked in the complexities of old established communities with denser population, are perhaps more obvious in the Western provinces, particularly in the rapidly changing circumstances of Alberta. In addition Alberta has undertaken more experimentation in the forms of local government than any other province.

The search for a satisfactory structure for local government is a constant one. The legislative and administrative convenience of the provincial government requires a system of more or less standard units with uniform powers. At the same time recognition must be given to communities of interests, adequacy of communications in relation to the services to be provided (each with a different ideal area), adequate financial resources, local circumstances, and the necessity of obtaining a representative, responsible and workable elected body.

Some or all of the multitudinous considerations are always changing. The usual process is of accommodation to new circumstances by a series of minor changes with more drastic changes at infrequent intervals.

With a sparse population and inadequate revenue, it was not until 1912 that a system of local government was established in Alberta. Small Rural Municipalities evolved based on land survey townships supplemented by special purpose districts, of which the school district with its one room school was the most important. As needs and resources grew, this system was elaborated but, particularly with the onset of the depression, its weaknesses became apparent. The first step towards a revised structure was the formation of large school divisions comprising up to fifty school districts. Next, the rural municipalities were enlarged, the numbers being reduced from 143 to 60 by 1949. As a more drastic measure two "counties" were established in 1951. Five more have since been formed. These units are unique in Canada not only for their size but also because the whole range of local government services, including education and hospitals is under the jurisdiction of the one elected body. They appear to have been very successful in securing unified control and responsibility, higher standards of administration and service, and a reduction in overhead costs. With the establishment of a Co-Terminous Boundaries Commission, which toured the whole province hearing local opinion and trying to obtain local consent, progress has also been made in sorting out the chaos of overlapping boundaries.

The problems of urban local government involving rapid development, heavy debt, and in the case of Edmonton and Calgary boundary problems on a metropolitan scale have not been as peculiar to Alberta as have those of the rural area.

In Alberta as elsewhere, the taxation of real property has become more and more inadequate as a source of income for local government and less and less appropriate to the range of services to be financed. The pattern followed in most other jurisdictions, with interesting local variations, has been followed: the supplementing of locally raised revenue by government grants, a

simple system of grants becoming more complicated and the grants larger until the necessity for a simpler scheme and other sources of local revenue has become apparent.

STUART FYFE

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

Satirical Poet

THE POETICAL WORKS OF CHARLES CHURCHILL. Edited with an introduction and notes by Douglas Grant. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xxii + 587. \$9.50.

Mr. Thurber has observed that the principal strain in English satire is the political. Charles Churchill, who rhymed 'law' and 'Nassau', supports such observation. Churchill's career was brief, and almost fortunately so, for his poetry, always wayward, was by fate strongly organized around the central figure of a day,—John Wilkes, whose opposition to Bute in the 1760's was set off by duelling and conspicuous misconduct (this poet sharing in the latter). The character of the Wilkes pieces is illustrated by *The Candidate*, a poem in which Churchill attacked Sandwich as he eyed the High Stewardship of Cambridge. Sandwich had (most hypocritically) denounced in Parliament Wilkes' *Essay on Woman*. Churchill liked to draw in the whole crowd, and *The Candidate* becomes in part an exposé of the Cambridge academic scene. Thomas Gray began immediately to help with identification, and Mr. Grant very much completes the job. The historian especially will be grateful to this editor for his great work in reviving this lively social poetry which carried the satiric tradition from Dryden (whom Churchill preferred to Pope) on to Byron. Churchill's Warburton became Byron's Southey.

The 'bold' Churchill shocks still with his vicious, uncensored, often warranted, portraiture. The aging Hogarth, sketching covertly in the gallery of the Court of Common Pleas, produced the well-known satiric sketch of Wilkes and Liberty.

Churchill proceeded to assail the person of Hogarth in an *Epistle* which Garrick immediately described as "the most bloody performance . . . in my time". Garrick's observation was quickly outmoded as Churchill pursued his craft. Churchill was a sensational, well-paid journalistic poet who rarely cared to exalt a victim into a symbol, satisfying himself with the scandal, the shocking fact. We see Johnson's 'horrid features' breaking into a conservative smile. Harsh as the manner is, there is a striking lingering glare in Churchill's dark and knowing pages.

As well as the bold Churchill, there is another poet at work, less affected by the tone of Augustan satire. Perhaps there is a Whig style. Though Churchill fails to rise to the liberal statement, he does move in a popular direction, towards the homelier things we feel rising at this time in Cowper, Burns, and the Scottish poet of Edinburgh, Robert Fergusson. This rather gentler Churchill we trace in some of the lighter portraits: his bluff Talbot who, preferring not to duel with Wilkes by candlelight in a closed room, appears to have consulted tea-cup readers on the safer choices of honour: his Warburton, the flexible, musical bishop, whose wife became a mistress in the Wilkes set. The easier Churchill can be amused with the Scots, who in this misty decade were providing England with Ossian and Oeconomy alike and getting pensions for doing so from the 'Lord of the isles'. The more pleasant Churchill writes running four-foot lines, with rhyming afterthoughts. His light humour is at its best in the long poem on the Cock Lane Ghost, the popular 'apparition' whose well-attended knockings were likened to 'auditions'. This lighter Churchill can reach towards delicate beauty, finding the shadow of shadows, hearing low winds under the sound of rain. He can remember Chaucer's 'April weather'. One should like to think that there was a faintly enlightened Churchill whose real conflict with Hogarth could have been aesthetic.

He is in the main an entertaining poet, yet there is a dull Churchill who for long stretches writes most monotonously in the pious voice of the clerical profession which he so quickly quitted, by episcopal request.

Criticism and Georgian patriotism are two of his more tiresome topics.

In preparing this edition, Mr. Grant has carefully collated texts, and supplied an extensive annotation which, ranging widely across the English scene, does full credit to the remarkable day-to-day interest of this verse. These splendid notes, nicely interrelated, are rather exactly pointed at Churchill's decade, with the result that we have a volume which becomes a brilliant period piece,—a most revealing image of a sophisticated English decade. This is obviously imaginative editing. Notes draw upon rarer titles of this period, and as often upon a valuable secondary bibliography concerned with Churchill and his time. The Index, excellent as it is, unfortunately does not keep up with these secondary writers, nor with Mr. Grant's manuscript material, as in the case of the Harvard manuscript of Walpole's notes on Churchill. A short biography introduces this edition,—objective in its tone and wisely avoiding that 'self' which Churchill avoided.

KENNETH MACLEAN

VICTORIA COLLEGE, TORONTO

Subtle Poet

T. S. ELIOT'S POETRY AND PLAYS.
By Grover Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1956. Pp. 338. \$6.00.

The work of T. S. Eliot obviously cries out for primers, introductions, manuals and guides, interpretations and commentaries. His poetry on first approach has always seemed to me like one of those gatherings in Proust where woe betide the visitor if he doesn't know protocol and the exact deferences due: you're not dressed in the right clothes, what! you don't know what Little Gidding was and you have read neither Gautier nor Ezekiel! Unfortunately, in removing so many of the difficulties in Eliot's poetry, Mr. Smith has left the impression that Eliot is somehow to blame and that in making his poetry so difficult he has

made some sort of mistake. I gather that Eliot's reply to the usual query about why his poems are so hard is that he can say what he is saying in no other way. Mr. Smith seems to think that (a) it would help if Eliot did not let the thematic development of his poems grow out of allusions to other writers quite so much. He has been too "content" to do this; (b) *Ash Wednesday* not only suffers from disjointedness, so do *The Waste Land* and the *Hollow Men*; (c) Eliot lacks a ready power of empathy—his poetic vision is too private; (d) if we knew more of Eliot's biography we would then know what he really meant.

Now Mr. Smith has heroically explained so many of Eliot's literary allusions that it does seem too bad if neither Eliot nor Mr. Smith can put them to any good use. Surely Eliot's essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent" in which the new poem is seen as becoming part of the grand body of literature in the same way that the individual Christian is supposed to become one with Christ, surely that essay justifies the poetic allusions; in both Pound and Eliot new poetry is a tremendous rearrangement or "making it new" of old poetry. If Mr. Smith doesn't like that way of writing poetry he should certainly discuss Eliot's critical theories more thoroughly than he does; otherwise the reader is left feeling that there is not much to be said on Eliot's side. Perhaps the poet was not only "content" to write his poems that way but struggled night and day for that effect.

The disjointedness Mr. Smith finds in Eliot is again a literary device the critic does not recognize as such. You might just as well complain of Wordsworth's jointedness in *The Prelude*. As to Eliot's lack of empathy and "the brackish waste places of his young manhood" the lack of distinction between poet Eliot and man Eliot is troublesome. If he means Eliot's poetry "has perhaps failed in essential generosity and good humour, in steady compassion for the human lot" I immediately think that either Eliot should have written more sweetly about the hollow men, or written love poems, or perhaps—does he mean—been a kinder person himself? As to the "brackish waste places" the author admits that we do not know enough about Eliot's life; *Prufrock* is a work of pretty wonder-

ful imagination for a youth led in wild brackishness. The whole book is not like this; there are many pages that give valuable insights into the poetry and the plays. But I still feel that the author's whole plan is wrong. What is the use of placing Eliot's work against the context of his emotional life, particularly when we know so little about it? If a poem as good as *Ash Wednesday* seems "haphazard" then it is too easy to cry for more biography. It is really more knowledge of the impersonal literary tradition that is needed.

JAMES REANEY

UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA

Poet at Work

SHELLEY AT WORK. A CRITICAL INQUIRY. By Neville Rogers. Oxford: 1956. Pp. xx + 356. 35s.

"The mind," Shelley noted in a draft Preface for *The Cenci*, is "a wilderness of intricate paths, wide as the universe, which is here made its symbol." Shelley's notebooks are likewise a wilderness of intricate paths, calculated to intrigue the unwary and baffle all but the most resolute and sensitive inquirer. By a remarkable act of synthesis and penetration Mr. Rogers threads his way through these documents—poems and drafts of poems, abandoned fragments, memoranda, drafts of letters and translations, drawings, scraps of Greek, Italian, Spanish, Latin—to discover what Shelley's ideas were and how derived. His purpose is to show how Shelley interpreted his experience through his ideas, to discern and clarify Shelley's intention and his thought, and to unravel the symbolism which is the body of thought expressed in his poetry.

Fifty years ago Yeats approached some scholar in search of illumination about the symbolism of *Prometheus Unbound*, and was told that the poem was merely Godwin versified. Recent scholarship, having a stronger stomach for "the poetry of ideas" and a sharper eye for sources, has carried us a little farther than that. But readers of Shelley—even persistent ones and even

the early Yeats—have been puzzled by the wealth of promising but poetically unrealised imagery, the similes that never grow into metaphor, the recurrent images that never quite become symbols, the urgent rhetoric that so often seeks to do the work of imagination. What Mr. Rogers has done is to trace the emergence and history of Shelley's central thoughts and images, and to show how, detaching themselves from their sources, these deepened and modulated—in his mind, if not in his poetry—into a coherent symbolic structure of increasing strength, scope, and flexibility. This is a fascinating and firmly documented account, showing how poetic thought clarifies itself through successive refinements and combinations, flowing in and out of life, receiving colour and depth from mundane complexities, disasters, and delights.

The first major transition in Shelley's thought was the shift of emphasis from Necessity to Love, from Godwin to Plato. But he extended his Platonism into a conception distinctly Shelleyan, almost Christian, which reached its first great climax in *Prometheus Unbound*. The underlying impulse is "libertarian energy"; his persistent character daemonic; the theme, the regenerative power of world-pervading love. His idea of Intellectual Beauty as the end of the poetic quest is interfused with the notion of love as energetic, liberating, creative. Good and evil are cyclic processes; only through regeneration of the will can love set in motion the rebirth cycle which brings all things to a just order in the overthrow of tyranny and the restoring of man to his Elysian birthright of freedom and energy.

But a poet's business is with vision, not with theory or ideas. And Shelley so constantly moves from the idea to the image that, despite the firmness and legitimacy of his symbolic system, his poetry is more often than not robbed of the very substance which symbolism exists to provide. Even Shelley himself regarded *Adonais* as "My least imperfect poem"; for he recognised that his problem was to encompass imagination in language and that right to the end he had not solved it. For all the "impassioned lyricism", Shelley was seldom capable of exploiting the true music of poetry. But in the later work there are signs of

steadier accomplishment. Whether his dying when he was not quite thirty may have arrested a poetic development of the first order, there is no saying. But now that Mr. Rogers's book has shown how serious and powerful a symbolic impulse was struggling to birth in Shelley, we are able to read the poems with fresh enlightenment and with a greater respect for his intellectual and imaginative stature.

GEORGE WHALLEY

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

Poet and Science

MILTON AND SCIENCE. By Kester Svendsen. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders. 1956. Pp. viii + 304. \$7.25.

For some twenty-five years keen and competent research students have studied collections of scientific data, made or translated by English writers of the Middle Ages or the Renaissance, and well known in Milton's time. This kind of investigation, more congenial and rewarding than much of the probing into theological dogmas held three hundred years ago, has helped Mr. Svendsen to show critics need not seek specific sources for the scientific information which Milton used in his prose writings and his poetry. Mediaeval and Renaissance encyclopedias which went back to Pliny and treated vast numbers of topics, including cosmology, natural history, mineralogy, and medicine, provided popular reading in the seventeenth century. Scientists of the Royal Society might look down on them, and the eighteenth century, if it knew them at all, might consider them old-fashioned; but "in Milton's strategy as poet," Mr. Svendsen remarks, "classical, mediaeval, and Renaissance science informs and particularizes meaning in the constant interplay of images and ideas."

Mr. Svendsen states his problems clearly and organizes his material admirably. "One must identify, describe, and explain the natural science in Milton; establish its origins and relation to seventeenth-century culture; define its place in the thought of his works;

and show its function in his art." He deals in successive chapters with the main subjects of the encyclopedias, cosmology, mineralogy, botany, the animal kingdom, the body and mind of man; he notes in Milton's prose and in his poetry the frequent and skilful use of this varied information, often as metaphor and simile.

The cosmology of *Paradise Lost* has long attracted close attention. I once heard an able scientist brush aside "poor old Milton"—who was not yet sixty when the poem was published—because he followed the Ptolemaic system although he was well aware of the Copernican. But Milton, as Mr. Svendsen points out, "was not even seriously interested in a contest of cosmological theories. . . . His conviction of man's moral responsibility . . . outweighed everything else." In Milton's pictures of minerals and plants and trees this keen critic looks for subtleties which others may miss, and he may at times over-stress the symbolism of the many references to animals, actual and fabulous; but his analysis makes the pictures stand out in vivid detail. Again and again he notes Milton's use of movement, of balance and contrast; curiously enough, he does not suggest the analogy of counterpoint, although this would have been natural to the music-loving son of a musician. He notices Milton's wide and detailed knowledge of medical matters, shown more in the prose writings than in the poems, and his interest in dreams; and he deplors the tendency of some recent psychological critics to look on "the ambivalence of Satan's character" as "Milton's unguarded self-revelation." To this interpretation, as to an older insistence that Milton, in spite of himself, made Satan the hero of the poem, Mr. Svendsen's conclusion gives a clear answer; ". . . we must believe that he means what he says, or literary criticism is impossible." He comments on Milton's outstanding use of physical and spiritual light, contrasted with darkness and shadow, particularly in the famous passage in Book I, describing Satan, "the ominous sun in eclipse, a thing of good made evil."

Throughout the book the wording is often heavy and abstract, but it is sometimes lightened by a neat epigram or a delightful flash of humour. Concerned as he is with both the poetry and the prose writings, Mr.

Svendsen never loses sight of the essential differences between the two, and he does not admire T. S. Eliot's "belated and ungracious palinode." Nor is he so busy with inquiry and catalogue and exposition that he cannot stop to admire the skilful construction, the lovely rhythm, the intense glow of Milton's imagination. His final words pay tribute to "the wide deep vision which is *Paradise Lost*."

WILHELMINA GORDON

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY

His Father's Son

THE AMERICAN HENRY JAMES. By Quentin Anderson. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. 1957. Pp. 369. \$6.50.

The purport of this book is that you can't understand Henry James unless you know his father's ideas. From his father, Professor Anderson argues, James took over whole the views that no power transcends the power of man's own mind and spirit, that nothing exists save that which the consciousness of man has mastered, and that man is wholly responsible for his character. This explains why there is no tragic view of life in Henry James's novels. Both father and son attributed to individuals "a capacity for insight into the nature of things so profound that men may be thought of in their plurality as incarnating an ideal order which will one day visibly prevail." This is the bootstrap myth—the idea that we can pull ourselves up to perfection by our spiritual bootstraps—and it is an indigenous American product. "Much of James's work seems really to have been animated by the belief that the world can be saved by American good faith," says the author.

Everyone knows that the elder James after his spiritual "vastation" developed from his reflection on Swedenborg a private system of metaphysics and psychology. This, according to Professor Anderson, Henry James swallowed whole and bodied forth in his fiction, especially in his later novels. Nearly half of Professor Anderson's book is devoted to a close examination of

The Ambassadors, The Wings of the Dove, and The Golden Bowl in the light of the elder James's eccentric cosmology. This part of the book has all the remorseless ingenuity and humorless zeal of a doctoral dissertation; the author will make a case if he has to burst his buttons to do so. When the reader has tracked the author through the jungle of emblematic references in the three great novels, he wonders if he will ever again have the strength to look at them as works of art.

Professor Anderson maintains that the elder James's views of the nature of man and of the human condition freed the son to become the artist we know. Yet he admits that many of James's impressive works of art, like *The Bostonians* and *What Maisie Knew*, make little or no use of "father's views", and he seems unhappy that he cannot give the full treatment lavished on *The Golden Bowl* to *Portrait of a Lady* and *The Princess Casamassima*. He claims that Henry James "was, after all, a thinker," and yet insists that James's mental horizons were so limited that he was quite unaware that the reader could not understand *The Wings of the Dove* and *The Golden Bowl* unless he also understood the father's system. James really expected (so the argument runs) the reader to see that he was dealing with a metaphysically inclusive psychology; this was because James himself had an extraordinarily provincial mind! "James knew too much about too little."

Professor Anderson is very anxious to claim Henry James as a genuine homespun American, "a man among men in his own American time." He wants James to be read as "our own domestic Dante". James himself declared that he wanted to write so that one could not tell whether he was English or American. He said that it was a complex fate being an American. Professor Anderson takes away the complexity; being an American consists of seeing life in terms of the senior James's private psychology. The truth is that, far from being mainly a product of the parish pump, James was, in Leon Edel's succinct phrase, "a cosmopolite without ever having been a provincial."

CARLYLE KING

UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN

Literary Masters and Lesser Lights

THE LIFE OF LADY MARY WORTLEY MONTAGU. By Robert Halsband. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xiii + 313. \$4.50.

DRAFTS & FRAGMENTS OF VERSE. By William Collins. Ed. J. S. Cunningham. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xii + 49. \$2.00.

THE EARLY MASTERS OF ENGLISH FICTION. By Alan Dugald McKillop. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press. Toronto: Burns and MacEachern. 1956. Pp. x + 233. \$6.25.

Lady Mary Wortley Montagu has always seemed to be one of the most fascinating of the Augustan wits, not because she was a writer of any distinction or even an intellectual in any proper sense of the word, but because she could always be counted on to do the unusual and to defy the conventions in an age which we think of as conventional and which drew the restraints tighter about women than about men. From previous biographies of her we knew that she eloped with the man she loved rather than submit to a marriage arranged in the conventional way by relatives, that she went with her husband on an embassy to Constantinople (where she visited Turkish baths and explored Turkish life as no English woman before her had done), that she introduced the "art" of inoculation against smallpox into England, and that she quarrelled vociferously and at length with Pope. The fact that most of her strong-willed actions were mistakes resulting in her own unhappiness did not destroy her reputation for courage and independence.

Mr. Halsband has now added considerably to our knowledge of her, and his picture is quite consistent with the one we saw before, only infinitely more complete and lively. He has had access to private papers never before made available for study, and he has personally followed her tracks as well as those of her papers, from Constantinople to the new world. Few scholars have done such painstaking research, and have been so richly rewarded by discoveries of importance. He has found out the reason for her departure from

England in 1739 and her subsequent long residence on the continent: she had a rendezvous with a young Italian nobleman, Francesco Algarotti, of specious brilliance and ambiguous character, who on visits to England during the previous years had completely captivated her imagination. That she was again mistaken and that the rendezvous was never kept by him was quite in keeping with the course of this woman's fate. Once again, towards the end of her life, she fell into the clutches of another Italian, Count Ugolino Palazzi, who swindled and virtually imprisoned her. Thus our knowledge of this strange lady has been enlarged and the pathos of her story deepened.

Mr. Halsband has deliberately avoided a psychological analysis of his subject's character, and never pushes his conclusions beyond the point where the ascertained facts have taken him. He has not, for example, been able to find the cause for Lady Mary's notorious quarrel with Pope, and although he clearly indicates where his sympathies lie, he prefers to remain indecisive on the question of rights and wrongs. Nor has he explained her relations with her husband, with whom after their separation she corresponded but whom she never took the trouble to meet, even when they were both on the continent within reach of each other. He risks few intuitive judgments on motives and never attempts to fill up gaps in the evidence with imaginative reconstructions. Trained in the rigid tradition of the graduate school, he has perhaps been rather over-cautious. Truth in biography is never merely the sum of the facts. While Mr. Halsband has avoided the more obvious faults of the scholarly biography—his book is concise, well-balanced, lively, packed with curious anecdote—he stops just short of penetrating the mystery of Lady Mary.

It is a far cry from the flamboyant Lady Mary to the gentle and self-effacing, but even more unhappy, William Collins. The slender volume of scraps from his pen published by Mr. Cunningham, comprising the first autograph manuscripts of Collins's poetry to come to light, derive a good deal of their interest from the fact that Collins wrote so little and so obviously failed to fulfil his promise as a poet. These hitherto unpublished poems contain, as one might

expect, quantities of nymphs, swains, genii, druids, and muses, but they have a certain poignant simplicity that one misses in the work previously published. They express more of Collins himself: his love of music and painting, for instance, as well as of the people and places dear to him. Even his unhappy love-affair with Miss Goddard, hitherto known of only through a brief mention by William Seward, is lamented in an elegy of nine stanzas. It is a pity that almost all of these poems remain incomplete, like the rest of those "ten thousand glorious systems" that, according to Thomson, Collins was in the habit of building in his mind. But they are as complete as a considerable number of those published in his works.

Professor McKillop's study of the Eighteenth-Century novelists is another piece of thorough scholarship. The writers discussed—Defoe, Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne—have been studied by recent writers of scholarly and critical articles in the journals and by biographers and bibliographers, but since the publication of the great standard histories of the novel, their places in the development of the tradition have not until recently been given full-scale consideration. Most writers have been content to pair them off antithetically or to pigeon-hole them—Defoe for realism, Fielding for "comic epic in prose", Richardson for sentiment, Sterne for whimsy, Smollett for smut. Without violently upsetting the applecart of received opinion on these writers, Professor McKillop has gently revealed the inadequacy of these platitudes and by carefully analysing all their novels and almost everything that has been written about them, has built up a more judicious doctrine. And he tends to show how they all in their own ways contributed to the same growing tradition. His book is not exciting, and he makes no startling statements. Sometimes he seems to be writing too exclusively for the undergraduate ploughing through a list of required reading. But he is sound, sensible, and very often highly enlightening.

CLARENCE TRACY

UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN

Literary Criticism

CONTEXTS OF CRITICISM. By Harry Levin. *Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature*, XXII. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Toronto: S. J. Reginald Saunders. 1957. Pp. xi + 294. \$6.50.

The book-sodden reviewer, thumbing his index of clichés to find one to fit a book of this kind, usually remarks that it will add little to a great reputation. In *taedio veritas*, in this case. This is certainly not the work to which I shall return to remind myself immediately of Professor Levin's extensive learning and profound intuition of the nature of literary creation. He has written the best of all books on Marlowe, the best general essay on Joyce, and, in his introduction to the Random House Jonson, has produced what is in my view the model of all short critical introductions, compressed, stylish, and wise. But here are gathered 'a series of papers which have led a scattered existence through the past ten years', sparks from the anvil, addresses, occasional scholarly papers, contributions to symposia, in which the author himself confesses that the main connecting element is expressed in the word *contexts*, the points where general critical definitions and assumptions are tested by reference to their application to particular texts. A collection of this kind is a set of intermittently composed excursions to an unwritten book.

That last way of putting it is not, I know, wholly satisfactory (one remembers the story told of the great mediaevalist T. F. Tout, who explained amiably that he kept on publishing studies and papers because he had got into the habit of reading proof), but it may help to get at the real value of this bundle of papers. For it is true that the best critical intelligences are whole and consistent; when a man's mind is literally made up, *composed*, whatever he writes will have some character of that form. The superficial evidence of this fact is to be found often in the choice of favorite themes or subjects: Professor Levin is interested, for example, in the history of the novel and in the function of criticism at the present time, and those interests dominate this collection. More deeply considered, the settled and characteristic quality of such a mind is revealed not so much in interests or even

opinions or prejudices, but in a distinctive way of analyzing and critically evaluating experience, whether of nature or art, a style of words. Professor Levin has the kind of poised intelligence which perceives the value of complementary relationships, of contemplating at once the obverse and reverse of things. He finds this relation between *Moby-Dick* and *Don Quixote*, between Balzac and Proust, between classicism and realism, symbol and sign, American and Europe. This anti-dogmatic habit informs his most important opinions, and even determines the balance of his sentences. The superb close of *The Overreacher* is an example: "The course of Icarus, defying the laws of gravity and common sense, was obviously uncertain and unsafe; yet even Bacon was compelled to admire it, because its youthful swiftness kindled a certain magnanimity."

Contexts of Criticism is full of examples, and reminds us, besides, in two essays on Cervantes, that the exemplary image of Professor Levin's mind is to be found in *Don Quixote*, in the dialogue of Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. You may call that long wonderful conversation what you will, a contest of art and nature, spirit and flesh, past and present, but in it the world of words and the 'sense of reality' meet—and complement each other.

MILLAR MACLURE

VICTORIA COLLEGE, TORONTO

An Old Master

CONFESSIONS OF FELIX KRULL CONFIDENCE MAN. By Thomas Mann. Translated from the German by Denver Lindley. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart. 1955. Pp. 384. \$4.95.

The Confessions of Felix Krull Confidence Man finds Mann writing in an entirely new vein. This buoyant, relatively short picaresque novel describing the harum-scarum 'high jinks' of a brainy young egotistical adventurer differs completely from that lengthy sociological chronicle, *Buddenbrooks* in which Mann illustrated

his artist credo that 'only the exhaustive can be truly interesting'. It is even farther removed in type from *The Magic Mountain* with its complicated symbolical patterns and its variety of interpretation. Nor do we find here the religious allegory of the *Joseph* series or the political and social messages which form an integral part of so many of the artist's works.

Yet the *Confessions of Felix Krull* is as great a masterpiece as any of its forerunners. It is a vivid testimony to the unimpaired genius of Thomas Mann, octogenarian. The first fifty-four pages of the novel were written in 1911 when Mann was 36; the remaining 330 pages were written in his old age, yet the gap of forty-odd years between parts one and two is barely discernible. 'I take up the thread of my story exactly where I dropped it', states Krull, and, indeed, if one did not know of the time lag, one simply would have thought that Mann had picked up his pen again before the ink on the pages of the first section was dry.

It is the peculiar gusto of the novel which makes it memorable. Recounted in the first person, the stream of the narrative flows with an apparently spontaneous joy from one episode to the next—from Krull's childhood as the son of the champagne-maker in the Rhine valley to his adventures as a hotel employee in Paris to the climactic episode in which he impersonates a wealthy English nobleman on a grand world tour. The delight in sheer mischief with which Krull relates his life's adventures reminds one of the vigorous picaresque style of the Elizabethan and Jacobean novelists. As in the case with these Renaissance novelists, much of the book's charm lies in the vicarious pleasure that the reader experiences in witnessing the hero's roguish triumphs.

Even if we praise this last novel of Mann's for its remarkable verve, one may still ask how it can be placed on an equal footing with works of such profundity of thought and complexity of form as *Buddenbrooks* or *The Magic Mountain*. Despite the deceptively simple appearance of the story, it has been endowed with maturity of form and vision through the use of a main theme—the mask. Forming the bedrock of the novel, this theme of the mask

with its ironic implications underlies the rippling recital of Krull's antics. The question of the 'real self', and more particularly, its integrity in the twentieth century with its emphasis on mass thinking, had always intrigued Mann: Does a 'real self' exist or is a person merely a collection of the various masks which he adopts, chameleon-like, in each different social situation? Felix Krull is the mask-donner par excellence. He changes with adroit impudence from the obsequious elevator boy to the remorseless thief, to the impeccable waiter, and finally, as a kind of grand finale, to Louis Venosta, the distinguished English nobleman. Thus through the rogue, Felix, Mann poses the question that is of increasing importance for the modern world with its emphasis on conformity or the single mask: does anything exist behind the mask but one huge empty Cheshire-cat grin?

Irony is then the novel's essence. Not only are the ironic possibilities of each individual situation developed to the full, but as the novel progresses, each episode is exploited more thoroughly and subtly, so that the story gains a cumulative force. This is particularly well illustrated by one of the final episodes in which Krull, impersonating the English nobleman, converses with Professor Kuckuck, the palaeontologist. A genuine sense of admiration for the professor and for the knowledge that he has to impart suffuses the whole discourse. There is a beautiful lyrical passage in which Kuckuck describes the oneness of Nature:

"This interdependent whirling and circling, this convulsion of gases into heavenly bodies, this burning, flaming, freezing, exploding, pulverizing, this plunging and speeding bred out of Nothingness and awakening Nothingness—which would perhaps have preferred to remain asleep and was waiting to fall asleep again—all this was Being—Our human brain, our flesh and bones, these were mosaics made up of the same elementary particles as stars and star dust and the dark clouds hanging in the frigid wastes of interstellar space."

Yet there is also the sly suggestion that Kuckuck is an arid pedant wasting the precious moments of real life collecting bones

'of a long-extinct species of tapir'. Names, moreover, are always significant in Mann, and is there not something slightly ridiculous about 'Kuckuck'?

Because of his extraordinary vigour and his masterly use of irony both as a source of form and perceptive comment, Mann has achieved in the *Confessions of Felix Krull* what Yeats says sadly no man achieves—a finish worthy of the start.

PATRICIA BROADHURST

KINGSTON, ONTARIO

Canadian Novelists

UNDER THE RIBS OF DEATH. By John Marlyn. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. 1957. Pp. 288. \$3.50.

STREET OF RICHES. By Gabrielle Roy: (translated from the French *Rue Deschambault* by Harry Binns). Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited. 1957. Pp. 246. \$4.50.

Taken separately, the parts that make up the novel *Under the Ribs of Death*, are full of excellence. The style is clear, the word surfaces are even, the prose texture is tough and pleasantly bristling, and the colouring is vivid.

The theme of the story is perennial, depicting as it does, the struggle of a Hungarian boy to grow up in an alien Anglo-Canadian culture during the nineteen twenties and thirties. The setting is an abstract Winnipeg which becomes concretized around a group of poor immigrant workers. In this world, bordered by freight yards, poor shops and Christian missions, the struggle to hold a job, feed and clothe the children, and to gain a measure of social acceptance is very real.

But the novel as a whole fails to come alive. Its spirit is not infectious. Perhaps this is because the author is so determined to show us step by detailed step how the hero, twelve year old Sandor Hunyadi becomes Alex Hunter, an assimilated north-end businessman. In denying his father's values—Spencer, Darwin and Kropotkin—which don't put clothes on anyone's back

or pay the instalments owed to the local real-estate fixer, Sandor fails to seek for anything deeper in the new culture than the promise of "belonging" and the erasure of his difference which he always perceives in a negative way. His boyhood dream is to see himself a man "sitting in the lobby of the Hotel, bright button shoes on his feet, his hat and cane on a table nearby—rich and well fed and at ease there in one of the great leather chairs, smoking an after-dinner cigar."

And so it comes about that Sandor never feels himself subjectively. He does not see himself as a person radiating from his own centre, but as a helpless object which everyone manipulates. Terrible things are done to him: a shadowy English gang chases him after school, and if he fights, his father beats him. He suffers every bitter humiliation of poverty—the plain hunger for food, the wearing of rummage sale clothes, and the sight of his father shamed at the hands of richer and more powerful men. He is anchorless, alone, and destitute, without even the price of a birthday present when he is invited to another child's party. It was as if the author had purposely dipped his hand into a great sack of miserable circumstance and showered his characters with the contents.

It would have made for a more convincing story if the author had dipped his other hand into the limitless well of man's nature, which has a subjective non-rational force of its own, and which can fight circumstance with the most uncircumstantial of weapons. This is hinted at in the character of Sandor's father, and dimly symbolized by Sandor's wife Mary.

But these hints of a richer more interesting life that goes on beneath the surface intrude too rarely. John Marlyn is far more interested in drawing a lively swash-buckling Onkel Janos whom the fates first deprive of a job and then force into a tormenting marriage with a rich old and stingy widow. But it is not fate which forces him; it is his own weakness. Like many another character, Onkel Janos is finally redeemed, but in Mr. Marlyn's strategy elements take their places too close to the end of the story. As in a chess game, we are only too conscious that everything depends on the next move, and since the game has been arranged by the author

beforehand, the characters cannot alter its outcome even if they wish.

Towards the end of the story, when Sandor has lost his hopes and his job, and is on relief, warm familial love is introduced as the medium for change and revelation. Looking into his son's eyes, Sandor is filled "with a gladness such as he had rarely known, because in those mild depths, it seemed to him, were all those things, miraculously alive, which he had suppressed in himself; stifled for the sake of what he had almost felt within his grasp, out there, over his son's head, out and beyond in the grey desolation."

But nothing in the story has prepared us for this point, so how can we believe that we have really arrived?

Street of Riches, Gabrielle Roy's fourth big work, is a kind of illuminated autobiography, in which the author selects certain phases of her life and recreates them for us in terms of a personal vision. She is not concerned with linguistic considerations, with the novelist's strategy or the short story writer's machinations. She has freed herself from almost all external canons in the matter of style, and has attained the point of development where her style is nothing more nor less than her own individuality. And it is this individuality, this Gabrielle Roy-ness, which comes through on these pages as naturally, as intimately, and as inevitably as the life process itself.

Street of Riches has another quality—one which I hesitate to name in a time when it has ceased to be a valid critical standard for all but the sentimental hangers-on of the discredited nineteenth century—it is beautiful. This doesn't happen by accident. It seems to me that beauty is something that belongs with those elements which unify, draw together, and make whole, while the other kind of elements—those which separate and divide and exist together in however purposeful a discord—may be of equal value and they are certainly of equal truth, but they don't make us feel as we feel about Gabrielle Roy's stories, that "they loved to happen".

The stories revolve around a French Canadian family who lived in St. Boniface when it was still rural enough to be bordered by meadows and to have wooden sidewalks. The narrator is the youngest of eight children, known as Petite Misere, and

it is through her that we experience the most subtle nuances of the relationship between parents and children, between sisters and brothers.

In "The Gadabouts", where Petite Misere tells about her mother's longing for freedom, the trip across the bridge into Winnipeg and the shopping at Eaton's, she also tells what this aroused in her childish soul: "I was annoyed that Maman could want for anything except being eternally chained to me and the house . . ." and "I was none too overjoyed to see this change in her, to see her think of her own tastes, indulge a whim; and yet I cannot say that I was displeased to see her walking without fatigue, her head held high, smiling to herself. Probably I wanted to hold captive those I loved, but I wanted then happy in their captivity."

The picture of this middle-aged mother taking the decision to go on a trip, buying material and designing a travelling suit, sewing at night to earn the money, making boarding-in arrangements for her older daughters, and then finally setting off for the distant unknown, has in it all the fulfillment and joy which comes from translating one's dreams into action. As Maman tells her husband of the wonders of her journey, Petite Misere observes: "Upon her face her memories were like birds in full flight."

Apart from the relationships which Miss Roy describes with such particularity and insight, all her stories move with the constant fluidity of two worlds, the inner and the outer. Between these worlds a busy exchange is continually taking place, and experience in the one is always being searched for its significance in the other.

A summer of whooping cough results in long days in a hammock listening to the music of glass chimes in the wind:

"Was all this lost time? Then why is it that the time of futile questions, of minute problems probed to no effect, is the time that recurs and recurs to the soul as the time it has used the best?"

For it is this lingering in the time-field itself, without special purpose, which is one of the conditions for artistic creativity. In "The Voice of the Pools", the author affirms this once more as she sets the

loneliness of the writer's life against the clamorous tune of prairie nights alive with the sound of the frogs calling to each other from their swamps.

Miss Roy writes also about more common experiences. *Petite Misere's* awakening femininity, which she adorns with paste jewelry, is matched by her spontaneous decision to exorcise that pagan soul in herself. And when we read of her clinging silently to the earpiece of the telephone while her suitor plays the violin at the other end, not only do we feel that we have arrived at this reality, but—and this is a greater tribute—we feel that we have never departed from it.

MIRIAM WADDINGTON

MONTREAL

Early Political Philosophy

FROM ALEXANDER TO CONSTANTINE. Passages and Documents illustrating the History of Social and Political Ideas 336 B.C. - A.D. 337: Translated with Introductions, Notes and Essays by Ernest Barker. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 1956. Pp. xxiv + 505. \$7.50.

It has long been the tradition in schools and universities that courses in Greek history end with the death of Alexander, and that Roman history should end with the death of Marcus Aurelius. Consequently, many classical students, and even university professors, have limped along with only a superficial knowledge of the Hellenistic Age and the impact of Greek culture on Rome. Any information they have concerning the Jews is often limited to what they have picked up by chance. Yet that period of the three centuries before Christ in the Near East is possibly one of the most formative in the history of western civilization. Sir Ernest Barker's book, which he says will be his last, provides a well-founded bridge from Greece to Rome which will do much to span the gap that has yawned widely for so many years.

The book is an anthology selected from the works of the more important writers of the period, Greek, Jewish, and Roman. There are few readers whose knowledge of the period is so comprehensive that they will be familiar with all Sir Ernest's selections. It is impossible to give a summary of the book's contents. The reader, however, may gain some idea of its scope from the following selection of excerpts: Cercidas on social justice, the "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs" on love of one's neighbour, Paulus on offences against the political order, reflections on kingship by Dio of Prusa, Plutarch, Musonius, Diotogenes, Ecphantus, the "Corpus Hermeticum," and Suidas.


The writer's object, however, is not merely to collect in a readily accessible form works which are difficult to obtain. The book is intended as material for a history of ancient social and political theory after Aristotle. Each of its five parts contains an introduction, notes and valuable essays which clearly illustrate the interrelation of ideas, and provide a stimulating commentary on the period as it evolves.

Every reader, of course, will have his own additions which he would like to have seen incorporated in the work. In the section on "Hellenistic-Jewish Thought," for instance, it would have been worth while to have included a passage from the "Against Apion" of Josephus. Among the Christian apologists there is no mention of the "Octavius" by Minucius Felix.

Any choice must be subjective. What is remarkable is not what Sir Ernest has omitted, but the amount of valuable material that is included. Throughout the work the reader is constantly impressed by the broad humanity that has been the characteristic feature of all the writer's books. It is to be hoped that Sir Ernest will change his mind, and that we have not seen the last work from his pen.

S. E. SMETHURST

QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY





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